Chapter 7 — The arguments of our opponents are conclusively refuted

The arguments adduced in the foregoing chapters facilitate the complete refutation of our adversaries’ opinion.

Their first contention, namely, that our Lord gave the counsel of poverty to one who had already practised the keeping of the commandments, (Mark 10:20.) is pulverised by St. Jerome. This father, commenting on the words in St. Matthew 19, all these things have I kept from my youth, says: this young man spoke untruly. For, if he had by his deeds fulfilled the command, "love your neighbour as yourself," why should he have gone away sad when Christ said to him: "go, sell what you have and give to the poor?” (Jerome, Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew 3.19, at 19:20 (CCSL 77; PL 26:137B).) Origen also, writing on the Gospel of St. Matthew, says, it is related in the Hebrew version of the Gospel that when the Lord said to him (the rich young man), "go, sell what you have," the youth began to hesitate. Then Jesus said to him, "how then can you say that you have observed the law and the prophets? It is written in the law: "you shall love your neighbour as yourself"; and see how many of your brethren, the sons of Abraham, are clothed in dung and perish with hunger. Your house is filled with plenty, but none of it goes forth to your brethren." Then, rebuking him, the Lord said: "if you would be perfect." (Origen, Commentary on Matthew, tom. 15, para. 14 (PG 13:1294-1296).) For it is impossible to fulfil the commandment to love our neighbour as ourselves if we are rich and abounding in possessions. This remark refers, of course, to the perfect observance of the precept of charity; and there is no reason why the rich young man may not have kept the commandments imperfectly, and thus not have spoken untruly in his answer to the Lord. This is the opinion of St. Chrysostom (John Chrysostom, Homilies on Matthew, homily 63, para. 1 (PG 58:603); cf Glossa ordinaria 5, 321, at Matt 19:20.) and of other writers. (Bede, for example, in Glossa ordinaria 5, 320, at Matt 19:20 (PL 114:149).) But the fact that Christ gave the counsel of poverty to one who was, even to a certain extent, practised in obedience to the commandments, is no proof that such obedience is a necessary preliminary, or the sole preparation, for the exercise of the counsels. St. Matthew was called from habits of sin to the practice of the counsels, thereby showing us that the way of perfection is open both to sinners and to innocent souls.

In the second place, our opponents say that a catechumen must be taught to keep the commandments after he has received the sacraments of the Church. This argument is irrelevant to the point in question; for instruction in the commandments, as well as the doctrine and sacraments of the faith, is necessary for all men, whether they remain in the world or embrace the perfect life of religious; for these things are common to both classes.

Their third argument, viz. that by keeping the commandments man attains the fulness of wisdom, means nothing more than that obedience to the commandments is rewarded by the knowledge of the things of God. Our opponents further quote the words given in one version of Sirach 1:26: if you desire wisdom, keep the commandments, and the Lord will give her to you. This text, however, as is evident, has no bearing on the question. (Cf. Peter Lombard, Commentaries on the Psalms and St. Paul, at Ps 118:104 (PL 191:1095D), from Augustine, Expositions on the Psalms, sermon 22, para. 8 (CCSL 40; CSEL 95.2; PL 37:1566).)

Their fourth argument, founded on the Gloss on the verse in Psalm 130, as a weaned child, to which reference has already been made, we will carefully discuss. For, although in itself frivolous, it is considered by our adversaries to be very weighty. If we examine this passage in the Gloss, we shall see that it refers to the spiritual nourishment of recent converts to the Faith. It sets forth that after baptism we are instructed in good works and nourished by the milk of simple teaching until, being somewhat grown, we are admitted to our Father’s table. This means to say that we progress from the more simple doctrine the Word was made flesh, to the Word of the Father is in the beginning with God. (Peter Lombard, Commentaries on the Psalms and St. Paul, at Ps 130:4 (PL 191:1172A).) Now these words of the Gloss, evidently refer to the order to be observed in instruction.

Our opponents next adduce, as an argument, that the Church observes five seasons in the spiritual generation of her converts. They are first initiated, by exorcism and catechism, into the rudiments of the faith. (Peter Lombard, Commentaries on the Psalms and St. Paul, at Ps 130:4 (PL 191:1172B).) Then they are nourished in the womb of the Church until Holy Saturday when, by baptism, they are born into light. (Peter Lombard, Commentaries on the Psalms and St. Paul, at Ps 130:4 (PL 191:1172B).) After baptism until Pentecost they are carried in the arms of the Church and nourished with her milk; for during that season neither fasting nor rising at night nor any other penitential practice is observed. (Peter Lombard, Commentaries on the Psalms and St. Paul, at Ps 130:4 (PL 191:1172B).) After Pentecost, when they have been confirmed by the Holy Spirit, catechumens are, so to speak, weaned, and begin to fast and perform other laborious exercises. (Peter Lombard, Commentaries on the Psalms and St. Paul, at Ps 130:4 (PL 191:1172C).) Now this example of the five seasons appears to support our adversaries’ argument, but it is fallacious in three respects.

