Article 4 — Whether there can be several sons in God

The fourth point of inquiry is whether there can be several sons in God. (Parallel texts: ST I.41.6; SCG IV.13; In I Sent. 7.2.2. See below: q. 9, a. 9, ad 1.)

Obj. 1: It would seem that there can. For a natural activity that belongs to one individual belongs to every individual of the same nature. Now, according to Damascene, generation is an activity of nature, and it belongs to the Father. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 2.27 (PG 94:959–62).) Therefore, it belongs to the Son and Holy Spirit as well, who are supposits of the same nature. But the Son does not beget himself; for, according to Augustine, nothing can generate itself. Therefore, he begets another Son, such that in God there can be several sons.

Obj. 2: The Father communicated all his might to the Son. Now, the generative power belongs to the Father’s might. Therefore, the Son has this power from the Father, and the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 3: The Son is the perfect image of the Father, and this demands perfect likeness. But this would not be the case if the Son did not imitate the Father in all respects. Therefore, as the Father begets a Son, so also does the Son. And the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 4: According to Dionysius, likeness to God is more perfect in respect of conformity in action than in respect of conformity in some form. Thus, that which both shines and illuminates is more like the sun than that which shines only. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy 3 (PG 3:163–78).) Now, the Son is most perfectly like the Father. Therefore, he is conformed to him not only in the power but also in the act of generation. Thus, we have the same conclusion as before.

Obj. 5: The reason why God, after making one creature, is able to make another is that his power is neither exhausted nor diminished in creating. Now, in like manner, the Father’s power is neither exhausted nor diminished through begetting the Son. Therefore, by begetting the Son, he is not prevented from begetting another, and so there can be several sons in God.

Obj. 6: But, you will say, the reason why he does not beget another son is that the result would be incongruous, as Augustine points out—namely, that there would be an infinite number of divine generations if the Father were to beget many sons, or the Son to beget grandsons to the Father, and so on.

On the contrary, nothing in God is potential but what is also actual, lest he be imperfect. Therefore, if it is potential that the Father beget several sons, and nothing arise to prevent it, there will be several sons in God.

Obj. 7: It belongs to the nature of that which is generated to proceed into a likeness of the generator. Now, as the Son is like the Father, so also is the Holy Spirit. And thus the Holy Spirit is likewise a son. Therefore, there are several sons in God.

Obj. 8: According to Anselm, the Father begetting the Son is nothing other than the Father speaking his very self. (Anselm of Canterbury, Monologion 32 (PL 158:186–88).) Now, as the Father can speak his very self, so also can the Son and the Holy Spirit. Therefore, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit can beget sons, and the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 9: The Father is said to beget the Son because he conceives in his own intellect his own likeness. But the Son and Holy Spirit can do the same, and thus we come to the same conclusion.

Obj. 10: Power is between essence and activity. Now, the essence of the Father and the Son is one, and theirs is one power. Therefore, begetting belongs to the Son. We conclude as before.

Obj. 11: Goodness is the principle of diffusion. Now, even as there is infinite goodness in the Father and the Son, so is there in the Holy Spirit. Therefore, even as the Father by begetting the Son communicates his own nature by an infinite communication, so likewise does the Holy Spirit by producing a divine person; for the divine goodness is not bestowed in an infinite degree on a creature. Therefore, it would seem that there can be several sons in God.

Obj. 12: No good can be a joyful possession unless it is shared with another. Now, sonship is a certain good in the Son. Therefore, it seems that his perfect joy demands that there be another son in God.

Obj. 13: The Son proceeds from the Father as brightness from light, according to Hebrews 1:3: who, being the brightness of his glory and the figure of his substance. Now, one splendor can produce another, and this one a third, and this one yet another. Therefore it seems to be the same in the procession of the divine persons that the Son can beget another son. Hence, the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 14: Paternity pertains to the Father’s dignity. But the same dignity is both Father’s and Son’s. Therefore, paternity befits the Son; and thus there are many sons in the divine.

Obj. 15: Whose is the power, his is the act. But the power of generating is in the Son. Therefore, the Son begets.

On the contrary (1), those creatures are most perfect that are composed of their entire matter, each one forming a single species by itself alone. Now, just as material creatures are individuated by matter, so the person of the Son is constituted by his sonship. Therefore, as God the Son is a perfect Son, it seems that in God sonship is in him alone.

Furthermore (2), Augustine says that if the Father could beget and did not beget, he would be envious. (Augustine, Against Maximinus 2.7; 2.18; 2.23 (PL 42:761–62; 785–87; 796–802).) But the Son is not envious. Therefore, seeing that he does not beget, he cannot do so. Consequently, there cannot be several sons in God.

Furthermore (3), what has been said perfectly should not be said over again. Now, the Son is the perfect Word lacking nothing, according to Augustine. (Augustine, On the Trinity 6.10; 7.2 (PL 42:931–32; 936).) Therefore, there ought not to be several words in God, nor several sons.

I answer that it is impossible that there be several sons in God. This is clear as follows. Since the divine persons agree in all absolute things, as they are essential to one another, they cannot be distinguished except according to their relations, and not in reference to anything except relations of origin. For of other relations, some presuppose distinction, such as equality and likeness, while some designate inequality, such as master and servant, and so on. On the other hand, relations of origin by their very account denote conformity, because that which takes its origin from another, as such, bears the likeness thereof.

