Lecture 4

There still remains one more question about the citizen: Is he only a true citizen who has a share of office, or is the mechanic to be included? If they who hold no office are to be deemed citizens, not every citizen can have this virtue of ruling and obeying; for this man is a citizen And if none of the lower class are citizens, in which part of the state are they to be placed? For they are not resident aliens, and they are not foreigners.

May we not reply, that as far as this objection goes there is no more absurdity in excluding them than in excluding slaves and freedmen from any of the above-mentioned classes? It must be admitted that we cannot consider all those to be citizens who are necessary to the existence of the state; for example, children are not citizen equally with grown-up men, who are citizens absolutely, but children, not being grown up, are only citizens on a certain assumption. Nay, in ancient times, and among some nations the artisan class were slaves or foreigners, and therefore the majority of them are so now. The best form of state will not admit them to citizenship; but if they are admitted, then our definition of the virtue of a citizen will not apply to every citizen nor to every free man as such, but only to those who are freed from necessary services. The necessary people are either slaves who minister to the wants of individuals, or mechanics and laborers who are the servants of the community.

These reflections carried a little further will explain their position; and indeed what has been said already is of itself, when understood, explanation enough. Since there are many forms of government there must be many varieties of citizen and especially of citizens who are subjects; so that under some governments the mechanic and the laborer will be citizens, but not in others, as, for example, in aristocracy or the so-called government of the best (if there be such an one), in which honors are given according to virtue and merit; for no man can practice virtue who is living the life of a mechanic or laborer. In oligarchies the qualification for office is high, and therefore no laborer can ever be a citizen; but a mechanic may, for an actual majority of them are rich. At Thebes there was a law that no man could hold office who had not retired from business for ten years. But in many states the law goes to the length of admitting aliens; for in some democracies a man is a citizen though his mother only be a citizen; and a similar principle is applied to illegitimate children; the law is relaxed when there is a dearth of population. But when the number of citizens increases, first the children of a male or a female slave are excluded; then those whose mothers only are citizens; and at last the right of citizenship is confined to those whose fathers and mothers are both citizens.

Hence, as is evident, there are different kinds of citizens; and he is a citizen in the highest sense who shares in the honors of the state. Compare Homer's words, like some dishonored stranger (Homer, Iliad, bk. 9, ln. 648; bk. 16, ln. 59.); he who is excluded from the honors of the state is no better than an alien. But when his exclusion is concealed, then the object is that the privileged class may deceive their fellow inhabitants.

As to the question whether the virtue of the good man is the same as that of the good citizen, the considerations already adduced prove that in some states the good man and the good citizen are the same, and in others different. When they are the same it is not every citizen who is a good man, but only the statesman and those who have or may have, alone or in conjunction with others, the conduct of public affairs.

Circa civem autem adhuc restat, etc. After the philosopher shows what the virtue of the citizen is, and whether it is the same as the virtue of the good man, he here raises a certain difficulty about what has been determined. And about this he does three things.

First, he arouses the difficulty.

Second, he resolves it, at aut propter hanc quidem rationem, [III.4.2] etc.

Third, he clarifies the solution, at manifestum autem hinc parum, [III.4.4] etc.

First, therefore, he says that a certain difficulty yet remains about the citizen: namely, whether he only is a citizen who is able to share in the government of the city; or whether even the banausoi—that is, the base artisanswho do not happen to share in government—ought to be placed among the citizens. And he argues for each part: because if the banausoi were called citizens—to whom belong nothing about cities—it would follow that the virtue which we called that of the good citizen—that he be able to govern and to be subject well—would not belong to every citizen, because such a citizen was posited as to be unable to govern: but if it would be said that nobody of this kind may be a citizen, a doubt will remain: in what genus the banausoi may be placed? For it could not be said that they are immigrants, as if they came from elsewhere in order to inhabit the city; nor that they are travelers, like wayfarers, who come to the city because of some business, and not in order to dwell. For artisans of this sort have dwellings in the city, and were born in the city, and are not immigrants from elsewhere.

Then, where he says aut propter hanc quidem, etc., he resolves the aforementioned doubt, and he says that on account of this last reason, which doubts in what part artisans should be placed if they are not citizens, nothing follows that is unfitting. For there are many who are not citizens and yet are neither immigrants nor travelers, as is clear concerning slaves, and freedmen who, out of slavery, are re-established in freedom. For it is true that not all are citizens who are necessary for the completion of the city, and without whom the city is not able to be; because we see not only about slaves, but even about children, that they are not so perfectly citizens as are men. For men are citizens simply, as having the power to work those things which are of the city; but children are citizens through the place of another, that is, with a certain lessened determination. For they are imperfect citizens: and just as slaves and children are indeed citizens in a way, but not perfectly, even so is it also for artisans. So just as in ancient times that the banausoi, that is the base artisans, stained their bodies with the work of the hands, and also travelers among certain cities were slaves, so also are many of them today.

