Chapter 16 — An answer to the arguments which are brought forward against the propositions contained in the preceding chapter

After what has been already premised, it will be easy to answer the objections of those who maintain an opinion contrary to ours.

And in the first place, it was argued that it is expedient to own property in common. It is certainly well to do so for the sake of those who are not capable of that height of perfection practised by the faithful of the early Church, among whom, however, the imperfect were not wholly neglected. Thus, although they who followed sublime perfection did not own any property, yet even our Lord, to whom the angels ministered, kept a purse for the necessities of others, and because His Church was to possess funds, as St. Augustine says in his commentary on St. John’s Gospel. Therefore, if there is any congregation of which every member aspires to the highest perfection, it is expedient for such a congregation to own no possessions.

When, in the next place, it is stated that St. Benedict received ample possessions during his lifetime, this only proves that the possession of common property does not make monastic perfection absolutely impossible. It is no proof whatsoever that it is not more perfect to renounce possessions altogether, especially as St. Benedict declares in his Rule, that he had, in condescension to the weakness of the monks of his time, mitigated in certain particulars the rigour of the monastic life as it was ordained by earlier Fathers. The same remark applies to St. Gregory, who built monasteries, according to the rule drawn up by St. Benedict.

The third argument, namely, that our Lord allowed his apostles to take with them in time of persecution purse and bag, tells rather against our opponents than for them. If, in the time of persecution the rule was suspended, it proves that the ordinary rule was that the apostles should take with them neither purse nor bag. We do not read that in time of persecution the apostles procured for themselves any possessions in common. Thus the argument of their conduct during persecution is irrelevant to our subject.

The fourth assertion, namely, that our Lord did not establish an order of men possessing nothing, but an order of prelates who owned certain property, is a distinct falsehood. For when our Lord taught his disciples to possess neither gold nor silver, lest their hearts should be weighed down by temporal anxieties; and when he promised to those who, for his sake should renounce lands and houses, a reward not only in the next world but in this life also, so that they should resemble the apostles in having nothing yet possessing all things, he made it clear that all who should hereafter follow this rule would be obeying his ordinance. Those who follow the saints who have founded various orders are, in reality, imitating not those holy founders, but Christ, whose precepts they preach. Our adversaries are either deceived on another point, or else they try to mislead us. Christ did not establish an order of bishops, or other clerics who were to own property, either in common or individually. He established such an order, indeed, but established it in perfect poverty. Later on, however, possessions were accepted by the Church in order, as we have seen, to be distributed by her.

As for the fifth assertion, namely, that Christian perfection has been in abeyance from the time of the apostles until our own days, it is certain, on the contrary that far from being in abeyance, Christian perfection has flourished vigorously, both in Egypt and in other parts of the world. No man can set limits to God, or say that he is to draw all men to himself at the same time, or in the same place; rather, according to the wisdom whereby he disposes all things sweetly, he provides at divers seasons the aids to man’s salvation peculiarly befitting those times. Has Christian teaching failed from the days of the masters and the doctors, Athanasius, Basil, Ambrose, Augustine, and the rest, until our times, in which men are even better instructed than they formerly were in Christian doctrine? Is it, according to the views of out opponents, unlawful to set again in motion any good work which for a while has been interrupted? If such be the case, it would be unlawful to suffer martyrdom or to work miracles, since both these good works have, for a time, been in abeyance.

The sixth argument, namely, that those who possessed no common property used to live by the work of their hands, is a calumny against others as well against religious; for the apostle who preached the Gospel maintained himself by manual labour. Is it a sin, then, for bishops, archdeacons and all who are officially bound to preach the Gospel not to live by the work of their hands? If they are not bound thus to maintain themselves, because St. Paul laboured not out of necessity, but as a work of supererogation, why should that work be enforced upon religious, which was only supererogatory with the holy fathers? No one can fulfil all works of supererogation; for one thing is superfluous in one man, and another in another man. But, granted that it is not supererogatory, but necessary that they who own no common property should live by the work of their hands, that necessity only extends to such labour as may prevent idleness. But idleness is prevented, not only by manual labour, but far more by the study of Holy Scripture; such idleness performs a great work, as St. Augustine says. And the Gloss on the words of Psalm 48, my eyes have failed, says, he is not idle who only studies the word of God; neither does he accomplish more who performs external work than he who exercises himself in the knowledge of divinity. For wisdom is of all works the greatest.

Idleness is also prevented by the warfare which we wage against the enemies of the Faith, according to St. Paul’s injunction: labour like a good soldier of Jesus Christ (2 Tim 2:3). This the Gloss interprets to mean the preaching of the Gospel against the enemies of the faith. This I acknowledge to be a necessary work, for those who have not otherwise a means of subsistence. For it is lawful for all preachers of the Gospel, even monks, to live by the Gospel and by their ministry at the altar. St. Augustine in De opere monachorum asks whether it is permissible for monks to have any common property, save what they gain by their own labour. Is it not ridiculous to say that religious may receive large possessions as alms, and yet may not accept donations to provide for their simple daily needs? Therefore no necessity constrains those who do not possess common property to labour with their hands. We have, however, elsewhere spoken more fully on this point.

The seventh argument deserves ridicule, rather than reply. For, who does not see that the task of heaping up riches—a task which seculars can barely achieve—involves far more anxiety of mind than that of merely procuring from the charity of the faithful and the mercy of God a simple, daily provision for the necessities of life.

As for the eighth argument, namely, that religious must occupy themselves about the affairs of those who minister to them, I acknowledge that this is true. But the affairs about which they must be busied are such as concern the spiritual welfare of their benefactors, or their consolation when they are in trouble. Such solicitude is a work of charity by no means incompatible with religion. For, as St. James says, religion pure and undefiled before God and the Father is this, to visit the orphan and the widow in their tribulation (Jas 1:27).

The last argument is absolutely worthless. For the things used by religious for their support are not absolutely their own property or under their own control, but are ministered to them for their necessities by those who have the management of such things.

This is all that occurs to me at present to write against the pernicious end erroneous teaching which deters some men from entering religious life. If any man desires to contradict my words, let him not do so by chattering before boys but let him write and publish his writings, so that intelligent persons may judge what is true, and may be able to confute what is false by the authority of the truth.