Chapter 11 — Arguments used by those who maintain that men should not bind themselves by vow to embrace the religious life

We must next examine the views held by those who endeavour to prevent men from binding themselves by vow to become religious. Some there are who seek to detract from the merit of any vows, contending that it is better to perform good works without being bound by any obligation. They support their opinion by the following words of Prosper (De vita contemplativa, 2): we ought to fast and abstain, not as being bound thereto by necessity, lest, if we do these works unwillingly, we should be acting not through devotion, but from constraint. (Pseudo-Prosper (Julianus Pomerius), De vita contemplativa, bk. 2, ch. 24, para. 1 (PL 59:470B).) Now he who makes a vow to fast, subjects himself to the necessity of fasting; and this is the case with all other good works. Therefore, it would not seem expedient to make a vow to fast, or to enter religion, or to perform any other pious action. Those who hold this view maintain, likewise that a good work loses in merit in proportion to the necessity for its performance. Now as a man who has vowed to enter religion, or to perform any other virtuous action, is bound to fulfil what he has promised to God, it is better and more praiseworthy if he executes such a good work without the obligation of a vow, rather than do it because he had taken a vow. Those who argue thus, endeavour likewise, in an especial manner, to prove that people should not be persuaded to enter religion on account of the obligation laid upon them by any vow or oath.

They support their opinion by the statute of the Council of Toledo, where (Decretals, XLV*, De Judaeis*) we find these words: not unwilling, but willing souls, will be saved. For justice must be preserved intact. Man, of his own choice, obeyed the will of the serpent and perished. Therefore, each man must be saved by the response of his own soul in believing, when the grace of God calls him to do so. Therefore men are to be converted, not by force, but by their own free will and choice. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 1, D. 45, ch. 5 (Friedberg, 1:161-62). Gerard references this decretal in Duplex quaestio, a. 1.) Now these words apply far more forcibly to entrance into religious life, which is less necessary to salvation than is faith in the Christian religion. But those who enter religion on account of a vow or an oath do so not freely, but under constraint. Therefore such an obligation is not to be commended. The decree of Pope Urban (Decretals, XIX*,* q. 2*, Duae sunt*) is considered an argument in support of this opinion. The pope says that they who enter religious life are led by a private law, which is the law of the Holy Spirit. Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty (2 Cor 3:17). (Pope Urban in Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 19, q. 2, ch. 2 (Friedberg, 1:839-40).) Now necessity, which constrains men by the obligation of a vow or oath, is opposed to liberty. Therefore, it is not seemly that men should be obliged to embrace religious life, on account of any oath or vow.

Another argument is drawn from the fall of those, who, having entered religion under the constraint of some obligation, have not persevered therein, but have returned to the world and abandoned themselves, in despair, to vice of every kind. (Cf., for example, Gerard, Duplex quaestio, a. 1, a. 2.) In them is fulfilled what our Lord said to the Pharisees: you go round about the sea and the land to make one proselyte, and when he is made, you make him the child of hell twofold more than yourselves (Matt 23:15).

It is further maintained that some men who were under vow to go into religion, have not fulfilled their obligation, and have nevertheless become good bishops or archdeacons. Had they kept their vow, these good results would not have been obtained. It is also urged that men must not be persuaded to embrace the religious state for the sake of any temporal advantages, such as gifts. The decree of Pope Boniface (Decretals, I*,* q. 2*, Quam pio*) is quoted in confirmation of this proposition, for the pope says: nowhere do we read that the disciples of the Lord or their followers were converted to the worship of God by gifts. (Boniface in Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 1, q. 2, ch. 2 (Friedberg, 1:408).)

It is further alleged that it leads men into unfaithfulness to be bound, while still inexperienced, to the laborious obligations of religious life, such as the long morning office, trying vigils, fasts and disciplines. They are led like cattle to the slaughterhouse; (Cf. Prov 7:22.) and, as they do not fulfil what they have vowed to perform, these religious exercises are for them snares which entangle them in eternal death. Such obligations, it is urged, are unlawful, as being contrary to the statute of Innocent IV, which provides a year of probation for candidates to religious life, and forbids anyone to be bound before the age of fourteen years. (Cf., for example, Gerard, Quodlibet XI, a. 23, and Duplex quaestio, a. 1, referring to Pope Innocent IV, "Epistulae," epistle 3, ["Ad fratres ordinis praedicatorum"], 23:565D.) This decree is in harmony with the rule of St. Benedict, which also, appoints a year of probation for those who enter the order. (Benedict, Reg. ch. 58 (CSEL 75; PL 66:803-806).) It is declared, furthermore, to be peculiarly unlawful for youths under the age of puberty to be bound to go into religion, for how can a youth accept obligations which may lawfully be made void by another? If any youths of tender years have bound themselves to become religious, they may be withheld from so doing by their parents or guardians. This is laid down in Decretals, XX, q. 2, where it is declared that if a maiden, under the age of twelve years has taken the veil, her engagements may be annulled at the will of her parents or guardians. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 20, q. 2, ch. 2 (Friedberg, 1:847-848).) Thus it is unlawful to bind, either by oath or vow, children under the age of puberty to the religious life.

It is further laid down that none, under this age, can be bound to religious life, even though he or she should be capable of fraud. St. Bernard, in the preparation of regulars and of those who embrace the religious state, comments on the decree Postulasti of Pope Innocent III: if you desire to know what to expect of them when they are under the age of thirteen or fourteen years, you may be in doubt, for they are capable of craft, and may make up in cunning what they lack in age. This has been proved in marriage (as we see in Extra, De sponsalibus impuberum, cap. 'A nobis,' and cap. 'Tuae'), and, as they have been able to bind themselves to the devil, they may also be able to bind themselves to God. But the pope replies that children under fourteen may, after they have been received, serve in the Church, but they may not be bound under obligations. He who is capable of fraud, the pope continues in his reply to Hugh, is bound to good, and if he has become a monk he is under the obligations of the monastic life, since he was able to bind himself to the devil. Innocent III was of the same opinion, for in this same decretal he replies that entrance into religious life is a solemn engagement, if age is supplied by malice. This is also laid down in the old decretal, but it is of small import in our days. (Bernard's gloss on Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii Papae IX), (ed. 1588), bk. 3, tit. 31, ch. 21, col. 1400.)

These who argue against the propriety of persons being under an obligation to go into religion, quote the Summae of Raymund and Goffin. (Raymond of Penafort, Summa de casibus poenitentia, (Lyon: Kaepelli, 1518), bk. 1, tit. 8, sect. 6, pg. 64; Geoffrey of Trani, Summa super titulos Decretalium, (Cologne: Ludwig von Renchen, 1488), bk. 3, tit. 31, ch. 21, 5:4 vb.) They also maintain (Decretals, XXII*,* q. 5*, Pueri*; and Honestum) that children under fourteen years of age ought not to be bound by oath; (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 22, q. 5, ch. 15-16 (Friedberg, 1:887).) neither, by the same reasoning, can they be bound by vow to enter religious life. They say further that, as the word religion signifies either re-binding or re-electing, according to St. Augustine (De civitate Dei, 10), (Augustine, De civitate Dei, bk. 10, ch. 3, para. 2 (CCSL 47; CSEL 40.1:449-50; PL 41:280).) therefore children, who are not bound and have made no choice, cannot be re-bound, nor can they repeat their choice. From these arguments they conclude that children who embrace, or are constrained to embrace religious life, are much to be pitied for their folly.