First, because there is a difference between what is willingly assumed, and what is imposed by necessity. There is a difference between the case of recent converts to the faith who, like babes, require to be nourished, and that of penitent sinners who, like sick men, need to be healed. Those newly converted to the faith need not necessarily, in the beginning, have difficult tasks laid upon them; they may be first exercised in easier things, and then be led on to those that are more laborious. Such men resemble children who are fed first on milk, and afterwards on stronger food; and it is to those who the Gloss refers. But if recent converts should, of their own accord, stretch forth their hands to higher things, who shall dare withhold them? In the smile used by the Gloss, we see that just as after the solemn baptism on Easter Eve, the Church, for the sake of the sick, grants a certain rest from laborious works, so likewise after the solemn baptism which precedes Pentecost, she immediately enjoins fasting, thus signifying that some who have in fervour of spirit been received to baptism, subject themselves at once to a stricter life. But with penitent sinners the case is otherwise. Severe penance is imposed on them at first. This, by degrees, is mitigated; for they are like sick persons who, in the beginning of their illness are restricted to a strict diet which, when convalescence has set in, is somewhat relaxed. Thus, the Church imposes on innocent souls, from the very beginning, the burden of the commandments, which must of necessity be kept. She does not lay the counsels upon them as a necessity, but she does not forbid them to undertake their observance, if they have the will so to do. Stricter obligations are, however, imposed upon penitents, according to the statutes of the canons of the early Church.

The second fallacy into which our opponents fall, in the application of their argument, is that of saying that in every office or profession, transition is made from what is easier to what is more difficult. Now it is not necessary that everyone who undertakes an important post, should first have served in an inferior capacity. Neither is it essential that a man, desiring to practise a trade, should already have worked at another trade; but he must ascend from the less to the more difficult branches of the trade in which he wishes to become proficient. In like manner, it is not essential that they who wish to become religious should already have kept the commandments in the world. What is necessary is that, when they enter religious life, the easier observances should be imposed upon them at first. Again, those who wish to become clerics need not first have led the life of laymen, nor need they who wish to live continently, have observed continence in married life.

The third error into which our adversaries fall, arises from the fact that there is a twofold difficulty in the work of practising the Counsels.

The first difficulty arises from the greatness of the work itself, which, because it needs the perfection of virtue, is not imposed upon the imperfect.

The second difficulty lies in the restraints imposed. And the more imperfect the persons, the more restraint they need. Thus children need closer watching while they are under the custody of their tutors, than when they have arrived at perfection.

Now the religious life, as we have seen, is a certain course of discipline restraining men from sin and leading them on to perfection. Therefore, they who are the most imperfect, not being practised in the observance of the commandments, stand in the greatest need of the safeguards of religious life, which render it more easy for them to abstain from sin than if they lived freely in the world. The words in the Gloss, but many, such as heretics and schismatics, pervert this order, are clearly shown, by the context, to refer to order of doctrine. (Peter Lombard, Commentaries on the Psalms and St. Paul, at Ps 130:4 (PL 191:1172C).) For the Gloss continues: this man says indeed that he has kept the commandments, thus laying himself under a curse as if he were humble, not merely in other matters, but also in knowledge. For he says, I thought humbly, being at first nourished by milk, which is the "Word was made flesh," in order that I might grow to the bread of angels, that is, "the Word which in the beginning was with God.” (Peter Lombard, Commentaries on the Psalms and St. Paul, at Ps 130:4 (PL 191:1172C).) And thus he returns to what he said at first. By this passage we see that words, intended as a means, have been used as an example.

