Lecture 5

Having determined these questions, we have next to consider whether there is only one form of government or many, and if many, what they are, and how many, and what are the differences between them.

A constitution is the arrangement of magistracies in a state, especially of the highest of all. The government is everywhere sovereign in the state, and the constitution is in fact the government. For example, in democracies the people are supreme, but in oligarchies, the few; and, therefore, we say that these two forms of government also are different: and so in other cases.

First, let us consider what is the purpose of a state, and how many forms of government there are by which human society is regulated.

We have already said, in the first part of this treatise, when discussing household management and the rule of a master, that man is by nature a political animal. And therefore, men, even when they do not require one another's help, desire to live together; not but that they are also brought together by their common interests in proportion as they severally attain to any measure of well-being. This is certainly the chief end, both of individuals and of states. And also for the sake of mere life (in which there is possibly some noble element so long as the evils of existence do not greatly overbalance the good) mankind meet together and maintain the political community. And we all see that men cling to life even at the cost of enduring great misfortune, seeming to find in life a natural sweetness and happiness.

There is no difficulty in distinguishing the various kinds of authority; they have been often defined already in discussions outside the school. The rule of a master, although the slave by nature and the master by nature have in reality the same interests, is nevertheless exercised primarily with a view to the interest of the master, but accidentally considers the slave, since, if the slave perish, the rule of the master perishes with him. On the other hand, the government of a wife and children and of a household, which we have called household management, is exercised in the first instance for the good of the governed or for the common good of both parties, but essentially for the good of the governed, as we see to be the case in medicine, gymnastic, and the arts in general, which are only accidentally concerned with the good of the artists themselves. For there is no reason why the trainer may not sometimes practice gymnastics, and the helmsman is always one of the crew. The trainer or the helmsman considers the good of those committed to his care. But, when he is one of the persons taken care of, he accidentally participates in the advantage, for the helmsman is also a sailor, and the trainer becomes one of those in training.

And so in politics: when the state is framed upon the principle of equality and likeness, the citizens think that they ought to hold office by turns. Formerly, as is natural, every one would take his turn of service; and then again, somebody else would look after his interest, just as he, while in office, had looked after theirs. But nowadays, for the sake of the advantage which is to be gained from the public revenues and from office, men want to be always in office. One might imagine that the rulers, being sickly, were only kept in health while they continued in office; in that case we may be sure that they would be hunting after places.

The conclusion is evident: that governments which have a regard to the common interest are constituted in accordance with strict principles of justice, and are therefore true forms; but those which regard only the interest of the rulers are all defective and perverted forms, for they are despotic, whereas a state is a community of freemen.

Quoniam autem haec determinata sunt, etc. After the philosopher determined about the citizen—from the knowledge of which it can be learned what a city is—he here intends, consequently, to distinguish “regime” according to its kind; and this is divided into three parts.

In the first, he separates out regimes.

In the second he shows what is just in any given regime, at sumendum autem, [III.7.1] etc.

Third, he shows which of the regimes is more powerful, at habet autem dubitationem, [III.8.1] etc.

About the first he does three things.

First, he states his intention.

Second, he shows what a regime is, at est autem politia, [III.5.2] etc.

Third, he divides regimes, at supponendum itaque primo, [III.5.3] etc.

He says, therefore, since the aforementioned things have been determined, it still stands to consider whether there is only one regime, or several; and if several, how many and which ones they are, and in what manner they differ from one another.

Then, where he says est autem politia, etc., he shows what a regime is. And he says that a regime is nothing other than the order of the city with reference to all government that is in the city, but chiefly with reference to the greatest government, which has mastery over all the others. And this, indeed, is because the politeuma of the city—that is, the placement of order in the city—is wholly established in him who has mastery over the city; and such an placement of order is the regime itself. Whence, the regime chiefly consists in the order of the highest government according to whose diversity the regimes are also made diverse: just as in democracies the people are masters, and in oligarchies, indeed, the wealthy few: and from this comes the diversity of these regimes. And in the same manner, this must be said for the other regimes.

Then, where he says supponendum itaque primo, etc., he distinguishes the regimes.

And he first shows in what manner correct regimes are distinguished from unjust ones.

Second, in what manner both regimes are distinguished in themselves, at determinatis autem his, [III.6.1] etc.

About the first he does three things.

First, he shows what the city is ordered toward.

Second, he shows in what manner governments are distinguished from each other, at at vero et principatus, [III.5.5] etc.

Third, he infers the difference between correct regimes and uneven ones, at manifestum igitur, [III.5.7] etc.

About the first he does two things.

First, he states his intention.

Second, he begins to execute what was proposed, at dictum est autem, [III.5.4] etc.