In God, therefore, there is nothing whereby the Son is distinguished from the other persons except the relation of sonship, which is his personal property, and by which the Son is not only the Son but also this supposit or this person.

Now, it is impossible for that whereby some supposit is a “this” to be found in several things; otherwise, the supposit itself would be communicable, which is against the account of an individual, a supposit, or a person. Consequently, in no way in the divine can there be more sons than one. For it cannot be said that one sonship makes one son and another sonship another son, because as the sonships would not differ in account, it would follow that if they were distinguished in matter or whatever supposit, there would be matter in God or something other than relation distinguishing them.

Moreover, another specific reason may be given as to why the Father can beget only one Son. For nature is determined to one thing, and therefore, since the Father begets the Son by nature, there can be but one Son begotten of the Father. Nor can it be said that there are numerically many existing in the one species, as is the case with us, since in God there is no matter, which is the principle of numerical distinction within the one species.

Reply Obj. 1: Although in the Father generation is in a certain way an activity of the divine nature, nevertheless it belongs to it with a certain concomitance to the Father’s personal property, as stated above: (Q. 2, a. 2.) therefore, it does not follow that it belongs to the Son, in whom the divine nature is found without that property.

Reply Obj. 2: The Father communicates to the Son all that divine might that follows the divine nature absolutely. But the generative power follows the divine nature along with the personal property of the Father, as stated.

Reply Obj. 3: An image is like that of which it is the image in reference to the latter’s species, not as regards its relation. For if the image is from something of which it is the image, it does not follow that the latter is also from another; for likeness is not properly considered with regard to relation, but with regard to form.

Reply Obj. 4: Even as the Son is like the Father in the divine nature and not in a personal property, so too is he like him in an action that goes with the nature, provided it does not go with a personal property. Such, however, is not generation: therefore, the argument fails.

Reply Obj. 5: Although the Father’s generative power is not exhausted or diminished by his begetting the Son, yet the Son equals the infinity of that power, for he is an infinite intellect and not a finite creature. Hence, the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 6: In an argument leading to the incongruous, the avoiding of the incongruity is not necessarily the only reason for denying the assertion from which the incongruity follows; rather, it is also for the sake of manifesting the incongruity. Hence, it is not only because an infinity of generations in God would be the result that there is not more than one son in God.

Reply Obj. 7: The Holy Spirit proceeds through the mode of love. Now, “love” does not signify something that is formed and specified by the likeness of the lover or of the beloved, just as “word” signifies the species of the speaker and of that which is said to possess it. Consequently, as the Son proceeds through the mode of Word, by the very account of his procession, it belongs to him to proceed into a species like his begetter and such that he is his Son, and his procession is called a “generation.” On the other hand, this belongs to the Holy Spirit not by reason of his procession but rather from a property of the divine nature, because in God there can be nothing that is not God; and thus the divine love itself is God precisely because it is divine, not because it is love.

Reply Obj. 8: “To speak” may be taken in two senses: strictly and broadly. To speak, in a strict sense, is to send forth a word; and in this way it is notional and belongs to the Father alone. And Augustine, in the beginning of On the Trinity 6, takes “speaking” in this sense when he says that the Father alone speaks himself. (Augustine, On the Trinity 7.1 (PL 42:931–36).) Second, “to speak” may be taken broadly, insofar as speaking is the same thing as understanding; and then it pertains to the essence. And in this sense Anselm, in his Monologion, writes when he says that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit speak themselves. (Anselm of Canterbury, Monologion 60 (PL 158:207–8).)

Reply Obj. 9: Even as “to beget” in God belongs to the Father alone, so also does “to conceive”; therefore, the Father alone conceives his own likeness in the intellect, although the Son and the Holy Spirit understand it; for no relation is expressed in “understanding,” except perhaps only according to our mode of understanding, whereas “begetting” and “conceiving” express a real origin.

Reply Obj. 10: This argument holds in regard to an action that follows the nature absolutely without any relation to a property. Such, however, is not generation; therefore, the argument fails.

Reply Obj. 11: In God, there can be no other than spiritual procession, and this is only according to intellect and will. Consequently, another divine person cannot proceed from the Holy Spirit, because he proceeds through the mode of the will as Love, and the Son through the mode of the intellect as Word.

Reply Obj. 12: A personal property must be incommunicable, as stated above: therefore, joy does not demand that it should be shared with another.

Reply Obj. 13: This comparison does not necessarily apply in every respect.

Reply Obj. 14: Even as paternity in the Father and filiation in the Son are the one essence, so too their dignity and goodness are one.

Reply Obj. 15: When we speak of the power of generating, the gerund, “generating,” may be taken in three ways.

First, as a gerund of the active voice, and thus, the power of “generating” is in him who has the power to generate.

Second, as the gerund of the passive voice, (This is usually called the “gerundive.”) and thus, the power “to be generated” belongs to one who has the power to be generated.

Third, as the gerund of an impersonal verb, and then the generating power belongs to one who has the power whereby he is actually generated by another.

In the first sense, the generating power is not in the Son, but it is in the second and third sense: therefore, the argument does not prove.