Article 5 — Whether the generative power is included in omnipotence

The fifth point of inquiry is whether the generative power is included in omnipotence. (Parallel texts: ST I.28.3; In I Sent. 7.1.1.)

Obj. 1: And it seems that it is not. For omnipotence is becoming to the Son according to the words of the Creed: the Father is omnipotent, the Son is omnipotent, the Holy Spirit is omnipotent. (Aquinas is here referring to the Quicumque, often called the Athanasian Creed. Cf. Heinrich Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum, ed. 18‒20 (Rome: Herder, 1932), 16‒17.) But the generative power is not becoming to him. Therefore, it is not included in omnipotence.

Obj. 2: Augustine says that God is omnipotent because he is able to do all the things that he wills. (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity 1.96 (PL 40:276).) From this, it seems that the power that is commanded by the will would pertain to omnipotence. Now, such is not the generative power, since the Father did not beget the Son by his will, as we have shown above. (Q. 2, a. 3.) Therefore, the generative power does not pertain to omnipotence.

Obj. 3: Omnipotence is attributed to God insofar as it extends to all things that are in themselves possible. But the generation of the Son or the Son himself is not among possible things but necessary ones. Therefore, the generative power is not included in omnipotence.

Obj. 4: That which belongs to several things in common belongs to them in respect of something that is common to all of them. For example, to have three sides belongs to the equilateral and the scalene insofar as they are triangles. Consequently, that which belongs to one thing alone belongs to it in respect of that which is proper to it. Now, omnipotence is not proper to the Father. Since, then, the generative power in God belongs to the Father alone, it does not belong to him as omnipotent, and consequently is not included in omnipotence.

Obj. 5: Just as there is one essence of Father and Son, so is there one omnipotence. But it does not pertain to the Son’s omnipotence to be able to beget. Neither, then, does it belong to the omnipotence of the Father; consequently, by no means does the generative power pertain to omnipotence.

Obj. 6: Things that are not of one account do not fall under the same heading; for when I say, “all dogs,” I do not include both the dog that barks and the constellation. But the generation of the Son and the production of the other things that are subject to omnipotence are not of one account. Therefore, when one says, “God is omnipotent,” one does not include his power of generating.

Obj. 7: That to which omnipotence extends is subject to the omnipotence. Now, in God, there is no subject, according to Jerome, as Damascene says in On the Orthodox Faith 3 and 4. (Cf. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 4.19 (PG 94:1191–94); 3.21 (PG 94:1083–86).) Therefore, neither the Son’s generation nor the Son himself is subject to omnipotence, and the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 8: According to the Philosopher, a relation cannot through itself be the terminus of a movement, nor, consequently, of an action: (Aristotle, Physics 5.2, 225b10–226a22.) therefore, it cannot be the object of a power, since “power” is said with respect to an action. Now, “generation” and “Son” imply relation in God. Therefore, God’s power does not extend to them; consequently, omnipotence does not include the power to beget.

On the contrary (1), Augustine says: if the Father is unable to beget a Son equal to him, where is his omnipotence? (Augustine, Against Maximinus 2.7, 2.18, 2.23 (PL 42:761–62, 785–87, 796–802).) Therefore, omnipotence includes begetting.

Furthermore (2), omnipotence is attributed to God in respect not only of external acts—such as creation, government, and the like, which are signified as to be terminated extrinsically in their effects—but also of interior acts, such as understanding and willing. For if anyone were to say that God cannot understand, he would take away from his omnipotence. Now, the Son proceeds as Word by the act of the intellect. Therefore, God’s omnipotence is understood to include the begetting of the Son.

Furthermore (3), it is a greater thing to beget the Son than to create heaven and earth. But the power to create heaven and earth belongs to omnipotence. Much more, then, does the power to beget the Son.

Furthermore (4), in every genus, there is a principle to which all that belong to that genus are traced back. Now, in the genus of powers, the principle is omnipotence. Therefore, all power is traced back to omnipotence; and consequently, the generative power is also either included in omnipotence, or there will be two principles in the genus of power, which is impossible.

I answer that the power to beget belongs to the omnipotence of the Father, but not to omnipotence simply. This is clear as follows.

Since power is understood to be rooted in the essence and is the principle of action, we must judge of the power and action as we judge of the essence. Now, in the divine essence, we must note that, by reason of its supreme simplicity, whatever is in God is the divine essence; therefore, even the very relations by which the persons are distinguished one from another are, in reality, the divine essence itself. And though one and the same essence is common to the three persons, nevertheless, the relation of one person is not common to the three, on account of the opposition in which these relations stand to one another. Thus, the paternity itself is the divine essence, yet the paternity is not in the Son, on account of the opposition between paternity and filiation.

Hence, we may say that paternity is the divine essence insofar as this is in the Father, not insofar as it is in the Son; for it is not in the Father in the same way as it is in the Son; rather, it is in the Son as received from another, whereas this is not the case in the Father. And although the Son does not have paternity, which the Father does have, it does not follow that the Father has something that the Son does not; for the relation itself, according to the account of its own genus as a relation, does not have it that it be something but only that it be toward-something. But that a relation has the fact that it is something real is due to its being-in something, either as the same thing as it according to reality (as in the divine), or as having its cause in its subject (as in creatures). Therefore, since that which is absolute is common to Father and Son, they are distinguished not in reference to something but only in reference to something relative; therefore, we must not say that the Father has something that the Son has not, but that something belongs to the Father in one respect, to the Son in another.

The same, then, applies to action and power. For generation signifies a power with a certain respect, and the power of generating signifies power with a certain respect; whence generation itself is God’s action, but only as it is the Father’s; likewise, the very power of generating is the divine omnipotence, but only as this is in the Father. Yet it does not follow that the Father is able to do what the Son cannot do. Rather, all things that the Father can do, the Son can do likewise—although he cannot beget; for to beget is spoken of relatively.

Reply Obj. 1: The power to beget pertains to omnipotence, but not as it is in the Son, as stated above in the body of the article.

Reply Obj. 2: In these words, Augustine does not intend to explain the entire account of omnipotence in those words, but to indicate a sign of omnipotence. Nor is he speaking of omnipotence except in reference to creatures.

Reply Obj. 3: The possible things to which omnipotence extends must not be confined to those that are contingent, since even necessary things are brought into being by the divine power. Hence, there is no reason why the begetting of the Son should not be counted among the things possible to the divine power.

Reply Obj. 4: Though omnipotence absolutely considered is not proper to the Father, nevertheless, as considered together with its determinate mode of existence, or definite relation, it becomes proper to the Father. In the same way, the expression “God the Father” is proper to the Father, although God is common to the three persons.

Reply Obj. 5: Just as the three persons have one and the same essence but not under the same relation, or with the same mode of existence in the three persons, so is it with their omnipotence.

Reply Obj. 6: The generation of the Son and the production of creatures are of the same account not univocally but only by analogy. For Basil says that the fact that the Son receives he has in common with every created thing. (Basil the Great (330–379 AD), “On Faith,” Homily 15 (PG 31:463–72).) In this sense, he is called the firstborn of every creature (Col 1:15), and for the same reason his generation can be placed under one common head with the production of creatures.

Reply Obj. 7: The generation of the Son is subject to omnipotence not in such a way that “subject” would designate inferiority, but only in the way that it designates the object of a power.

Reply Obj. 8: The generation of the Son signifies the relation through the mode of action, and the Son signifies the relation through the mode of a subsisting hypostasis; thus, there is no reason why we should not refer omnipotence to these things.

Reply Sed Contra: The replies on the other side merely prove that the ability to beget pertains to the omnipotence of the Father.