Lecture 1

He who would inquire into the essence and attributes of various kinds of governments must first of all determine 'What is a state?' At present this is a disputed question. Some say that the state has done a certain act; others, no, not the state, but the oligarchy or the tyrant. And the legislator or statesman is concerned entirely with the state; a constitution or government being an arrangement of the inhabitants of a state. But a state is composite, like any other whole made up of many parts; these are the citizens, who compose it. It is evident, therefore, that we must begin by asking, Who is the citizen, and what is the meaning of the term? For here again there may be a difference of opinion. He who is a citizen in a democracy will often not be a citizen in an oligarchy.

Leaving out of consideration those who have been made citizens, or who have obtained the name of citizen any other accidental manner, we may say, first, that a citizen is not a citizen because he lives in a certain place, for resident aliens and slaves share in the place; nor is he a citizen who has no legal right except that of suing and being sued; for this right may be enjoyed under the provisions of a treaty. Nay, resident aliens in many places do not possess even such rights completely, for they are obliged to have a patron, so that they do but imperfectly participate in citizenship, and we call them citizens only in a qualified sense, as we might apply the term to children who are too young to be on the register, or to old men who have been relieved from state duties. Of these we do not say quite simply that they are citizens, but add in the one case that they are not of age, and in the other, that they are past the age, or something of that sort; the precise expression is immaterial, for our meaning is clear. Similar difficulties to those which I have mentioned may be raised and answered about deprived citizens and about exiles.

But the citizen whom we are seeking to define is a citizen in the strictest sense, against whom no such exception can be taken, and his special characteristic is that he shares in the administration of justice, and in offices. Now of offices some are discontinuous, and the same persons are not allowed to hold them twice, or can only hold them after a fixed interval; others have no limit of time- for example, the office of a dicast or ecclesiast. It may, indeed, be argued that these are not magistrates at all, and that their functions give them no share in the government. But surely it is ridiculous to say that those who have the power do not govern. Let us not dwell further upon this, which is a purely verbal question; what we want is a common term including both dicast and ecclesiast. Let us, for the sake of distinction, call it 'indefinite office,' and we will assume that those who share in such office are citizens. This is the most comprehensive definition of a citizen, and best suits all those who are generally so called.

But we must not forget that things of which the underlying principles differ in kind, one of them being first, another second, another third, have, when regarded in this relation, nothing, or hardly anything, worth mentioning in common. Now we see that governments differ in kind, and that some of them are prior and that others are posterior; those which are faulty or perverted are necessarily posterior to those which are perfect. (What we mean by perversion will be hereafter explained.) The citizen then of necessity differs under each form of government; and our definition is best adapted to the citizen of a democracy; but not necessarily to other states. For in some states the people are not acknowledged, nor have they any regular assembly, but only extraordinary ones; and suits are distributed by sections among the magistrates. At Lacedaemon, for instance, the Ephors determine suits about contracts, which they distribute among themselves, while the elders are judges of homicide, and other causes are decided by other magistrates. A similar principle prevails at Carthage; there certain magistrates decide all causes.

We may, indeed, modify our definition of the citizen so as to include these states. In them it is the holder of a definite, not of an indefinite office, who legislates and judges, and to some or all such holders of definite offices is reserved the right of deliberating or judging about some things or about all things. The conception of the citizen now begins to clear up.He who has the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of any state is said by us to be a citizens of that state; and, speaking generally, a state is a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life.

But in practice a citizen is defined to be one of whom both the parents are citizens; others insist on going further back; say to two or three or more ancestors. This is a short and practical definition but there are some who raise the further question: How this third or fourth ancestor came to be a citizen? Gorgias of Leontini, partly because he was in a difficulty, partly in irony, said- 'Mortars are what is made by the mortar-makers, and the citizens of Larissa are those who are made by the magistrates; for it is their trade to make Larissaeans.' Yet the question is really simple, for, if according to the definition just given they shared in the government, they were citizens. This is a better definition than the other. For the words, 'born of a father or mother who is a citizen,' cannot possibly apply to the first inhabitants or founders of a state.

Ei qui de politia considerat, etc. After the philosopher investigated regimes following the tradition of others, he here begins to pursue the same things following his own opinion. And it is divided into two parts.

In the first part, he clarifies the diversity of regimes;

in the second, he teaches how the best regime may be instituted, at the beginning of Bk. VII, at de politia optima facturum, etc.

The first part, moreover, is divided in two.

First, he distinguishes the regimes;

second, he determines each of them, in Bk. IV, at in omnibus artibus et scientiis, etc.

And this first part is divided in two.

In its first part he determines what belongs [pertinet] to regime commonly;

second, he divides regimes from each other, at quoniam autem haec determinata sunt, [III.5.1] etc.