But in a way, even in the best-organized city, the banausoi are not able to be citizens. And if it is said that a banausus is a citizen in a certain manner, then it needs to be said that the virtue of the citizen, which we determined—namely, that he be able to govern and to be subject well—is not of just any citizen, after whatever manner he may be called: but it is necessary, in order that virtue of this sort should belong to anyone, that they not only are free, but also are released, that is, detached from the works necessary for life. Indeed, those who are groomed for such necessary works, if they serve in these things for only one person, this is properly of slaves: for it was customary for slaves to deliver services of this manner to their masters. But if these services were delivered commonly to anyone whosoever, this belonged to banausoi and wage-earners, for cobblers and bakers will serve anyone for money.

Then, where he says manifestum autem, etc., he clarifies the proposed solution. And about this he does three things.

First, he shows in what manner the citizen is diversified in diverse regimes.

Second, he shows that the greatest citizen in any given regime is he who is able to participate in government, at quod dicitur maxime civis, [III.4.6] etc.

Third, in an epilogue [III.4.7], he ties together those things that have been said about the virtue of the citizen.

He first says, therefore, that it will be clear in what manner truth holds itself toward what has been set down from a small consideration of those things that will follow. For if someone could see perfectly what will be said, what was said would become evident to him: for since there are several regimes differing in kind, and the citizen is so called within the order toward the regime, as was said, it is also necessary that the citizen have several kinds. And most of all, this difference is approached in the amount that citizens are subordinates, who hold themselves in diverse manner toward government in diverse regimes. Those who command govern in any regime. Whence, on account of the diversity of regimes, and consequently, of citizens, it is necessary a certain regime, such as in a democracy—in which only freedom is sought—the banausoi and wage-earners are citizens: for they will be able to be promoted toward government, since they are free. But in other regimes this is impossible, as most of all happens in aristocracy, in which honors are given to the worthy according to their virtue; now those who live the life of the banausoi or wage-earners cannot exhibit to the city those things that belong to virtue in their regime, because they are not exercised in such things. But in oligarchies, wage-earners, certainly, are not able to be citizens, because in regimes of this sort, people are taken up to government because of long-preceding honors. Whence it does not easily happen that wage-earners are taken up to honors, who are scarcely able, through the whole of their lives to gather what would make them wealthy. But banausoi, that is, artisans, are able to be citizens and governors in such regimes because many artisans gain wealth quickly, and so because of wealth, can be taken up to government in oligarchies, although for a certain time they will have abstained from making art after becoming wealthy, and led an honorable life. Whence, at Thebes, there was a statute that he who had not abstained from the affairs of selling for ten years could not participate in virtue—namely, governing virtue.

But although travelers and immigrants and abject persons are not able to be citizens, since the powerful govern in well-instituted cities, nevertheless, in many regimes, namely, democratic ones, the law about travelers and immigrants—that they may not be citizens—is loosened; because in certain democracies, although he who is born from a citizen mother is deemed a citizen, it is permitted that the father be an immigrant or traveler. And so also the law about illegitimacy is loosened among many cities—namely, that they may be citizens. But they do this because of the lack of good citizens, and because of the scarcity of men, having the defect of a mob, in which the power of democracy consists, they use such laws so that they may first elect those as citizens who are born from slaves or slave-women, as long as the other parent is free; then, when the multitude has grown, they exclude all the children of slaves, but esteem as citizens those who are born from citizen mothers, though their fathers may be immigrants; but finally the laws are straightened out toward this, that they judge as citizens only those who were born from parents both of whom were free and citizens. Thus, therefore, it is clear that there are diverse kinds of citizens, following the diversity of regimes.

Then, where he says et quod dicitur maxime, etc., he shows what is most of all a citizen. And he says that most of all, he is called a citizen in any given regime who participates in the honors of the city. Whence, Homer said poetically of a certain man that he arose after others—in order to speak, for instance—as someone dishonored, that is, as some immigrant who was not a citizen. But where such an account of the citizen is hidden because of deception, then those dwelling together are called “citizens”, as, for instance, all those inhabiting the city are called citizens. But this is not fitting, because he who does not participate in the honors of the city is like an immigrant in the city.

Then, where he says utrum quidem igitur, etc., he ties together what he had said in an epilogue: and he says that concerning this question which he was pursuing, whether the virtue of the good man and the zealous citizen are the same, it has been shown that in a certain city, namely, the aristocratic, the same one is a good man and a good citizen, because government is given according to the virtue which is of the good man. In others, however, one will be a good man, and another a good citizen, namely, in corrupted regimes in which government is not given according to virtue. And the citizen who is the same as the good man is not just any citizen, but he who is civic, that is, the ruler of the city and the master, or the one able to be master of those who belong to the care of the community, either alone or also with others. For it was said above that the virtue of a prince and of a good man is the same. Whence, if one who is a prince or who is able to be is taken up as a citizen, his virtue is the same as that of a good man. If, however, someone imperfect is taken up as a citizen, who is not able to be a prince, the virtue of the good citizen and of the good man will not be the same, as is clear from what has already been said.