Article 1 — Whether within the divine there is the power to beget

The first point of inquiry is whether within the divine there is the power to beget. (Parallel texts: ST I.27.2; I.41.4; In I Sent. 7.1.1.)

Obj. 1: It seems that there is not. For all power is either active or passive. Now, there can be no passive power in God, nor can a generative power be active here, because then the Son would be brought about or made, which is against the faith. Therefore, there is no generative power in God.

Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher, action belongs to that which has a power. (Aristotle, On Sleep 1, 454a1–b10.) Now, in God there is no begetting, and consequently, there is no generative power. The middle is proved as follows. Wherever there is a begetting, there is communication of a nature and a reception of the same. But, since receiving belongs to matter or a passive power (which are not in God), reception cannot belong to God. Therefore, there can be no begetting in God.

Obj. 3: The begetter must be distinct from the one begotten but not in reference to what the begetter communicates to the begotten, since in that regard they are in fact the same. Consequently, in the begotten, there must be something besides what is communicated to him by generation; thus, it seems that whatever is begotten must be composite. But there is no composition in God. Therefore, there cannot be a begotten God; consequently, there can be no begetting in God. And thus the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 4: Nothing belonging to imperfection should be ascribed to God. But every power, both active and passive, is imperfect in comparison with its act. Therefore, we should not attribute a generative power to God.

Obj. 5: But you will say that this applies to a power that is not united to its act.

On the contrary, whatever is perfected by another is less perfect than that by which it is perfected. Now, a power united to its act is perfected by the act. Therefore, the act is more perfect than it, and in this way even a power united to its act is imperfect in comparison with its act.

Obj. 6: The divine nature is more effective in acting than created nature. Now, there is found among creatures some nature that works not through any middle power but by its very self, just as the sun enlightens the air and the soul vivifies the body. Consequently, there is a much stronger reason why the divine nature should be a principle of generation through its very self and not through a power. Therefore, one should not posit a generative power in God.

Obj. 7: Generative power must be a sign either of dignity or lack of dignity. Now, it is not a sign of dignity because then it would be found in the higher creatures more than in the lower, that is, in the angels and heavenly bodies more or rather than in animals and plants. Therefore, it is a sign of a lack of dignity, and thus should not be ascribed to God.

Obj. 8: Two kinds of generative power are found in lower realities: a complete one in those things where generation is effected by the mingling of the sexes, and an incomplete one that takes place without the mingling of the sexes, as in plants. Since, then, we cannot ascribe the complete power to God, in whom there cannot be a mingling of sexes, it seems that generative power cannot in any sense be ascribed to God.

Obj. 9: Only the possible falls under a power, since “power” is spoken of in reference to the possible. Now, the existence of generation in God is not a possible or a contingent thing, since it is eternal. Therefore, we cannot ascribe to God a power in respect of generation; consequently, a generative power is not there.

Obj. 10: The power of God, being infinite, is not bounded either by its act or by its object. Now, if there is a generative power in God, its act will be a begetting, and its effect will be a son. Therefore, the Father’s power will not hold only to the begetting of one Son but will extend to many, which is absurd.

Obj. 11: According to Avicenna, (Avicenna (980–1037 AD), The Metaphysics of the Healing 1.2, 8–14; 3.11.) when a thing has a something entirely from another, we attribute to it, considered in itself, the opposite. Thus air, which has light only from another, is dark, considered in itself. In this way, since all created things, which have their existence, truth, and necessity from another, are non-existent, false, and impossible, considered in themselves. But nothing of the kind can be in God. Consequently, in God, there cannot be someone who has existence entirely from another; and thus, someone begotten cannot be there. Consequently, neither is there generation or generative power.

Obj. 12: In the divine nature, the Son has nothing but what he receives from the Father; otherwise, it would follow that there is composition in him. Now, he receives the essence from the Father; consequently, there is nothing in him but the essence. Hence, if there is generation in God, or if the Son is begotten, it will follow that the essence is begotten, which is false, since the essence would be distinguished in the divine.

Obj. 13: If, in God, the Father begets, he must do so in respect of his nature. But the nature is the same in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. For the same reason, then, both the Son and the Holy Spirit will beget, which is contrary to the teaching of the faith.

Obj. 14: A nature that exists perpetually and perfectly in one supposit is not communicated to another supposit. Now, the divine nature exists perfectly in the Father, and perpetually, since it is incorruptible. Therefore, it is not communicated to another supposit. Consequently, there is no generation there.

Obj. 15: Generation is a species of change. But there is no change in God. Neither, therefore, is there generative power.

On the contrary (1), according to the Philosopher, each thing is perfect when it is able to make another like itself. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1, 981b7; Meteorology 4.4, 380a11.) Now, God the Father is perfect. Therefore, he can make another like himself; and in this way he can beget a Son.

