Chapter 12 — Refutation of the error contained in the last chapter

In order that the truth may be made manifest with regard to each of the premises contained in the last chapter, we will investigate them one by one, beginning with those that concern common things, and proceeding to those who are more spiritual. We will first, examine whether it be true that good works, done under vow, are less meritorious than those performed without such obligation. And, although a great deal has been said on this subject in our little book on perfection, (Thomas is referring here to his book De perfectione spiritualis vitae, specifically ch. 13.) we will nevertheless not hesitate to go over the ground again.

We must first remember that although the praiseworthiness of an action depends radically on the will, the work itself becomes outwardly more praiseworthy in proportion to the excellence of the will. Now one condition of a good will is that it be firm and stable. Proverbs 13:4 reproaches the slothful in these words: the sluggard wills and wills not. Therefore an exterior work becomes praiseworthy and meritorious, in proportion to the stability of the will in good. Hence St. Paul says: be steadfast and immoveable (1 Cor 15:58). And Aristotle teaches that for the perfection of virtue, stability and constancy in operation are necessary. (Aristotle, Ethics 2.4, 1105a33.) Lawyers also define justice as firmness and steadfastness of will. (Cf., for example, Ulpianus in Digesta, ed. Kruger-Mommsen (Berlin: Weidman, 1962-63), bk. 1, sect. 1, n. 10, 1:2.) On the other hand, we know that the heinousness of sin depends upon the obstinacy in evil shown by the sinner. In fact, this obstinacy is itself called a sin against the Holy Spirit. (Cf. Augustine, Enchiridion 83 (CCSL 46; PL 40:272); Peter Lombard, Liber sententiarum, bk. 2, d. 43, ch. 2 (PL 192:754-55).) Now it is clear that the will to do anything is strengthened by an oath. I have sworn, says the Psalmist, and am determined to keep the judgments of your justice (Ps 118:106). The will is likewise confirmed by a vow, since a vow is a promise, and he who promises to do a thing strengthens his determination to do it. Therefore, as we see in our experience of human life, a virtuous action is more meritorious and more praiseworthy, if it is performed when the will is strengthened by a vow.

So inconstant is the human will that it has become customary not to believe what men say they will do for one another, unless they confirm their words by promise, and further ratify those promises by lawful safeguards. Now we owe more to ourselves, especially in the affairs of our spiritual wellbeing, than we owe to other people. This we are taught by the words of Sirach 30:24[23], have pity on your own soul, pleasing God. Now by reason of the inconstancy of his will, a man may neglect to perform something that he intended for the temporal advantage of his neighbour; he therefore provides against this possible omission by confirming his promise by some oath or pledge. (Cf. Albert the Great, Super sent., bk. 4, d. 38, a. 6, arg. 4.) How much more fittingly then may he not bind, himself by oath or vow to carry out some good resolution which he has made? Hence St. Augustine says, in his epistle to Paulina and Armentarius, having made a vow, you have bound yourself, and cannot act otherwise. (Augustine, Epistulae, epistle 127, to Armenatius and Paulina, para. 8 (CCSL 31B; CSEL 44:27; PL 33:487).) And he further adds: never regret your vow, but rather rejoice that it is now no longer lawful for you to do what, to your detriment, you were able to do before. (Augustine, Epistulae, epistle 127, to Armenatius and Paulina, para. 8 (CCSL 31B; CSEL 44:28; PL 33:487).)

It is further to be remembered that a work of lesser intrinsic worth is rendered more meritorious, if it is inspired by some motive of superior virtue. Thus, abstinence is more meritorious if it is practised from charity, and the merit is further increased if the motive be latria, which is of greater value than abstinence. Now a vow is an act of latria. It is a promise made to God, concerning those things which relate to his worship. Hence Isaiah 19:21 says, the Egyptians shall know the Lord in that day, and shall worship him with sacrifices and offerings, and they shall make vows to the Lord, and perform them. Thus we see that fasting will be more meritorious and more praiseworthy, if it is performed under vow. A counsel or command concerning this matter is given us in the words of Psalm 75:12: vow, and pay to the Lord your God! This command or exhortation would be futile, were not a good work done under vow more meritorious than one done without such an obligation.

These facts being premised, we must now consider whether it be justifiable or not for a man to bind himself to enter the religious life. If it be true that it is a virtuous action to embrace the religious state, and that virtuous actions become more meritorious if they be done in fulfilment of a vow, those men must be acting in a praiseworthy manner when, being unable to become religious at once, bind themselves by vow to do so at a future time. This argument must be patent to all. save to those who, with Vigilantius, hold that the secular state is equal in merit to the religious life, or who have the still grosser folly to outdo the heresy of Vigilantius by presuming to assert that the religious state, which enjoys the approbation of the Church, is not a state of salvation.

This audacious teaching does not only stultify the counsels of Christ, but is distinctly schismatical, as it contravenes the ordinances of the Church. But if, on the contrary, those who oblige themselves by vow to embrace the religious life, are inspired to do so by the Spirit of God and act in a praiseworthy manner, they also are to be commended who, working together with the Holy Spirit, endeavour by their exterior ministry to persuade their neighbours to do what the Spirit of God interiorly moves them to do. For, as St. Paul says, we are God’s coadjutors (1 Cor 3:9), that is, by our external ministry. (Cf. Peter Lombard, Commentaries on the Psalms and St. Paul, at 1 Cor 3:9 (PL 191:1555D).)

