Chapter 13 — Refutation of the arguments adduced in the last chapter

Our last chapter consisted in an exposition of the arguments brought forward to prove that a vow did not add to the merit of a good work. Our present task is to answer these arguments. This we can easily do.

The words of Prosper, we ought to fast, not out of necessity, refer to a forced fast, in contradistinction to a voluntary one. This is proved by the context, lest we should, by not fasting voluntarily, show ourselves unwilling rather than devout. These words do not refer to the necessity imposed by a vow, for by a vow devotion, is increased. This appears from the very etymology of the word.

The second argument, namely, that which is done out of necessity is less meritorious than that which is done freely, must be understood of the necessity imposed on a man against his own will. But when a man lays upon himself the necessity of doing good, his action is thereby rendered more praiseworthy, since he who performs it is a servant of justice, which St. Paul exhorts us all to become (Rom 6:18). Hence St. Augustine, in his epistle to Paulina and Armentarius, exclaims, blessed necessity which constrains us to better things. (Augustine, Epistulae, epistle 127, to Armenatius and Paulina, para. 8 (CCSL 31B; CSEL 44:28; PL 33:487).)

The third argument, which refers to the conversion of the Jews of their own free will, does not appear relevant to our subject. For the will may be confirmed in good without any violation of its liberty; otherwise neither God nor the blessed in heaven would enjoy free will. But coercion, proceeding either from violence or fear, is repugnant to liberty. Therefore, the canon De Judaeis expressly condemns it, saying, the holy Synod henceforth forbids violence to be used towards anyone to make them believe. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 1, D. 45, ch. 5 (Friedberg, 1:161).) But neither a vow nor an oath do violence to a man; they merely serve to confirm his will in good. Therefore, neither a vow nor an oath render a man unwilling, but rather cause him to will more strongly, and to begin, in so far as may lie in his power, to execute what he has bound himself to. No one in his senses will say that it is unlawful to persuade Jews to bind themselves by vow or oath to be baptized.

The fourth contention of our opponents is that sometimes those who have bound themselves by oath or vow to go into religion lapse, and falling into despair, abandon themselves to all manner of iniquity; and thus they become the children of hell, twofold more than they who led them to become religious. This objection is answered by St. Paul, shall their unbelief make the faith of God without effect? (Rom 3:3). From which words we are to conclude that the fact that some men abuse grace is not detrimental to the perseverance of others in good. The Gloss says on this passage that the refusal of certain Jews to believe in no wise hinders others of their nation from accepting what God has promised to his faithful. (Peter Lombard, Commentaries on the Psalms and St. Paul, at Rom 3:3 (PL 191:1351A), taken from Ambrosiaster (Pseudo-Ambrose), Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul, at Rom 3:3 (PL 17:76D).) In the same way, the fact that certain men, after taking a vow or an oath to embrace the religious life, change their minds and become worse than they were before, is no hindrance to others who, having taken a vow, persevere in its accomplishment. Therefore, they who persuade men to make a vow to become religious do not, so far as they are concerned, make them children of hell, but rather children of the kingdom; since the number of those who persevere is greater than that of those who fall away.

