Lecture 6

Having determined these points, we have next to consider how many forms of government there are, and what they are; and in the first place what are the true forms, for when they are determined the perversions of them will at once be apparent.

The words constitution and government have the same meaning, and the government, which is the supreme authority in states, must be in the hands of one, or of a few, or of the many. The true forms of government, therefore, are those in which the one, or the few, or the many, govern with a view to the common interest; but governments which rule with a view to the private interest, whether of the one or of the few, or of the many, are perversions. For the members of a state, if they are truly citizens, ought to participate in its advantages.

Of forms of government in which one rules, we call that which regards the common interests, kingship or royalty; that in which more than one, but not many, rule, aristocracy; and it is so called, either because the rulers are the best men, or because they have at heart the best interests of the state and of the citizens. But when the citizens at large administer the state for the common interest, the government is called by the generic name- a constitution. And there is a reason for this use of language. One man or a few may excel in virtue; but as the number increases it becomes more difficult for them to attain perfection in every kind of virtue, though they may in military virtue, for this is found in the masses. Hence in a constitutional government the fighting-men have the supreme power, and those who possess arms are the citizens.

Of the above-mentioned forms, the perversions are as follows: of royalty, tyranny; of aristocracy, oligarchy; of constitutional government, democracy. For tyranny is a kind of monarchy which has in view the interest of the monarch only; oligarchy has in view the interest of the wealthy; democracy, of the needy: none of them the common good of all.

But there are difficulties about these forms of government, and it will therefore be necessary to state a little more at length the nature of each of them. For he who would make a philosophical study of the various sciences, and does not regard practice only, ought not to overlook or omit anything, but to set forth the truth in every particular. Tyranny, as I was saying, is monarchy exercising the rule of a master over the political society; oligarchy is when men of property have the government in their hands; democracy, the opposite, when the indigent, and not the men of property, are the rulers.

And here arises the first of our difficulties, and it relates to the distinction drawn. For democracy is said to be the government of the many. But what if the many are men of property and have the power in their hands? In like manner oligarchy is said to be the government of the few; but what if the poor are fewer than the rich, and have the power in their hands because they are stronger? In these cases the distinction which we have drawn between these different forms of government would no longer hold good.

Suppose, once more, that we add wealth to the few and poverty to the many, and name the governments accordingly—an oligarchy is said to be that in which the few and the wealthy, and a democracy that in which the many and the poor are the rulers—there will still be a difficulty. For, if the only forms of government are the ones already mentioned, how shall we describe those other governments also just mentioned by us, in which the rich are the more numerous and the poor are the fewer, and both govern in their respective states?

The argument seems to show that, whether in oligarchies or in democracies, the number of the governing body, whether the greater number, as in a democracy, or the smaller number, as in an oligarchy, is an accident due to the fact that the rich everywhere are few, and the poor numerous. But if so, there is a misapprehension of the causes of the difference between them. For the real difference between democracy and oligarchy is poverty and wealth. Wherever men rule by reason of their wealth, whether they be few or many, that is an oligarchy, and where the poor rule, that is a democracy. But as a fact the rich are few and the poor many; for few are well-to-do, whereas freedom is enjoyed by all, and wealth and freedom are the grounds on which the oligarchical and democratical parties respectively claim power in the state.

Determinatis autem hiis, etc. After the philosopher distinguished correct regimes from unjust ones, he here intends to distinguish both from each other. And he does two things about this.

First, he says what his intention is.

Second, he follows through on what was put forward, at quoniam autem politia, [III.6.2] etc.

He says first, therefore, that after the aforesaid things have been determined, what follows is to determine about regimes: how many they are in number, and which ones there are; and in this order: that we may first consider correct regimes, second, unjust ones.

Then, where he says quoniam autem politia, etc., he distinguishes regimes. And he does three things about this.

First, he shows in what respect the distinction between regimes must be taken.

Second, he distinguishes regimes, at vocare autem consuevimus, [III.6.3] etc.

Third, he objects to the aforesaid things, at oportet autem paulo, [III.6.5] etc.

He says first, therefore, that (because) a regime is nothing other than the politeuma, that it signifies the order of mastery in the city. It is necessary that regimes be distinguished following the diversity of mastery. For in the city, either one is master, or a few, or many. And should any of these three exist, it can happen in two modes. In one mode, when they govern for the common utility, and then they are correct regimes; in another mode, when they govern for the private utility of those who are masters, either one, or a few, or many; and then they are transgressions of regimes, because it is necessary either to say that the subordinates are not citizens, or that they share in the city’s utility in some way.

Then, where he says vocare autem consuevimus, etc., he distinguishes both regimes by their proper names.

And first the correct ones,

second the damaged ones, at transgressiones autem, [III.6.4] etc.