The first part is divided in two parts:

in the first, he states his intention;

in the second, he he pursues what was put forward, at eos quidem igitur qui aliter qualiter, [III.1.4] etc.

Concerning the first he does two things:

first he shows that in order to treat of regimes, it is necessary first to consider the city;

second, he shows that in order to treat of the city, it is necessary to consider what the citizen is, at quoniam autem civitas, [III.1.3] etc.

Therefore, he says first that for he who desires to consider regimes, what each one is according to its proper rationale and what kind it is, whether it is good or bad, just or unjust, it is necessary to first consider what a city is. And he proves this with a twofold reasoning:

first, because it is possible to have a doubt about this. For some people had doubts about whether certain occupations were done by the city--whether, for instance, they were done by a tyrant, or by the city’s wealthy. In which case, some say that the city did these things, but others say that the city did not do these things, but that it was the oligarchs, that is, the wealthy governors, or even a tyrant. And thus the doubt seems to turn upon whether it is only the wealthy governors who are the city. And because [the question] is in doubt, it is necessary that it be determined.

The second reason is because the whole intention of those who treat of regimes and legislation is to be occupied with the city, because the regime is nothing other than the order of those who inhabit the city.

Then, where he says quoniam autem civitas, etc., he shows that it is necessary to determine the citizen for two reasons,

of which the first is this: in all those things that are composed from many parts, it is first necessary to consider the parts. The city, however, is a certain whole constituted out of citizens as [its] parts, since the city is nothing other than a certain multitude of citizens. Therefore, in order to know about the city, one must consider what a citizen is.

The second reason is because there happens to be a doubt even about this—for not all like-mindedly confess that the same person is a citizen. For someone from the popular [element], who is a citizen in a democracy according to which the people govern is not counted as a citizen at any time in an oligarchy, according to which the wealthy govern: because frequently an oligarchy is such that the people have no part in it.

Then, where he says eos quidem igitur, etc., he pursues what was proposed. And he divides it into two parts.

In the first, he shows what a citizen is.

In the second he shows which virtue it is that makes a good citizen, at his autem quae dicta sunt, [III.3.1] etc.

Concerning the first he does two things.

First, he determines what a citizen is.

Second, he raises certain doubts, at sed forte illi magis, [III.2.1] etc.

Concerning the first he does two things.

First, he shows what a citizen is according to the truth of the thing.

Second, he rules out a certain false determination, at determinant etiam secundum usum, [III.1.9] etc.

Concerning the first he does two things:

first he puts forth certain modes, according to which some people are citizens in a certain respect [secundum quid], and not simply speaking [III.1.5].

Second, he shows what a citizen is simply, at civis autem simpliciter, [III.1.6] etc.

Therefore, he says first that we ought, for the present, send away those who are called citizens in a certain poetic mode, that is, after metaphor or likeness: because such are not truly citizens. And indeed, the first mode is according to habitation. For they are not truly called citizens from this—that they inhabit the city—because immigrants and slaves inhabit in the city, and they, indeed, are not citizens, simply speaking. The second mode is that some can be called citizens because they are placed under the jurisdiction of the city such that they participate in the justice of the city in this: that sometimes they may obtain a sentence in their favor, and sometimes they are judged, that is, condemned: because this also happens to those who have contracted certain things between themselves, and who yet are not citizens of one city. And yet, in some cities, foreigners do not participate perfectly in justice of this sort, as do the citizens: but it is necessary, if they want to contend in judgment, that they present one who stands up for them, that is, who gives right faith for their obedience to what is right [ius]. Whence it is clear that immigrants imperfectly participate in the communion of justice: and thus, following this, they are not citizens simply, but are able to be called citizens in a certain respect. Likewise, in a third way, we call children citizens who have not yet been written into the number of the citizens. And likewise, we call the elderly citizens, who have already been sent out from the number of citizens, since they are not able to execute the works of the city: for we do not call either of them citizens simply, but with some addition: the children insofar as they are imperfect; but the elderly insofar as they are carried on beyond what the condition of the citizen requires. Or, if another such thing is also added on, there will be no difference, for it is clear what we intend to say: for we are now inquiring after what the citizen is simply, without any addition—which is necessary for correcting or explaining the name of citizen. But there is a fourth way, in which there is the same doubt and solution: namely, about fugitives and the worthless--that is, ill-reputed persons; because such people are citizens in a certain respect and not simply speaking.

Then, where he says dicit civis autem simpliciter, etc., he shows what a citizen is simply, and about this he does three things.

First, he lays out a determination of the citizen.

Second, he shows that the determination is not common to just any regime, at oportet autem non latere, [III.1.7] etc.

Third, he shows in what way it may be corrected so that it will be common, at sed habet directionem, [III.1.8] etc.

