Article 3 — Whether the generative power goes into the act of generation at the command of the will

The third point of inquiry is whether the generative power goes into the act of generation at the command of the will. (Parallel texts: ST I.41.2; SCG IV.11; In I Sent. 6.1.1‒3. See below: q. 10, a. 2, ad 4, ad 5.)

Obj. 1: It seems that this is so. For Hilary says that not by natural necessity was the Father led to beget the Son. (Hilary of Poitiers, On Synods 25 (PL 10:520).) Now, if he did not beget by his will, he begot by a natural necessity, since an agent is either voluntary or natural. Therefore, the Father begot the Son by his will, and thus the generative power goes into the act of generating through the command of the will.

Obj. 2: But you will say that the Father begot the Son by neither his preceding will nor by his consequent will, but rather by an accompanying will.

On the contrary, this argument seems inadequate. For since everything in God is eternal, nothing in him can temporally precede anything that is in him. And yet, we do find that one thing has the account of a principle to something else, for instance, God’s will in relation to his choice whereby he chooses the just, from the mere fact that it proceeds from his intellect. Therefore, though the will does not temporally precede the begetting of the Son, nevertheless it seems that we may consider it to be the principle of the Son’s generation, because it does proceed from the intellect.

Obj. 3: The Son proceeds through the act of the intellect when he proceeds as the Word. For there is no intellectual word except when, thinking about something, we understand it, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Trinity 9.4, 9.7 (PL 42:963–65, 967).) Now, the will is a principle of intellectual activity, for it commands the act of the intellect, just as it also commands those of the other powers, as Anselm says; (Anselm of Canterbury, On Similitudes 2 (PL 159:605).) for I understand because I will to do so, just as I walk because I will to walk. Therefore, the will is the principle of the Son’s generation.

Obj. 4: But you say that it is true in human affairs that the will commands the act of the intellect, but it is not so in divine things.

On the contrary, predestination is, in a way, an act of the intellect, for we say that God predestined Peter because he willed to do so, according to Romans 9:18: he has mercy on whom he will, and whom he wills he hardens. Therefore, not only in human affairs but also in divine ones does the will command the act of the intellect.

Obj. 5: According to the Philosopher, that which moves of itself can be either in motion or not; for the same reason, that which acts from itself can either act or not act. (Aristotle, Physics 8.5, 257b6–258b9.) But nature is not capable of acting or not acting, since it is determined to one thing. Therefore, it does not act of itself, but acts as moved by another. Now, this cannot be the case in God. Therefore, in God no action is from nature, and consequently, neither is generation. Therefore, generation is from his will, since all agents are reduced to nature or will, as stated in Physics 2. (Aristotle, Physics 2.4, 195b36–196b9.)

Obj. 6: If the action of the nature precedes the action of the will, an incongruity follows, namely, that the account of the will would be taken away. For, since nature is determined to one thing, if it moved the will, it would move it to one thing alone—and this is contrary to the account of will, which as such is free. On the other hand, if the will moves nature, neither the account of nature nor of will is taken away, since nothing prevents that which is open to many from moving towards one. Therefore, it is more reasonable that the action of the will precedes the action of nature than vice versa. Now, the generation of the Son is pure action or activity. Therefore, it is from the will.

Obj. 7: It is written: he spoke and they were made (Ps 148:5), which words Augustine expounds as follows: he begat the Word in whom they were so that they might be made. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 2.6–7 (PL 34:267–69).) Accordingly, the procession of the Word from the Father is the type of the creation to be brought forth. Therefore, if the Son does not proceed from the Father by a command of the will but one of nature, it seems that all created things would proceed from God naturally and not only voluntarily, which is erroneous.

Obj. 8: Hilary says: if anyone say that the Son was born of the Father without the concurrence of the Father’s will, let him be anathema. (Hilary of Poitiers, On Synods 25 (PL 10:520).) Therefore, the Father did not beget the Son involuntarily, and so the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 9: It is written: the Father loves the Son, and he has given all things into his hand (John 3:35), which words a Gloss expounds as referring to the giving of the eternal generation. (Glossa ordinaria 5, 1081–82, at John 3:35.) Therefore, the love of the Father for the Son is the sign, rather than the account, of the eternal generation. But love is from the will. Therefore, the will is the principle of the Son’s generation.

Obj. 10: Dionysius says that God’s love does not allow him to be without offspring. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 4.10 (PG 3:707–8).) Hence, again, it would seem to follow that love is the reason for generation.