Therefore, he says first that if it is a monarchy, that is, the government of one, it is called by the customary name “kingship” if it intends the common utility. And that regime in which a few govern for the common good—more, indeed, than one—is called “aristocracy” (that is, the power of the best men); either the best one, or because the best men govern—the virtuous—or because such a regime is ordered toward that which is the best for the city and for all the citizens. But when many govern, intending the common utility, it is called a polity [politia], which is the name common to all regimes [politiis]. And it happens rationally that such a regime should be called by a name of this sort: for it easily happens that one or a few may be found in a city who greatly exceed the others in virtue: but it is with exceeding difficulty that many may be found who can attain to the perfection of virtue; but this happens most of all with reference to warlike virtue—that many may be perfect in it. And therefore, in this regime, warlike men govern, and those who have weapons.

Then, where he says transgressiones autem, etc., he distinguishes the corruptions of the aforementioned regimes by name. And he says that of the mentioned regimes there are these transgressions: tyranny, indeed, of kingship; but oligarchy—that is, the government of the few—is the transgression of aristocracy; and democracy—that is, the power of the people, of the vulgar multitude, is the transgression of the polity in which the many govern because of their warlike virtue, at the very least. From this he concludes that tyranny is a monarchy—that is, the government of one—intending the utility of the governor; oligarchy tends toward the utility of the wealthy; democracy toward the utility of the poor: none of these intend the common utility.

Then, where he says oportet autem paulo, etc., he raises an objection against the aforesaid things. And he does three things in this regard.

First, he says what his intention is: and he repeats what he said before.

Second, he raises a difficulty, at prima autem dubitatio est, [III.6.6] etc.

Third, he puts forth a solution, at videtur igitur ratio, [III.6.8] etc..

Therefore, he says first that it is necessary to discuss a little more from a distance what is of each of the aforementioned regimes, since he has certain difficulties. He who philosophizes in each art, as considering the truth and not only only reflecting on what is useful for acting, ought to look down upon nothing nor to neglect anything, but in each particular, to clarify the truth. Now it has been said that a tyrant is a certain despotic monarch, that is, having mastery over the political community--since he uses citizens as slaves; an oligarchy is when those who have mastery over the regime abound in wealth; a democracy is when those who have mastery over the regime do not possess a multitude of wealth, but rather, are poor.

Then, where he says prima autem dubitatio, etc., he raises a difficulty.

And first he puts forward the difficulty;

second, he excludes a certain response, at at vero siquis, [III.6.7] etc.

Therefore, he says first that the first difficulty is against the definition, specifically, of democracy and oligarchy. For it was said that a democracy is when the poor are masters in the city, but oligarchy when the wealthy are masters; but the name of oligarchy itself designates the government of the few, whereas the name of democracy designates the government of the people, or the many. Let it be put forward, therefore, that in some city there are more wealthy than poor, and the wealthy are masters of the city: it seems, following this, that it would be a democracy, which is when the many are masters; and similarly, if somewhere it were to happen that the poor were fewer, but they were better and stronger and were masters of the city, it would follow, according to this, that there would be an oligarchy because the few were masters. Therefore, it does not seem that regimes have been well defined, since it was said that democracy is [the government of] poor masters, oligarchy of rich masters.

Then, where he says at vero si quis connectens, etc., he excludes a certain response. For it would be possible for someone to say that in the definition of oligarchy, the fewness is yoked to the wealthy; and in the definition of democracy, the many are yoked to poverty; and thus, namely, that oligarchy would be in which a few wealthy would govern, but democracy in which many poor do so. But this consequently has another doubt: for if the regimes are sufficiently divided, so that, namely, there are no other regimes besides the aforementioned ones, it will not give what regime the two aforementioned regimes may be comprehended under--namely, when either many wealthy or a few poor govern.

Then, where he says videtur igitur, etc., he infers the solution of the difficulty from what has been set out. And he says that the reason for the difficulty that has been set out seems to clarify that, the princes being many are accidentally disposed toward democracies: and that they being few are accidentally disposed toward oligarchies, because everywhere, we find more poor than wealthy; and according to this, the names are posited as is found in most cases. But because what accidentally is, is not a specific difference, therefore oligarchies are not distinguished from democracies in themselves by speaking according to multitude and scarcity: but that by which they differ through themselves is poverty and wealth: for the rationale of the rule that is ordered toward opulence is other than that of the one that is ordered toward freedom--which is the end of democracy. And therefore it is necessary that wherever people are masters according to wealth, whether they are more in number or fewer, that there it will be an oligarchy; and wherever the poor are masters, there it will be a democracy: but it is only accidentally that the latter are the many, and the former are the few. For those are few who abound in wealth, but all participate in freedom; and because of this, these two quarrel among themselves, since the few desire to go first because they exceed in wealth, and the many desire to prevail over the few, as if they were equal to them in strength because of freedom.