The foregoing remarks only apply to adults. We must now consider the question as to whether children, be they boys or girls, may lawfully bind themselves by vow to become religious. A distinction must be made between two kinds of vows: simple vows, and solemn vows. (Cf. Peter Lombard, Liber sententiarum, bk. 4, d. 38, ch 2 (PL 192:932); Raymond of Penafort, Summa de casibus poenitentia 4.5.3 (Kaepelli, 483).) A simple vow consists in a mere promise. A solemn vow is a promise accompanied by some exterior manifestation, whereby a man actually offers himself to God. Thus the reception of holy orders, the profession of a definite religious life made in the hands of a prelate, or the reception of the habit of professed religious, which is considered equivalent to religious profession, all solemnize a vow. (Cf. Raymond of Penafort, Summa de casibus poenitentia 4.5.3 (Kaepelli, 483).) Simple and solemn vows have different effects upon matrimony. A solemn vow is an obstacle to marriage, and annuls a contract of marriage already made. (Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii Papae IX), ed. Emil Friedberg, Corpus iuris canonici 2 (Leipzig: Bernhard Tauchnitz, 1881), bk. 4, tit. 6, ch. 3, 2:685 [Also called the Extra or Decretalium].) A simple vow does not annul a marriage, but is an impediment in the way of any contract of marriage after the vow is made.

Simple and solemn vows have, likewise different effects upon religious life. A solemn vow, made either by explicit or implicit profession, causes a man to become a monk or a brother in some religious order. (Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii Papae IX), bk. 3, tit. 31, ch. 13 (Friedberg, 2:573).) A simple vow does not make a him a monk, for it leaves him with the ownership of his property, and does not annul his marriage, should he marry after taking such a vow. Now as a simple vow consists solely in a promise made to God, proceeding from the interior deliberation of the mind, such a vow possesses an efficacy of which no human law can deprive it. There are, nevertheless, two conditions under which a simple vow may be invalidated. First, if such due deliberation as would ratify a promise, have been wanting; thus a vow taken by a mad or delirious man would not be binding (as is laid down in Extra de regul. et transeuntibus ad relig. Sicut tenor). (Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii Papae IX), bk. 3, tit. 31, ch. 15 (Friedberg, 2:574).) Neither would any obligation attach to the vow of a child as yet incapable of fraud, or who had not attained to the use of reason, which in children is developed at such different ages that no certain rule can be laid down concerning it.

The other condition which would invalidate a simple vow is, in the event of a person vowing something to which he has not the power to give. Thus, if a slave makes a vow to go into religion, he (supposing him to have attained the use of reason) would be certainly bound to keep his vow, if his master permitted him to do so. But if his master would not ratify the vow, the slave could, without sin, revoke it. This is laid down in the Decretals, XLIV*, Si servus*, where it is said that if a slave have, unknown to his master, been ordained, the master is entitled within a year of the ordination to prove that the slave is his property and to take him back. (The text is in reality found in Gratian, Decretum, P. 1, D. 54, ch. 20 (Friedberg, 1:213).) And since a boy or girl is, during childhood, in the power of the father, the father may, if he so will, acknowledge the vow made by a child as an effect of divine inspiration. We read in the book of Numbers 30:4, if a woman vows anything, and binds herself by an oath, being in her father’s house, and but yet a girl in age: if her father knew the vow that she has promised, and the oath wherewith she has bound her soul, and held his peace, she shall be bound by the vow: whatsoever she promised and swore, she shall fulfil in deed. But if her father, as soon as he heard it, overruled it, both her vows and her oaths shall be void; neither shall she be bound to what she promised, because her father has overruled it. From this passage it appears that boys or girls, under the age of puberty, are bound, as far as in them lies, to keep vows that they have made, unless their reason is defective. Nevertheless, as they are under the authority of their father, he can annul their vows. This is also made clear by the context of the passage in Numbers, which we have quoted, which speaks of the right of a husband to annul a vow made by his wife. (Num 30:7-9.)

We cannot positively determine the age at which individuals reach the use of reason; but the period at which the subjection of one person to another ceases, can be distinctly defined. This time is for a girl the age of twelve years: for a boy the age of fourteen. This age is generally reckoned the time of puberty, as we see in Decretals, XX, q. 2*, Puella; Si in qualibet*. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 20, q. 2, ch. 1-2 (Friedberg, 1:847).) Thus with regard to a simple vow to enter religion, a person may be bound, in so far as it depends upon himself, by such a vow even before he has arrived at the age of puberty, provided that he is capable of fraud, and has attained the use of reason, so that he understands what he is doing. But this vow may be revoked by a father or a guardian who holds the place of a father. A solemn vow, on the other hand, made either explicitly or implicitly, requires certain exterior rites ordained by the Church. The Church exacts that both for the reception of holy orders, and for the making of a solemn vow, the candidate must have attained the age of puberty, which for a boy is fourteen years and for a girl twelve. Therefore a profession made by anyone under this age, even though the person is capable of fraud, does not render him a monk or brother of any religious order. This is the commonly accepted teaching of the Church, though Innocent III is said to have spoken otherwise. (Seemingly, Pope Innocent III only spoke otherwise according to Bernard's gloss on Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii Papae IX), bk. 3, tit. 31, ch. 21, col. 1400.)