Chapter 10 — Answer to the objections raised against the foregoing arguments
It is easy to answer the objections which may be raised against our arguments. It is true, in the first place that advice should be sought in difficult and serious undertakings, when the way is not clear. When, however, the right path has been shown us by some higher counsellor, it is unwise to open the question again and to seek further advice.
The second argument adduced, that a vow is confirmed by the deliberation of the mind, is irrelevant to the matter in hand. For the deliberation spoken of consists in that choice, whereby a man elects the greater good to which he intends to devote himself. Now all that is done from choice, is done by deliberation or counsel; for choice is the desire for a thing commended to us, as Aristotle says (Ethics, 3). (Aristotle, Ethics 3.6, 1112a15; 3.9, 1113a10.) The same Holy Spirit who is the spirit of strength and piety, and who moves men to a determination of embracing the religious life, is likewise the spirit of counsel and of knowledge, (Isa 11:2.) and directs their interior deliberation.
The third objection brought against us is equally irrelevant. Try the spirits whether they be of God (1 John 4:1) we are told. But probation is only necessary where certainty does not exist. The Gloss comments on the words of St. John, which we have quoted: things that are certain need no discussion. (Peter Lombard, Commentaries on the Psalms and St. Paul, at 1 Thess 5:21 (PL 192:309C).) Nevertheless, those whose duty it is to admit others into religious life may be uncertain of the motive which may lead a candidate to present himself. For he may be inspired by desire for spiritual perfection; or he may be influenced by curiosity, or by a wish to do some harm. Again, uncertainty may exist as to the fitness of postulants for religious life. Therefore, the Church ordains, (Pope Innocent IV, "Epistulae," epistle 3, ["Ad fratres ordinis praedicatorum"], 23:565D.) and religious rules require, (Cf., for example, Benedict, Reg. ch. 58 (CSEL 75; PL 66:803C).) that candidates should pass through a period of probation. But the postulants themselves cannot be in doubt as to the motive which leads them to seek the religious habit. Therefore, they do not need deliberation, especially if they are not doubtful about their health, which the year of probation is intended to put to a test.
The statement that Satan transforms himself into an angel of light and inspires good desires with the intention of deceiving us, is very true. But, as the Gloss says, when the devil deceives the bodily senses, he does not withdraw the mind from a praiseworthy and holy intention; for whoever leads a faithful life is in no danger. Even should Satan, pretending to be good, do or say things befitting the holy angels, and should he delude a man into believing him, the error would not be dangerous or harmful. But, when, by means of his pretence of good, he begins to draw men away to his own work, they need the greatest watchfulness, lest they should be led astray by him. (Peter Lombard, Commentaries on the Psalms and St. Paul, at 2 Cor 11:14 (PL 192:74C), from Augustine, Enchiridion 60.16 (CCSL 46; PL 40:260).) Granted, then that the devil instigates someone to enter religious life, this undertaking is a good one, worthy of the holy angels, and a man who consents to it will run no risk. But he must be on his guard to resist temptations to pride or other vices. God makes use of the malice of the devil for the profit of the just, for whom, if they overcome, he prepares crowns; and thus the evil spirits are duped by the saints. But it must be understood that a suggestion to enter religious life proceeding either from man or from Satan has no efficacy, unless it be accompanied by the interior attraction of God. St. Augustine in his book De praedestinatione sanctorum says that all the saints are taught by God, (Cf. John 6:45.) not because all come to Christ, but because no one comes to him by any other means. Thus the desire to enter religion, from whomever such a suggestion may proceed, comes from God. (Cf. Augustine, De praedest. sanct. 8.14 (PL 44:971).)
