Article 6 — Whether the power to beget is the same as the power to create

The sixth point of inquiry is whether the power to beget is the same as the power to create. (Parallel text: In I Sent. 20.1.1.)

Obj. 1: And it seems that it is not. For, according to Damascene, generation is the activity or work of nature; (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 2.27 (PG 94:959–62).) but according to Hilary in On Synods, creation is a work of the will. (Hilary of Poitiers, On Synods 24.58 (PL 10:520).) Now, will and nature are not the same principle but are opposite members of a division, as stated in Physics 2. (Aristotle, Physics 2.4–5, 195b31–197a35.) Therefore, the generative and creative powers are not the same.

Obj. 2: Powers are distinguished by their acts, as is said in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 415a16–b28, 416a18–b30.) But generation and creation are very different acts. Therefore, the generative and creative powers are also not one power.

Obj. 3: There is less unity among things that are spoken of univocally in some respect than among those that have the same being. But in no respect are the generative and creative powers spoken of univocally, just as neither are generating and creating, nor the Son and a creature. Therefore, the generative and creative powers are not the same in being.

Obj. 4: There is no order among things that are the same thing. Now, the creative power is prior to the generative power according to its understanding, even as the essential is prior to the notional. Therefore, these powers are not the same.

On the contrary (1), in God power and essence do not differ. But there is only one divine essence. Therefore, there is only one divine power. Therefore, the powers in question are not distinct.

Furthermore (2), God does not do by several means what he is able to do by one. But God is able both to generate and to create by one power, especially since the generation of the Son is the type of the production of creatures. As Augustine expounds: “he spoke, and they were made”: that is to say, he begot the Word in whom they existed as things to be made. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 2.6–7 (PL 34:267–69).) Therefore, the generative and creative powers are but one power.

I answer that, as stated above, in speaking of the divine power, we must take as our guide those things that apply to the essence itself. (See q. 2, a. 5.) Now, in God, although one relation is really distinguished from another on account of the opposition of the relations, which are real in God, nevertheless, the relation itself is not something other, according to reality, than the divine essence, but only according to account; for relation does not have an opposition to an essence.

Consequently, we cannot grant that anything absolute is multiplied in God, as some say who maintain that there are two sorts of being in God: an essential being and a personal being. For all being in God is essential, and a person exists only through the being of the essence. Now, within a power one considers, besides the very thing that is the power itself, a certain relation or order to what is subject to that power. Accordingly, if the power in its relation to an essential act (such as the power for understanding or creating) is compared to the power in its relation to a notional act (such as the power of begetting) as a power, we find that they are one and the same power, just as there is one and the same being of the nature and the person. And yet we understand at the same time a different reference for each, according to the diverse acts relative to which they are called “powers.”

Therefore, the generative and creative powers are one and the same power, if we consider them as powers, but they differ in their diverse references to diverse acts.

Reply Obj. 1: Although in creatures, nature and purpose are distinct, in God they are one and the same in reality. Or we may reply that “power to create” does not name purpose or will but power as commanded by will, whereas the power to beget acts as inclined by nature. But this does not necessitate a distinction of powers, since there is nothing to prevent the same power from being commanded to one act by the will and inclined to another by nature. For example, our intellect is inclined to believe by the will and is led to understand first principles by nature.

Reply Obj. 2: The higher the power, the wider its scope, and the less distinguishable it is through a diversity of objects. Thus, the imagination is one power covering all objects of sense relative to which the proper senses are distinguished. Now, the divine power is raised above all others; therefore, a difference of acts requires no distinction in the power itself as a power; rather, God by his one power is able to do all things.

Reply Obj. 3: The generative and creative powers, considered as to their very substance, so to speak, are not merely spoken of univocally but are one. But the fact that they are spoken of analogically is because of the order of act.

Reply Obj. 4: There is no order of first and second between these powers except according to how they are distinct. Whence their order is viewed only in reference to their acts. Hence, it is clear that the generative power is prior to the creative power just as generation is prior to creation. But in relation to the essence, they are the same thing, and there is no order between them.