Furthermore (2), Augustine says that if the Father could not beget, he lacked the power. (Augustine, Against Maximinus 2.7 (PL 42:761–62).) But there is no lack of power in God. Therefore, he was able to beget, and in him is a power of generating.

I answer that it is the nature of every act whatsoever that it might communicate its very self as far as possible. This is why every agent acts inasmuch as it is in act. But to act is nothing other than to communicate as far as possible that whereby the agent is in act. Now, the divine nature is supremely and most purely act; therefore, it communicates its very self as far as possible. But it communicates its very self to created things by a mere likeness, which is clear to anyone; for every created thing is a being according to its likeness to the divine nature. But the Catholic faith also asserts another mode of communication of the divine nature, in that it itself is communicated by a quasi-natural communication, such that, just as one to whom humanity is communicated is a man, so too the one to whom the Godhead is communicated is not merely like God, but truly is God.

But here we must observe that there are two differences between the divine nature and material forms.

In the first place, material forms are not subsistent; hence the humanity in a man is not the same thing as the man who subsists. But divinity is the same thing as God; hence, the divine nature itself is subsistent.

Second, no created form or nature is its own being, even though God’s very being is his nature and quiddity; and this is why his proper name is He who is, because in it he is denominated as from his own proper form (Ex 3:14).

Consequently, since form in these lower things does not subsist through itself, there must be something else in that to which the form is communicated by which the form or nature receives subsistence; this is matter, which underlies material forms and natures. And since a material form or nature is not its own being, it receives being through its being received in something else; hence, insofar as it is received into diverse things, it has a diverse being. Thus, the humanity is not one in Socrates and Plato as regards being, although it is one as regards its own proper account.

On the other hand, since the divine nature is subsistent through itself, in the communication of the divine nature there is no need of anything material through which it might receive subsistence. Consequently, it is not received in something as though in matter, such that the one begotten would be found to be composed of matter and form. And again, because the essence itself is its own being, it does not receive being through supposits in which it exists; whence, through one and the same being, it is in both the one communicating and the one who is being communicated, and thus, it remains numerically the same in both.

Now, one finds a most congruent example of this communication in the activity of the intellect. For the divine nature itself is spiritual; therefore, it is manifested better by means of spiritual examples. For when our intellect conceives the quiddity of some reality subsisting through itself outside the soul, there arises a certain communication of this thing that exists through itself, insofar as our intellect in some way receives from the exterior reality its form. And this intelligible form existing in our intellect in a certain way advances from that exterior reality. But because the exterior reality is diverse from the nature of the understanding, the being of the comprehended form of the intellect is other than the form of the reality existing through itself.

But when our intellect conceives its own quiddity, each is preserved. That is, the very form understood advances, in a certain way, from the one understanding to one understood when the intellect forms the form; and also, a certain unity is preserved between the conceived form that advances and the reality from which it advances, since each has intelligible being. For the intellect is one thing, whereas the intelligible form, which is called the “word of the intellect,” is the other.

Since, however, our intellect is not, by its own essence, established in the perfect act of intellectuality, nor is a man’s intellect the same as the human nature, it follows that although the aforesaid word is in the intellect and in a certain way conformed to it, yet it is not the same thing as the very essence of the intellect, but is its expressed likeness. Again, in the conception of this intelligible form, the human nature is not communicated, such that it could be properly called a “begetting,” which implies a communication of nature.

Now, just as when our intellect understands its very self, there is found in it a certain word coming forth bearing a likeness to that from which it proceeds, so too in the divine there is found a Word holding a likeness of him from whom it proceeds. The procession of this Word transcends the procession of our word in two ways.

First, because our word differs from the essence of the intellect, as already stated, while the divine intellect, which is in the perfect act of intellectuality according to its own form, cannot receive any intelligible form that is not its own essence. Consequently, its Word is of one essence with it.

Second, the divine nature itself is its intellectuality; and in this way, a communication that takes place through an intellectual mode is also a communication through the mode of nature, so that it can be called a “begetting.” This is the second way in which the Word of God surpasses the procession of our word. And Augustine is designating this mode of generation. (Augustine, On the Trinity 1 (PL 42:819–44).)

Since, however, we are treating of divine things according to our mode—which our intellect seizes from lower realities, from which it takes its knowledge—therefore, just as in these lower realities, some principle of action, which we call a “power,” is attributed to any action, so too in the divine, although in God there is no difference between his power and action, as there is in created realities. For this reason, given that in God there is generation, which is signified through the mode of action, we must grant him the power to beget, or a generative power.