The fifth argument, namely that advice is needed before going into religion, because the undertaking may end badly, needs some discrimination. The bad end of any undertaking may be the fault either of the enterprise itself, or of him who makes the attempt. If the undertaking itself is dangerous and frequently productive of ill effects, great deliberation would be needed before attempting it; or it might be better to abandon it entirely. But if danger from the enterprise accrue but to very few, much deliberation would not be required about the step itself. Great care and vigilance, however, would be necessary on the part of him who undertakes it, lest he should by any chance fall into danger. Otherwise he would make his enterprise a pretext for neglecting all human efforts. This is enforced by the words of Sirach 11:4: he who observes the wind shall not sow; and he who considers the clouds shall never reap, and those other words of Proverbs 26:13, the slothful man says, "there is a lion in the way and a lioness on the roads.” On this text the Gloss observes: there are many who, when hey hear words of exhortation, say that they would never want to enter the way of justice, but are held back by Satan from making progress. (Glossa ordinaria 3, 1717-18, at Prov 26:13.)
It sometimes happens, however, that an undertaking, certainly good in itself, may come to an unfortunate termination. This failure is due to instability of purpose on the part of the person engaged in the affair. But the fact that some men who have become religious have changed for the worse, and have apostatised is no reason for delaying to enter religious life, on the plea of requiring longer deliberation. The same pretext might be used as an excuse for not embracing the faith or approaching the sacraments, for as we are told by St. Peter, it would have been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they had known it to turn back (2 Pet 2: 21). St. Paul also says, he deserves worse punishments who has esteemed the blood of the testament unclean, and has offered an affront to the spirit of grace (Heb. 10:29). Neither would he return to works of justice, since we find it written, he who passes over from justice to sin, God has prepared him for the sword (Sir 26:27[19]).
The sixth argument used against our proposition is one that must be carefully examined, both on account of the frequency with which it is adduced, and on account of the heresy which lurks under its cover. We are told that a work that is of God cannot come to nought. (Cf. Acts 5:38-39.) Two heresies have sprung up in our time through misunderstanding these words. (Although Moneta does not record that they rely or cite Acts 5:38-39, the Cathari do promote the heresies that Thomas speaks of: Moneta of Cremona, Summa adversus Catharos et Valdenses*, ed. T. Ricchini, N. Palearini, and M. Palearini (Rome: Pallas, 1743), bk. 1, ch. 1, sect. 1; bk. 3, ch. 5, sect. 8.)*
The first error is that since the body becomes corrupted, it cannot be the work of God.
The second is that any grace or charity received from God cannot be lost. We might as well say that because Satan sinned, he was not created by God; or that because Judas fell away from the Apostolic College, his calling was not from God; or that because Simon Magus lapsed into heresy after baptism, it was not the will of God that Philip should have baptised him.
We may add one other argument, as weighty as the preceding, which is commonly used by our adversaries: if a man, they say, goes into religion and leaves his monastery, his vocation was not from God, nor did the advice given him by his counsellors proceed from heaven. In refutation of this opinion, we may quote the words wherewith St. Augustine (Contra Julianum, 1) replies to those who held that no root of evil can exist in that which is the gift of God. (Augustine, Contra Julianum Pelagianum, bk. 1, ch. 9, para. 42 (PL 44:669).) St. Augustine argues: Manicheus will conquer, unless both he and you be resisted. Therefore, the truth of the Catholic faith overcomes Manicheus, because it overcomes you. (Augustine, Contra Jul. 1.9.42 (PL 44:670).) In order, then that our opponents may be worsted, together with the Manicheans, let us say that the counsel of God is never brought to nought. To quote the words of Isaiah 46:10: my counsel shall stand, and all my will shall be done. Now in God’s unchangeable counsel, He sometimes, as St. Augustine says in De perseverantia, gives temporal justice to those to whom he does not give the gift of perseverance; just as he gives temporal existence to corruptible things, on which he does not bestow eternal life. (Augustine, De dono perseverantiae, ch. 22, para. 58 (CSEL 105; PL 45:1029).) And thus the Manicheans are answered. For corruptible things are created by the immutable counsel of God, in order that they may enjoy temporal existence. Our opponents are likewise silenced, since, in the eternal wisdom of God, he gives the resolution of entering the religious life to those on whom he does not bestow the grace of perseverance.
Chapter 10 of 16