The next argument brought forward against us is so frivolous that it requires no answer. It concerns the five thousand men whom Christ fed with five loaves and the four thousand among whom seven loaves were distributed. It is not necessary that the order of things typified should correspond with the order of their types, for we often see that later things are prefigured by earlier ones, and vice versa. Neither can any valid argument be drawn from symbolical things of this nature, as St. Augustine says in his Epistle against the Donatists. (Augustine, Epistulae, epistle 93, to Vincent the Donatist, ch. 8, para. 24: "Quis autem non impudentissime nitatur aliquid in allegoria positum pro se interpretari, nisi habeat et manifesta testimonia quorum lumine illustrantur obscura?" (CCSL 31A; CSEL 34.2:470; PL 33:334); cf. Epistola ad catholicos contra donatistas, vulgo de Unitate Ecclesiae, ch. 5, para. 8 (CSEL 52:239; PL 43:396).) Dionysius likewise writes in his Epistle to Titus that allegorical theology is not argumentative. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistolae, epistle 9, sect. 1 (PG 3:1106D)) We will, notwithstanding, observe that by this order of miracles is typified the order of precepts and counsels, in so far as regards the whole human race. The counsels were given not in the old law but in the new; for, the law brought nothing to perfection. (Heb 7:19.) The Gloss points this out by saying that the five loaves signify the legal precepts, and that the seven loaves are symbolical of evangelical perfection. (Glossa ordinaria 5, 256, at Matt 14:21.) But this is no reason why the same men should be exercised first in the precepts of the law, and then in the counsels in the religious life; for we do not read that the same individuals were first among the seven thousand, and that they then formed part of the four thousand who were miraculously fed by Jesus Christ.

Again, the point brought forward by our opponents, as to the four things of which the Gospel is composed, is not relevant to the question we are discussing. For the perfection proposed as an example does not refer to the counsels, but to virtuous acts or the perfect way of keeping the commandments as Christ kept them. Hence the Gloss goes on to quote other examples, e.g., learn of me, for I am meek, and elsewhere, be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect (Matt 5:48). I have given you an example (John 13:15). (Glossa ordinaria 5, 475, on Jerome's prologue to the Gospel of Mark; This is in reality written by Pseudo-Jerome (Commeanus), Super Marcum.)

We must examine with greater care the seventh argument, as it is one that our opponents are fond of using. It concerns the order to be observed between the active and the contemplative life. It is perfectly true that the active ought to precede the contemplative life, but the meaning of the active life is not always understood. It is sometimes thought that the active life consists merely in the management of temporal affairs; and therefore, as religious possess nothing, either individually or in common, they are believed to be incapable of sharing in the active life. St. Gregory, in the second part of the Second Homily on Ezekiel, points out that this view is a mistaken one. The active life, he says, consists in giving bread the hungry, instructing the ignorant, correcting those who err, recalling the proud to humility, caring for the sick, distributing to each one what is needful to him, and in seeing how each one may be maintained by those things that an entrusted to us. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on Ezechiel 2.2.8 (CCSL 142; PL 76:953A).) Thus we see that the active life regards not merely temporal matters, but also the guidance and correction of others in spiritual concerns, and that for such duties those men are the best fitted who own no worldly possessions. Consequently, when our Lord appointed the apostles to be the teachers of the whole earth, he stripped them of their property (Matt 10).

We may further enquire whether the exercise of the moral virtues pertains to the active life. Aristotle (Ethics, 10) answers this question in the affirmative, and adds that the intellectual virtues belong to the contemplative life. (Aristotle, Ethics 10.12, 1178a10-b8.) St. Augustine confirms this opinion in De Trinitate, 12, where he ascribes the inferior reason, which is exercised about temporal matters concerning either ourselves or others, to action, and the superior reason, which is occupied with eternal interests, to contemplation. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 12, ch. 3-4 (CCSL 50; PL 42:999-1000).) In accordance with this view, it is quite reasonable to hold that the active must precede the contemplative life. For, unless a man has, by the exercise of the moral virtues, freed his soul from passion (which it is the business of the active life to do), he will not be fit for the contemplation of divine truth. Blessed are the clean of heart, says Christ, for they shall see God (Matt 5:8). They shall see him here by imperfect contemplation, and hereafter by what is perfect. Thus the exercise of the active life pertains not only to laymen, but to religious also.

Three reasons go to prove that this is the case.

First, because by the exercise of the moral virtues the passions are restrained.

Secondly, because religious can show mercy to others by teaching and correcting, or by visiting the sick and comforting the sorrowful, be they seculars or religious of their own monastery. Thus they can verify the words of St. James 1:27, religion clean and undefiled before God and the Father is this: to visit the fatherless and the widow in their tribulation, and to keep one’s self unspotted from this world.