It is nevertheless possible (though God forbid it!) that they may, as appears by the exposition of St. Jerome and St. Chrysostom, (Jerome, Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew 4.23, at 23:15 (CCSL 77; PL 26:170A); Pseudo-Chrysostom, Opus imp. in Matth., homily 44 (PG 56:883); Chrysostom, Homilies on Matthew 73.1 (PG 58:673).) by their bad example lead those whom they influence into sin. Our argument seems to be supported by the words of St. Paul, but the younger widows avoid (1 Tim 5:11), an exhortation for which he gives the following reason: having damnation, because they have made void their first faith, (1 Tim 5:12.) whereby, that is, they pledged themselves before God to continence. But, as St. Jerome says in his epistle De monogamia ad Agerunchiam, on account of those who have committed fornication against Christ their Spouse, the Apostle desires them to marry again, preferring a second marriage to fornication. (Jerome, Epistulae, epistle 123, to Ageruchia, para. 3 (CSEL 56:75; PL 22:1048A).) For it is much better to be a wife for a second time, than to have commerce with a debauchee or with many adulterers. But St. Paul does not, on this account, forbid young widows to make a simple vow of continency. In fact, he rather commends such a practice, saying, it is good for them if they so continue, i.e. in their widowhood (1 Cor 7:8). But he forbids widows who are living in wantonness to be assisted by the alms of the Church: (Cf. Peter Lombard, Commentaries on the Psalms and St. Paul, at 1 Tim 5:8 (PL 192:351D).) but the younger widow avoid, for when they have grown wanton in Christ they will marry (1 Tim 5:11).

As for the sixth argument, namely that some men who have made vows to go into religion have, nevertheless, remained in the world and become good bishops, it is patently contrary to fact. In the decree of Innocent, which treats of vows and their accomplishments, we find the following passage, you state in your letters to us that you made a solemn vow in the church of Grenoble to assume the religious habit, and that you further promised, in the hands of the bishop of the same church, to fulfil this vow within the period of two months on your return from the Apostolic See. Nevertheless, heedless that the time for accomplishing your promise has expired, although unfaithful to a vow, you have been called to the government of the church of Geneva. We counsel you then that if you desire to give peace to your conscience, you should renounce the see, and should pay to the Most High your vows. (Pope Innocent III in Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii Papae IX), bk. 3, tit. 34, ch. 10 (Friedberg, 2:595).) Hence it is plain that a man who has vowed to go into religion cannot, with a good conscience, retain a bishopric or an archdeaconate; and should he retain it, he would not be a good bishop or archdeacon, but a traitor to his vow.

The next contention, namely, that men should not be bribed to enter religion, is answered by the very chapter quoted in support of it. For it declares that unless someone has the intention of feeding the poor, no one of any profession whatsoever is to be refused maintenance. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 1, q. 2, ch. 2 (Friedberg, 1:408).) Hence it appears that the practice of burses for poor scholars, and of supporting them during their studies in order that they may be more fit to enter religion, is by no means to be condemned. Neither is it unlawful to bestow some material benefit upon a man, in order that he may be encouraged, by such a favour, to do better; but it would be unlawful to enter into a compact or agreement with him. Hence in the same chapter, it is laid down that all compacts and agreements must be avoided. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 1, q. 2, ch. 2 (Friedberg, 1:408).) Were it unlawful to encourage persons to spiritual good by means of material assistance, the custom, prevalent in certain churches, of giving a largesse to those who assist at the divine office, would be unjustifiable.

The eighth argument, namely, that it leads to unfaithfulness to persuade young persons to adopt such painful practices as fasting, watching, and the like, contains a fallacy which may easily be detected. For those who are received to the religious life, or who are bound by vow to enter it, are, from the very outset, shown its hardships. It does not lead men to unfaithfulness if, in order to persuade them to embrace a life whose sufferings are manifest, we, after the example of Christ, hold out to them the prospect of spiritual consolations. Take my yoke upon you, said our Lord, and learn of me, for I am meek and humble of heart, and you shall find rest for your soul (Matt 11:29). In these words, physical labour is symbolised by the yoke, and spiritual consolation by the rest promised to those that bear it. Hence St. Augustine, in De verbis Domini, says, they who bravely submit to the yoke of the Lord, undergo such dangers and difficulties that they appear to be called, not from labour to rest, but from rest to labour. (Augustine, Sermons on the Scriptures, sermon 70, [De verbis Domini], ch. 1, at Matt 11:28-30 (CCSL 41A: PL 38:443).) But the Holy Spirit who is with them by the abundance of heavenly delights and the hope of future blessedness, sweetens all present bitterness and lightens all present loads. (Augustine, Sermons on the Scriptures, sermon 70, [De verbis Domini], ch. 2, at Matt 11:28-30 (CCSL 41A; PL 38:443).) Therefore, they who judge that men deceive themselves by undertaking hardships for Christ’s sake, merely show that they have had no experience of heavenly delights.