Obj. 11: Any opinion about God that does not involve incongruity or error can be maintained. Now, if we suppose that the Father begat the Son voluntarily, no incongruity follows; for it seems to follow neither that the Son is not eternal, nor that he is not consubstantial with or equal to the Father. For the Holy Spirit, who proceeds through the mode of the will, is coeternal, coequal, and consubstantial with the Father and the Son. Therefore, it does not seem erroneous to assert that the Father begat the Son by his will.

Obj. 12: No will can not will its own ultimate end. Now, the end of the divine will is the communication of its own goodness, and this is especially effected by generation. Therefore, the Father’s will cannot but will the generation of the Son. Therefore, he begat the Son by his will.

Obj. 13: Human generation is drawn from the divine, according to Ephesians 3:15: of whom all paternity is named in heaven and on earth. Now, human generation is subject to the command of the will; otherwise there could be no sin in the act of generation. Therefore, the divine generation is also, and so the same conclusion follows.

Obj. 14: Every action proceeding from an unchangeable nature is necessary. But the divine nature is utterly unchangeable. Therefore, if the divine generation is the activity of the nature and not of the will, it follows that it is necessary, and thus that the Father begat the Son of necessity—which is contrary to the teaching of Augustine. (Augustine, Dialogue of 65 Questions, q. 7 (PL 40:736).)

Obj. 15: Augustine says that the Son is counsel of counsel, and will of will. (Augustine, On the Trinity 15.20 (PL 42:1087).) Now, the preposition “of” indicates a principle. Therefore, the will is the principle of the Son’s generation, and so the same conclusion follows.

On the contrary (1) Augustine says, the Father begot the Son neither by his will nor of necessity. (Augustine, Dialogue of 65 Questions, q. 7 (PL 40:736).)

Furthermore (2), the supreme effusion of the will is through the mode of love. But the Son does not proceed through the mode of love; rather, it is the Holy Spirit who does so. Therefore, the will is not the principle of the Son’s generation.

Furthermore (3), the Son proceeds from the Father as brightness from light, according to Hebrews 1:3: who, being the brightness of his glory and the figure of his substance. Now, brightness does not proceed from light by a mediating will. Neither, therefore, does the Son from the Father.

I answer that the generation of the Son may be referred to the will as the object of the will, for the Father has willed both the Son and the Son’s generation from eternity, but by no means can the will be the principle of the divine generation. This is made clear as follows. The will as such, being free, is open to either alternative, for it is capable of acting or not acting, doing this or something else, willing and not willing. And if this does not belong to the will with regard to a certain thing, this will be true of the will not as will but on account of the natural inclination it has for a certain thing, such as for the ultimate end, which it is unable not to will; for example, the human will is unable not to will happiness and cannot will unhappiness. Therefore, it is clear that whenever a thing has the will for its principle, it is possible for it to be or not to be, to be such or otherwise, to be now or then.

Now, everything of this sort is created, since in what is uncreated there is no capacity for being or not being. Rather, through itself it is necessary that it be, as Avicenna proves. (Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing 8.4.) Therefore, if we suppose the Son to be begotten by the will, it necessarily follows that he is a creature. For this reason, the Arians, who held the Son to be a creature, said that he was begotten by the will. However, Catholics say the Son was born not by the will but by the nature. For nature is determined to one thing. And accordingly, since the Son is begotten of the Father by nature, it follows that he cannot be unbegotten, or otherwise than he is, or not consubstantial with the Father; for that which proceeds naturally proceeds in likeness to that from which it proceeds. This is the teaching of Hilary: God’s will gave every creature its nature, but a perfect nativity gave the Son his nature. (Hilary of Poitiers, On Synods 24.58 (PL 10:520).) Hence, everything is such as God has willed it to be, whereas the Son is such as God is.

Now, as already stated, although the will is open to either alternative in regard to some things, it has a natural inclination in regard to the ultimate end; and similarly the intellect has a certain natural movement in respect of its knowledge of first principles. Moreover, the principle of the divine knowledge is God himself, who is the end of his own will; therefore, that which proceeds in God through an act of the intellect knowing his very self proceeds really, and likewise that which proceeds through an act of the will loving its very self. And for this reason, since the Son proceeds as the Word by an act of the divine intellect inasmuch as the Father knows his very self, and the Holy Spirit proceeds by an act of the will inasmuch as the Father loves the Son, it follows that both Son and Holy Spirit proceed naturally, and further, that they are consubstantial, coequal, and coeternal with the Father and with each other.

Reply Obj. 1: Hilary is speaking of the necessity that denotes violence. This is evident from the words that follow: not led by natural necessity, since he willed to beget the Son. (Hilary of Poitiers, On Synods 25 (PL 10:520).)