He says first, therefore, that since it is necessary to distinguish regimes from each other, it is necessary first to set forth two things.

The first of which is: the account of why the city was instituted.

The second is: the differences between governments, with regard to men, and with regard to all who enter into a communion of life.

For from these two things, it will be possible to grasp the difference between a just and an unjust regime.

Then, where he says dictum est autem in primis, etc., he shows what the end of the city or regime is. And he says that it was said in the first book--in which economics and despotism were determined--that man is naturally a civic animal; and so it is that men have an appetite for living together with each other and for not being alone; [and this would be the case] even if one man were in no way in need of another in order to lead the political life: but for all that, there is a great common utility in the communion of a social life. And this with reference to two things.

First, certainly, with reference to living well, toward which each one carries on his part, just as we see in any given community that one serves the community from one office, another from another, and thus all live well commonly. This, therefore—namely, living well—is most of all the end of the city or regime, both commonly, with regard to all, and singly, with regard to each one.

Second, the common life is also useful on account of living itself, as one in a community of life supports the existence of another, to the point of sustaining his life, even against the danger of death. And because of this, men assemble together and conserve the political communion, because even living itself, considered in itself, without the other things that make for living well, is a certain good and choiceworthy, unless perchance a man suffers things in his life exceedingly heavy and cruel. And this is clear from this: that men, even if they bear many evils, nevertheless persevere in an affection for living that is, in a certain manner, in their guts—that is to say, strongly wed to the desire for life, as if life itself has in itself a certain natural solace and sweetness.

Then, where he says at vero et principatus, etc., he distinguishes the kinds of government.

And first in economics;

second, in politics, at propter quod et politicos, [III.5.6] etc.

He says, therefore, that it is easy to distinguish the modes of government which are spoken of, because he has also frequently made mention of them in other discourses, apart from their governing intention, such as in Ethics Bk. VIII, and also above in Bk. II. There is, moreover, in household affairs a twofold government. One, indeed, is of a master toward slaves, which is called despotic: and although the same thing is, according to the truth of the matter, useful for him who is naturally a slave and for him who is naturally a master—namely, that the former be ruled by the latter—nevertheless, the master governs the slave for the utility of the master, and not for the utility of the slave, except perhaps accidentally—inasmuch as a corrupted slave delays the feast. But there is another government for free men—such as sons and a wife and the whole family—which is called economic government. Indeed, this government intends what is useful for the subordinates—or even what is common to both. Indeed, in and of itself, and chiefly, [it intends] what is useful for the subordinate, just as we see in other arts, as the art of medicine intends chiefly the utility of those who are medicated, and the art of training intends chiefly the utility of those who are exercised: but it accidentally happens that the utility also overflows into those who have the art. For he who exercises boys also, at the same time, is exercised; sometimes, he is even from the number of those who are exercised, as the captain [gubernator] is one of the sailors. Thus, therefore, the exerciser of boys or the captain of a ship considers, of himself, the utility of the subject: but because he is himself one of their number, both therefore take part—accidentally—in the utility of the community which they care for. And similarly, the father participates in the utility of the house that he cares for.

Then, where he says propter quod et politicos, etc., he distinguishes political government according to what has been set out. And he says that, because government that is over freemen is ordered chiefly to what is useful for the subordinates, therefore, it is deemed worthy that citizens should particularly govern according to political [modes of] government, when they have been instituted [in them] according to the equality and likeness of citizens. For then it seems worthy that at one time this one should govern, and at another, another. However, it would be otherwise if a certain multitude of citizens were to exceed the others in goodness: for then it would be worthy that those ones always govern, as was said above. But the assessment of men about [what determines] this worth is varied at diverse times. For in the beginning, the men who would govern as though they were serving the others were thought worthy, as also it was, such that they for their part would serve others, intending what is useful for them, and then at another time, someone else would govern who would intend their good, just as they had previously intended the good of the others. But later, because of the utility that came from the common goods that princes usurped for themselves, and also that came from the very right of government, men willed to govern always, as if to govern were to be healthy and not to govern were to be sick. For men thus seem to have an appetite government as the sick have an appetite for health.

Then, where he says manifestum igitur, from what has been said he concludes with the distinction between correct regimes and unjust ones. For since it is thus, that government over freemen is ordered toward what is useful for the subordinates, it is clear that in whatsoever regime the princes intend the common utility, those regimes are correct according to absolute justice: but in any regime whatsoever which intends only the utility of those who govern, those are damaged and certain corruptions of correct regimes: for they do not have the just in them simply, but in a certain respect, as will be said below. For they govern the city despotically, using citizens like slaves, for their own utility: and this is against justice, because the city is the community of freemen; for a slave is not a citizen, as was said above.