The ninth argument is quite irrelevant to the matter in hand. The statute of Pope Innocent, which is quoted, refers to solemn vows made at professions, not to simple vows whereby people bind themselves out of devotion to go into religion.

The tenth objection, namely, that parents can annul the vows of children not yet arrived at the age of puberty, carries no weight. For the fact that an engagement may be broken does not make such an engagement sinful. It would be equally reasonable to say that whatever minors, that is persons under twenty-five years of age, may do to the detriment of their own interest is unlawful, because anything that they lose can be completely restored to them. (Cf. Digesta 4.4.) Hence children commit no sin by taking a vow to go into religion, or by assuming the religious habit without their parents’ permission, even though such vows can be annulled. Were they to commit sin by taking such vows, the fact would be noted by the canons, which grant faculties to parents to dissolve the vows of children.

The eleventh argument, which rests upon quotations from the decretals De apparatu, and from the Summae of the jurists Raymund and Goffin, does not bear upon our point. The passages quoted refer to the solemn vow which makes a person a religious or a professed member of some order. Doctors of canon law held different opinions about their vow, although it would seem inconsistent and ridiculous for professors of sacred learning to quote as authorities the little glosses of jurists, or to make them a basis of argument.

The twelfth objection, that which concerns oaths, is likewise irrelevant, for the canons do not forbid children to take oaths; they only prohibit their being obliged to do so.

The fallacy contained in the thirteenth argument is easily detected. Children are bound by that profession of Christian faith which they have chosen in the sacrament of baptism. Therefore, they may be bound anew, and can make a further choice of the state of perfection. This, however, is not a very correct way of speaking, since in baptism children receive the Christian religion and are bound again to God, making afresh their choice of him from whom the sin of our first parents had separated them.

Finally, the profane conclusion whereby these objections end, and which accuses children of folly, is an affront to pious ears. Who would presume to blame the holy child St. Benedict because, in his desire to please God alone, he left his father’s house, and sought for holy conversation and a solitary dwelling? (Gregory the Great, Dialogorum, bk. 2, prologue (PL 66:126A).) Who but a heretic would blaspheme against St. John the Baptist, of whom we are told that the child grew and was strengthened in spirit, and he was in the desert until the day of his manifestation to Israel (Luke 1:80)? Such presumptuous words show that they who speak them are carnal men, who reckon as folly what is of the spirit of God. St. Ambrose says, in his commentary on the Gospel of Luke, the Holy Spirit is not limited to age, nor extinguished by death, nor shut out by the womb. (Ambrose, Exposition on Luke's Gospel 1.33 (CCSL 14; CSEL 32.4:32D-E; PL 15:1547B).) St. Gregory, in his Homilia Pentecostes, likewise says, he fills the harp-playing youth, and makes of him a Psalmist; he fills the herdsman who was uprooting a fig tree, and makes of him a prophet; he fills the abstemious youth, and makes of him a venerable judge; he fills the fisherman, and makes of him a preacher; he fills the persecutor, and makes of him a teacher of the nations; he fills the publican, and makes of him an evangelist. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels 2.30.8 (CCSL 141; PL 76:1225D-26A).) I will further quote the words of St. Paul (1 Cor 3:18), if any man among you seems to be wise in this world, let him become a fool that he may become wise. For he who is a fool in the wisdom of this world (which is folly in the sight of God) is no fool in the wisdom of God. The book of Proverbs 1:22, speaking to children, says, O children, how long will you love childishness? (This is where verse 22 ends.) Give heed to my reproof. I will utter my words (Vulgate: spirit.) to you. (Prov 1:23.)