Reply Obj. 2: The antecedent will is in respect of no reality in God; for whatever God wills at a certain time he has willed from eternity. But his concomitant will is in respect of all the goods that are both within him and within created things; for he wills himself to be and the creature to be. But the temporally preceding or antecedent will is in fact only in respect to the created, which has not existed from eternity. The intellect is preceding as regards those eternal acts that are signified as to be terminated in creatures, such as the plan, predestination, and the like. But the generation of the Son is neither a creature nor is it signified as to be terminated in a creature. Therefore, with regard to it, the will is not preceding either in time or in understanding but is only a concomitant will.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as the act of the intellect seems to follow the act of the will insofar as it is commanded by the will, so too, conversely, the act of the will seems to follow the act of the intellect insofar as will’s object, namely, the good understood, is offered to it by the intellect. Hence, we would go on to infinity unless we came to a stop either in the act of the intellect or in the act of the will. But we cannot come to a stop in an act of the will, since its object is presupposed by its act. Therefore, we must come to a stop in an act of the intellect that follows the intellect naturally, such that it is not commanded by the will. It is in this way that the Son of God proceeds as the Word, according to the act of the divine intellect, as we have already stated.

Reply Obj. 4: The act of the divine intellect is natural insofar as it terminates in God himself, who is the principle of his own cognition. But insofar as it is signified as to be terminated in creatures, to which it stands in a certain way as our intellect does to its conclusions, it advances from the intellect not naturally but voluntarily. And therefore some of the acts of the intellect in the divine are signified as commanded by the will.

Reply Obj. 5: With regard to those things to which nature can extend according to its own essential principles, nature does not need to be determined by another, but only with regard to those things for which its own principles do not suffice. Consequently, philosophers were not being led by the effects of heat and cold, considered in themselves, when they said that the work of nature is the work of an intelligence; for even those who said that natural things happen due to the necessity of matter traced all the works of nature back to these things. However, they were so led by those effects for which the power of hot and cold (and such qualities) could not suffice, such as the way the members in an animal’s body are ordered in such a way that the nature is preserved. Therefore, since generation is the work of the divine nature according to itself, there is no need for it to be determined to this action by some will. Or it may also be replied that nature is determined by something as to its end. But to be determined by something is not suitable to that nature that is itself the end and not for the sake of the end.

Reply Obj. 6: When considering them in diverse things, the action of will precedes the action of nature. Therefore, the action of the whole of nature proceeds from the will of the one governing it. But within the same thing, the action of its nature must precede the act of its will. For nature is prior to will according to understanding, since nature is understood to be the principle whereby a thing subsists, whereas the will is the final principle whereby it is ordered to its end. Yet it does not follow that the account of will is taken away. For although according to the inclination of the nature, the will is determined to a certain single thing, which is the ultimate end intended by the nature, it nevertheless remains undetermined with regard to other things. This is clear in the case of man, who wills his happiness, but not other things, naturally and of necessity. Accordingly, in God the action of the nature precedes the act of the will both naturally and according to understanding; for the generation of the Son is the type (“Type” here translates ratio, which we have usually translated as “account” or “reason.”) of all things that are produced from the divine will—that is to say, of all created things.

Reply Obj. 7: Though it was within the Word of God begotten of the Father that all created things would come to be, it does not follow that if the Word proceeds naturally, then created things also proceed naturally. For example, although our intellect knows principles naturally, it does not follow that it knows naturally the conclusions that follow from them. For the will makes use of what we naturally possess as open to alternatives.

Reply Obj. 8: The Father begot voluntarily, but this indicates nothing other than his concomitant will.

Reply Obj. 9: If these words are understood as referring to the eternal generation, the Father’s love for the Son should not be taken as the type of that giving whereby the Father from all eternity gave all things to the Son, but rather as its sign. For likeness is the reason for love.

Reply Obj. 10: Dionysius is speaking of the formation of creatures, not of the generation of the Son.

Reply Obj. 11: The Holy Spirit is said to proceed through the mode of the will because he proceeds through an act that is naturally from the will—namely, the mutual love of the Father and the Son. For the Holy Spirit is Love just as the Son is the Word by which the Father has spoken his very self.

Reply Obj. 12: Again, this argument proves only that the Father wills the generation of the Son, which pertains to the concomitant will, which regards the generation as an object, not as something of which it is the principle.

Reply Obj. 13: Human generation is effected through a natural capacity, namely, the generative power, through the medium of the motive power that is subject to the command of the will, whereas the generative power is not. But this does not apply to God, and so the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 14: Augustine does not mean to deny a necessity of immutability, as the argument suggests, but a necessity of coercion.

Reply Obj. 15: When it is said that the Son is will of will, the sense is, “will of the Father, who is will.” Hence, this preposition “of” denotes the generative principle that is the begetter and not the principle by which generation is effected, which is the point of our inquiry.