The third reason why religious share with seculars in the active life is because, at their entry into religion, they distributed their worldly possessions to the poor. It is not, therefore, because the precepts belong only to the active life that the Gloss says that the commandments are the duty of the active, and the counsels of the contemplative life. (Cf. Glossa ordinaria 5, 320, at Matt 19:17; Glossa interlinearis, at Matt 19:21 (in Glossa ordinaria 5, 321-322).) St. Gregory writes: to live a contemplative life is to bear in mind with all diligence, charity to God and to our neighbour, (Gregory the Great, Homilies on Ezechiel 2.2.8 (CCSL 142; PL 76:953A).) which are the great precepts of the law. The counsels dispose the soul more particularly to the contemplative life. For without them, the mere observance of the precepts will not suffice for contemplation, which requires greater perfection. No one need remain in the world for the sake of leading an active life; for in religion he can have quite as much exercise in the active life as is necessary to dispose him for the contemplative.

The eighth argument, viz., that no one arrives at once at the highest point, is not much to the purpose, although great stress is laid upon it. For we may consider the highest and the lowest either as referring to the same condition and to the same man, or to different conditions and different men. If we consider these degrees as referring to the same condition and the same man, it is quite evident that no one arrives at once at the highest point; for every virtuous man is, during the whole course of his life, making progress towards perfection. But if these degrees are considered with regard to different conditions, there is no reason why a man should not fill the highest post without having served in an inferior capacity. It is not necessary for a cleric to have lived as a layman; for some men are admitted in their boyhood into the ranks of the clergy. Neither is the saying that no one reaches the highest point at once true, if we consider it as referring to different people; for one man may start from a degree of holiness far higher than that to which another will attain throughout the whole course of his life. St. Gregory says (Dialogues, 11): in order that all his contemporaries and all succeeding generations might know to what a height of perfection the child Benedict had arrived, when he received the grace of conversion. (Gregory the Great, Dialogues 2.1 (PL 66:128B).)

The ninth argument, viz. that damp walls cannot bear a roof, and the tenth that he courts a fall who tries to climb a steep ascent without steps, are both irrelevant to our subject. The authorities from whom these passages are drawn use these examples in speaking of the dignity of the episcopal state, which requires mature virtue and is, therefore, not to be conferred on those who are imperfect. But the counsels are aids to perfection and safeguards from sin. Hence we may speak of them as serving to dry the moisture from newly erected walls, and as sure steps whereby the summit of perfection may be reached.

The eleventh argument used against us deals with the natural priority of the commandments to the counsels. Reference to what we have already said will show how much weight such an argument carries. If we speak of the final precepts, viz. the love of God and of our neighbour , it is clear that the counsels are directed towards these precepts as to their end. The relation between the counsels and these precepts is that which exists between things ordained for a certain end, and the end for which they are ordained. Now an end is the first thing, if we consider it with reference to the intention; but it is the last if we consider it with regard to the prosecution or consummation. If then the counsels were so ordained with reference to the commandments that unless the counsels were practised the commandments could not be observed, it would follow that man is bound to observe the counsels before loving God or his neighbour. Such, of course, is not the case. But if the relations between the counsels and the precepts be in such wise that by means of the counsels, the precepts can be more easily and more perfectly kept, it follows that by means of the counsels we can attain to the perfect love of God and of our neighbour. Hence we see that, although in intention this precept precedes the counsels, yet in prosecution the counsels precede this precept.

If we consider the relations between the counsels and the other precepts which are given as means to the love of God and our neighbour, we shall see that these relations are of a twofold nature. For, as the counsels cannot be observed without the precepts, and as the precepts are kept by many without the counsels, the counsels can be compared to the precepts if they be considered generally. Thus the relations between the counsels and the precepts would be that of particular to general. The particular will precede the general, not necessarily in order of time, but in order of nature. Therefore it is not essential to be exercised in obedience to the precepts before passing to the observance of the counsels. But another relation may be observed between the counsels and the precepts, which can be observed without the counsels. In this relation the counsels may be compared to the precepts as a perfect to an imperfect species, e.g. as a rational to an irrational animal. In this relation, the counsels precede the precepts in the order of nature, for in every genus the perfect is naturally first. As Boethius says, nature begins from the perfect. (Cf. Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 3, prose 10: "Neque enim ab diminutis inconsummatisque natura rerum coepit exordium, sed ab integris absolutisque procedens" (CCSL 94; CSEL 67:65; PL 63:765A).) It does not matter that in this relation the precepts precede the counsels in point of time, for a thing of an imperfect species may, in point of time, be prior to the thing of a perfect species to which it passes. What is essential is that an imperfect thing should pass to a perfect one of its own species.

The last argument, viz. that there can be no salvation without the counsels if the counsels precede the precepts, is manifestly based on a misunderstanding of what I have been saying. For we do not affirm that the counsels are so related to the precepts that the latter cannot be kept without the former. What we assert is that by means of the counsels the precepts can be more perfectly obeyed.