Article 2 — Whether the generative power in God is spoken of essentially or notionally

The second point of inquiry is whether the generative power in the divine is said essentially or notionally. (Parallel texts: ST I.41.1, ad 1, ad 2; I.41.5; In I Sent. 7.1.1, ad 2; 7.1.2; 6.1.3.)

Obj. 1: It would seem that it is said only notionally. For a power holds the account of a principle, as is clear from the definitions given in Metaphysics 5. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.12, 1019a15–b10.) Now, when “principle” is said in the divine in reference to a divine person, it is said notionally. Since, then, the power of generating implies a principle in this sense, it would seem that it is said notionally.

Obj. 2: But it is said that it signifies both the essence and a notion.

On the contrary, there are two categories in God, according to Boethius: substance, to which the essence pertains, and toward-something, to which the notions pertain. (Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (ca. 480–524 AD), On the Trinity 4–6 (PL 64:1252–56).) But something cannot be in two categories, since a white man is not some one thing except accidentally, as Aristotle says in the Metaphysics 5. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.7, 1017a8.) Therefore, the power of begetting cannot include in its own account both the substance and a notion.

Obj. 3: In God, a principle is distinguished from that of which it is a principle. But there should be no distinction within the essence. Consequently, the account of a principle is incompatible with the essence; and thus, “power,” which includes the account of a principle, does not signify the essence.

Obj. 4: In God, what is proper is relative and notional, while that which is common is essential and absolute. Now, the generative power is not common to the Father and the Son; rather, it is proper to the Father. Therefore, it is spoken of relatively or notionally, and not essentially or absolutely.

Obj. 5: The principle of a thing’s proper action is its proper form and not a common form, just as a man understands by his intellect because this action is proper to him in relation to other animals, as is also the form of rationality or intellectuality. Now, generation is the proper activity of the Father as Father. Therefore, its principle is paternity, which is the Father’s proper form, and not divinity, which is the common form. But paternity is spoken of as toward-something. Therefore, the power of generating is spoken of as toward-something not only as regards the account of a principle but even as regards that which is a principle.

Obj. 6: As the generative power does not really differ from the essence, so neither does paternity. But this does not prevent paternity from being said only in relation to another. Therefore, neither does it oblige us to say that the generative power signifies the essence together with a relation.

Obj. 7: In God, three things are found to have the account of a principle—namely, power, knowledge, and will—and are ascribed to God essentially. Now, knowledge and will in God do not each signify at the same time some relation or notion. For equal reason, therefore, neither does power, and so it cannot be said that the generative power signifies at the same time the essence (on the part of the power) and a notion (on the part of the generation), but it seems to signify nothing but the notion, for reasons already given.

On the contrary (1) the Master says, in Sentences I, that the generative power in the Father is the very essence of God. (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 1, d. 7 (PL 192:541–42); cf. above, q. 1, a. 1, ad 6.)

Furthermore (2), Hilary says that the Father begets by the power of the divine nature. (Hilary of Poitiers, On Synods 12.27–36 (PL 10:500–508).) Therefore, the nature itself is the principle of generation and in this way holds the account of a power.

Furthermore (3), Damascene says that generation is the existing work of the nature; (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 2.27 (PG 94:959–62).) thus, the same conclusion follows.

Furthermore (4), there is but one power in God. Now, the creative power is essential. Therefore, the generative power should be also.

I answer that there are several opinions on this point.

Some have maintained that the generative power is spoken of in the divine only as toward-something, and they were moved by the following argument: according to its account, power is a certain principle, and “principle” is spoken of relatively and is notional if it is referred to the divine power and not to creatures.

But in arguing thus, they seem to have been deceived in two ways.

First, although the account of a principle does belong to power, and principle is in the genus of relation, nevertheless, the thing that is a principle of the action or passion is not a relation but a certain absolute form; and that is the essence of the power. Therefore, the Philosopher places power in the genus not of relation but of quality, as he does knowledge, even though a certain relation happens to both.