Reply Obj. 1: The power which we attribute to God is, properly speaking, neither active nor passive, since the categories of action and passion are not in him; rather, his action is his own substance. But there is a power here signified through the mode of an active power. Nor must the Son be brought about or made, just as neither must there be action or passion here, properly speaking.

Reply Obj. 2: While receiving is completed at having as its end, there are two ways something is said to be receiving, just as there are two ways of having.

In one way, matter has its form, and a subject an accident, or in fact anything that is possessed is outside the essence of the one who possesses it;

in another way, the supposit has a nature (for instance, this man has humanity). This nature is not outside the essence of the one who possesses it—indeed, it is his essence. For Socrates is truly that which is a man.

Accordingly, even in mankind the begotten one receives the form of his begetter not as matter receives form or subject accident, but as a supposit or hypostasis has the specific nature. And so it is in God. Hence in God begotten, there is no need of any matter or subject of the divine nature, but it follows that he himself is the subsistent Son, who has the divine nature.

Reply Obj. 3: God begotten is not distinguished from God begetting by some added essence, since (as stated above) (Q. 2, a. 1, ad 2.) there is no need for any matter as a recipient of the divine nature; they are distinguished, however, by the relation itself, which is having the nature from another, such that in the Son, the very relation of sonship takes the place of all individuating principles in things created (for which reason it is called a “personal property”), while the divine nature itself takes the place of the specific nature. Yet, since the relation itself does not differ in reality from the divine nature, no composition arises there, as with us a certain composition results from the principle of the species and from the individuating principles.

Reply Obj. 4: This argument follows when that power differs from the act, whether or not it is united to the act. But this is not the case in God.

Reply Obj. 5: And thus the reply to the fifth objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 6: Anything that is a principle of an action, as that by which an action is done, holds the account of a power, whether it be an essence or some accidental medium, like some quality standing between the essence and the action. In corporeal creatures, however, seldom or never do we find any action of some substantial nature without some mediating accident; for the sun illumines by means of the light within it. For the soul vivifies the body through the soul’s essence. But “to vivify,” although it is said through the mode of action, is not in the genus of action, since it is a first act rather than a second.

Reply Obj. 7: In creatures, generation is impossible without a distinction of essence or nature with respect to existence, since their nature is not their existence. Consequently, generation is among creatures along with a certain lack of dignity; hence, generation is unbecoming to the nobler creatures. But in God, a generation of this sort can be without this or any other imperfection, and so nothing forbids us to ascribe it to God.

Reply Obj. 8: This argument considers material generation. Therefore, it is not to the point.

Reply Obj. 9: It is true that the object of an active or passive power must be possible and contingent when the action or passion is accompanied by movement (since all movable things are possible and contingent). Such, however, is not the generative power in God, as stated above. And thus the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 10: The Son of God is not the effect of the generative power, for we confess our belief that he is begotten, not made. If, however, he were the effect, the power of the begetter would not be bounded by him even though he cannot beget another Son, because he himself is infinite. Now, the reason there cannot be another Son in the divine is that sonship itself is his personal property, and by it, so to say, he is individuated. And the individuating principles of each individual belong to it alone; otherwise, it would follow that a person or an individual thing would be communicable in account.

Reply Obj. 11: The saying of Avicenna should be understood as meaning when that which is received from another is not numerically the same in recipient and giver, as happens in creatures in relation to God. Hence, everything received in a creature is, as it were, a unit in comparison with the divine being, since a creature cannot receive being according to that perfection that is in God. On the other hand, in God, the Son receives from the Father numerically the same nature that the Father has. Hence, the argument fails.

Reply Obj. 12: The Son has nothing that is really divided from the essence that he receives from the Father. But from the very fact that he receives from the Father, it follows that in him is a relation by which he is referred to and distinguished from the Father. And yet this relation does not differ from the essence.

Reply Obj. 13: Though the same nature is in Father and Son, it is in each by a different mode of existing—that is, with a different relation. Consequently, it does not follow that whatever befits the Father through his own nature befits the Son.

Reply Obj. 14: Creatures reach a divine likeness by participating in their specific nature. Hence, the fact that some created supposit subsists in a created nature is itself ordered to something else as to its end; and therefore, if the end be sufficiently attained by one individual according to a perfect and proper participation in the specific nature, there is no need for another individual subsisting in that nature. But God’s nature is the end and is not for the sake of any end. Moreover, it befits the end to be communicated in every possible way. Hence, though in God it is found perfectly and properly in one supposit, nothing forbids its also being found in another.

Reply Obj. 15: Generation is a species of change insofar as by generation the communicated nature is received in some matter, which is the subject of change. This is not the case in the divine generation, so the conclusion does not follow.