He first says, therefore, that through nothing else can the citizen be better determined, simply speaking, than through this: that he participates in the city through judgment—namely, that he is able to judge about things—and through government—namely, that he has some power in the city’s business. But it should be known that there are two kinds of government. For some are determined to a certain time, and thus among certain cities it is not permitted that the same man should twice obtain the same government, or that he should obtain it for a determinate time; for example, that he should exercise a certain office for a year, and afterward he should not be able to be instituted into the same office until around three or four years had passed. But the other government is one that is not determinate following a certain time, but a man is able to exercise the office for any length of time whatsoever: just as the praetor, who holds the power of judging about any causes, and the councilman, who holds the power of speaking his own sentences in the assembly of the city. But it can happen that someone does not name judges or is on the council as governors, and because it is said on account of this that they do not have any government, that they will not be able to [serve as] council or to judge. But this makes no difference to what was put forth, because such a doubt does not exist except in name: for we do not find any common name for the judge, and the proclaimer: and therefore let this name be placed upon them: “indeterminate government.” Thus, therefore, we put forth that those who participate in this sort of government are citizens: and this seems a better determination of the citizen, simply speaking.

Then, where he says oportet non latere, etc., he shows that this determination of the citizen is not common to all regimes. And he says that it must be clear that in every affair [rebus] in which the things supposed differ in kind, and one of them is first, another is second, then it is taken differently—that is, it is consequently arranged such that either nothing is common to these, as with equivocal terms, or there is scarcely anything common, that is, according to a certain modicum. Regimes, however, as will be said, differ in kind, and some of them are before, some of them after; because those that are damaged and transgress the correct order of the regime are naturally after undamaged regimes, just as in any genus, the perfect is naturally before the corrupt. But how certain regimes transgress the correct order will be clear below. Whence there must be another rationale of citizenship in diverse regimes. Hence the aforementioned determination of the citizen is most fit for a democracy, in which any of the people has the power of judging about something and of proclaiming. And in other regimes, it sometimes happens that any of the citizens has this power, but yet, this is not necessary, because in these regimes, it is not the people that have some citizenship, nor something that they deem the *Ecclesia—*that is, a gathering of the people—but only some who are specially called together, and these only judge of some sentence in part, as in Lacedaemon, the ephors judged sentences for contracts, but others judged others, and diverse people judged diverse things. Moreover, the elders judged cases of murder, and other seats of government others. And so also, among the Carthaginians, because all the sentences were judged by some of the governors, and so the popular citizens did not participate in judgment: whence, the aforementioned determination of the citizen does not fit with such regimes.

Then, where he says sed habet directionem, etc., he corrects the aforementioned definition of the citizen; and he says that the aforementioned definition can be straightened out into something that is common because in regimes other than democracy, the council and the chief do not have indeterminate government, but these two belong only to those who have determinate government, because for some of these, or even all, it is fitting to judge and to counsel, either about some matters, or about all. And from this it can be clear what a citizen is: for it is not he who participates in judging and the council, but he who is able to be constituted in some government of counsel or judging. For those who are not able to be taken up to such offices do not seem to participate in the regime, and hence do not seem to be citizens. But finally, he concludes from this that the city is nothing other than a multitude of such people, who are thus called citizens sufficient for autarkia, that is, the self-sufficiency of life such that it can be called this absolutely. For the city is the self-sufficient community, as was said in Book I.

Then, where he says determinant etiam secundum usum, etc., he excludes a determination by which some define the citizen. And he says that some, following custom, determine that a citizen is he who was born from two citizen parents, and not from only one, either the father or the mother. But some further require for this--that anyone be a citizen--that they trace their generation to citizen ancestors even to the second generation, or the third, or beyond. And if the citizen is thus determined politically, that is, following a custom of certain cities, and swiftly, that is, before the due investigation, a doubt will arise about how this third or fourth generation ancestor was a citizen. For following the aforementioned determination, he will not be able to be called a citizen unless also his generation could reach back to a third or fourth citizen ancestor: and thus it will proceed without an end. But about this he puts forth the saying of Gorgias, a Sicilian of Leontini, who spoke certain wise words about the aforementioned determinations, either because he was not certain of the truth, or because he was talking ironically. For he said that just as mortars are things that come into being from the artisans of mortars, so also the Larissan citizens are those who were made--that is, generated--by other citizens of Larissa, who are makers of Larissan citizens. But this was said simply, and without a reason: because if anyone participates in the regime following the definition aforementioned by us, it is necessary to say that they are citizens, even if they were not also generated [progeniti] by citizens: alternatively, the determination that they give cannot be adapted for those who first built or inhabited the city--who, it is agreed, were not born from citizens of that city. Whence it would follow that they were not citizens, and consequently, neither would the others be citizens who flowed forth from them--which is unfitting.