Second, things that in the divine indicate a principle in reference to an activity are not said notionally, but this is the case only for things that speak of a principle in reference to the terminus of the activity. For the principle that is spoken of notionally in the divine is said in reference to the subsistent person, but the activity is not signified as subsisting. Consequently, things that have the account of a principle in reference to the activity need not be spoken of notionally in the divine; otherwise will, knowledge, intellect, and all like terms would be spoken of notionally.

Power, however, although it is a principle sometimes both of an action and of what is produced by the action, yet the one is accidental to it and the other belongs to it through itself. For an active power, through its own action, does not always produce some reality that is the terminus of the action, since, according to the Philosopher, there are many activities that have no product; (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.1, 1094a1–16; Metaphysics 9.6, 1048a30–b35.) for power is always a principle of action or activity. Consequently, it does not follow that because of the relation of a principle that the name “power” implies, it is predicated of God relatively.

Moreover, this opinion itself seems inconsonant with the truth. For if the thing that is a power is the very reality that is the principle of action, it follows that the divine nature is that which is a principle in God; for, since every agent as such produces its like, the principle of generation in the begetter is that thing according to which the begotten becomes like the begetter. For a man by virtue of his human nature begets a son who is like him in that nature. Now, God begotten is conformed to God the Father in the divine nature; hence, the divine nature is the principle of the generation by virtue of which the Father begets, as Hilary says. (Hilary of Poitiers, On Synods 12.27–36 (PL 10:500–508); 27.73 (PL 10:527–28).)

For this reason, others have said that the generative power signifies the essence alone. But this opinion also seems incongruous. For an action done by virtue of a common nature through something included under that nature takes on a certain mode from principles proper to it. For example, an action that is owed to a man’s animal nature is produced in him insofar as it befits the principles of the human species; therefore also, a man more perfectly has an act of the imaginative power than do the other animals, insofar as it belongs to his rationality. Likewise too, the action of man is found in this or that man according to how it befits the individuating principles of this or that man, due to which it happens that one man understands more clearly than another. And therefore, if it is necessary that the common nature is the principle of an activity that belongs to the Father alone, it must be the principle insofar as it belongs to the personal property of the Father. And for this reason, the account of power in a certain way includes paternity, even as regards that which is the principle of generation.

For these reasons, we must say with others that the generative power signifies at the same time the essence and the notion.

Reply Obj. 1: Power conveys the account of a principle in relation to activity, which latter (as already stated) is not said of God notionally.

Reply Obj. 2: In created realities, one category is accidental to another, on account of which one thing cannot result from the two, except what is one accidentally. But in God, relation is in reality his very essence, and thus there is no likeness.

Reply Obj. 3: Among created realities, there are two principles of generation: the generator and that by which he generates. The generator, however, is distinguished from the thing generated by the generation since nothing generates its very self. But that by which the generator generates is not distinguished but rather is common to both, as stated above. (Q. 2, a. 2, resp.) Consequently, it does not follow that there is a distinction in the divine nature as by a power of generating, since a power is a principle by which the effect is produced.

Reply Obj. 4: By reason of the implied relation, the generative power is not common but proper.

Reply Obj. 5: In every generation, the principle of generation is not fundamentally some form of the individual but rather the form that pertains to the nature of the species. Further, there is no need for the thing generated to be like the generator in regard to individual conditions, but in regard to the nature of the species. Now, paternity is not in the Father through the mode of the form of a species, as humanity is in a man, for the divine nature is in him in this way; rather, paternity is in him (so to speak) as an individual principle, for it is a personal property. Consequently, it does not follow that in him it is the principle of generation fundamentally; rather, it is in a certain way understood along with it (for the reason given above). Otherwise it would follow that the Father by begetting would communicate not only divinity but fatherhood, which is incongruous.

Reply Obj. 6: The generative power is really the same thing as the divine nature, such that the nature is included in its account, but this is not so with the paternity, so the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 7: Knowledge or will is not the principle of generation, since generation belongs to the nature, which, insofar as it is a principle of action, has the account of a power. Hence it is that, in God, power is consignified with that which is toward-something, whereas this is not the case with knowledge or will.

Reply Sed Contra: The replies to the arguments on the other side may be easily gathered from what has been said.