Article 1 — Whether sensuality is a knowing power or is only appetitive

The question is on sensuality. First, it is asked whether sensuality is a knowing power or is only appetitive. (Parallel texts: ST I.81.1; In II Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 1.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it is a knowing power, for as the Teacher says in the Sentences, (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 24, ch. 4.) whatever you may find in our soul that is common with the beasts pertains to sensuality; but the sensitive knowing powers are common to the beasts and to us; therefore they pertain to sensuality.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says in On the Trinity (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 12, ch. 12 (PL 42:1007).) that the sensual motion of the soul, which intends toward the body’s sensation, is common to us and to sheep, and it is separated from the reasoning of wisdom; and expounding upon this he adds (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 12, ch. 12 (PL 42:1007).) that indeed, bodily things are sensed by the body’s sensation, but eternal and unchangeable spiritual things are understood by wisdom’s reasoning; but to sense bodily things belongs to knowing. Therefore, sensuality, whose act is a sensual motion, is itself a knowing power.

Obj. 3: But one might answer that Augustine adds this in order to manifest the objects of sense: for then the motion of sensuality tends toward the body’s senses inasmuch as they are occupied with sensible things themselves.

On the contrary, Augustine adds this to show to show how sensuality is separated from reason; but even reason concerns itself with bodily things, which Augustine says are the objects of the senses, the lower reason disposing and the higher reason judging; and so sensuality is not separated from reason by this; therefore Augustine did not intend what was answered.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, in the progression of sin which is effected in us, sensuality holds the place of the serpent, as Augustine teaches; (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 12, ch. 12 (PL 42:1007); cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 24, ch. 7.) but in the temptation of the first parents the serpent stands as the one making known and proposing the sin, which pertains to the knowing and not to the appetitive power, because it belongs to it to be brought to sin; therefore sensuality is a knowing power.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, Augustine says in the same book that sensuality is close to the notion of knowledge; (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 12, ch. 12 (PL 42:1007); cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 24, ch. 5.) but it would not be close to it if it were only appetitive, since the notion of knowledge is knowing: for then it would pertain to another genus of the soul’s powers; therefore sensuality is a knowing power and not only appetitive.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, according to Augustine in On the Trinity, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 12, ch.12 (PL 42:1007); cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 24, ch. 4.) sensuality is distinguished from both higher and lower reason, in which is contained also the higher appetite, that is the will; otherwise mortal sin could not be in them. But the lower appetite is not distinguished from the higher appetite as a separate power, as will be proven. Therefore, sensuality is not a lower appetite. However, it is one of the soul’s lower powers, as is clear from its definition; (apud Petrum Lomb. Lib. Sent. II d. 24 c. 4 ut dicitur infra obj. 10.) therefore it is a lower knowing power.

Proof of the minor: an accidental difference among objects does not indicate a difference among powers with regard to species, for sight is not divided into distinct powers by seeing a man and by seeing a donkey; for man and donkey happen to the visible insofar as it is visible.

But the desirable which is apprehended by sense and what is apprehended by the intellect, according to which both the higher and lower appetites seem to be distinguished, happen to what is desirable insofar as it is desirable; for the desirable, inasmuch as it is desirable, is good, yet it happens to it to be apprehended by sense or by intellect. Therefore, the lower appetite is not a power distinct from the higher appetite.

Obj. 7: But one might reply that the two appetite mentioned previously are distinguished by the good understood simply and the good as existing now.

On the contrary, as the intellect is to the true so is the appetite to the good; but truth taken simply, which is necessary, and truth as existing now, which is contingent, do not distinguish the intellect into two powers. Therefore, neither is the appetite able to be distinguished into two powers with respect to the good taken simply and the good as existing now.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, it seems that the good as existing now is an apparent good, whereas the good taken simply is the true good; but whenever the higher appetite consents to the apparent good, the lower appetite also desires some true good at the same time, as is the case with what is necessary for the body. Therefore, the good as existing now and the good taken simply do not distinguish the higher and lower appetites, and so the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, the sensitive power is divided against the appetitive, as is clear from the Philosopher in On the Soul, (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.14, 411a26.) where he distinguishes five kinds of actions of the soul, namely nourishing, sensing, desiring, moving according to place, and understanding. But sensuality is contained under the sensitive power, as the name itself shows: therefore, sensuality is not an appetitive power but a knowing power.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, what is defined agrees with whatever thing that the definition agrees with; (Cf. Peter of Spain, Summulae logicales, tract. 5, n. 10.) but the definition of sensuality which the Teacher holds in the Sentences, (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 24, ch. 4.) agrees with lower reason, which is at the same time intent upon the body’s senses and upon what pertains to the body; therefore lower reason and sensuality are the same thing; but reason is a knowing power, therefore sensuality is also.

On the contrary (1) is what it says in the definition of sensuality, (Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 24, ch. 4.) that it is the appetite for things pertaining to the body.

Furthermore (2), sin exists in the one desiring, not only in the one who is knowing; but in sensuality there are some very minor sins, as Augustine says in On the Trinity; (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 12, ch. 12 (PL 42:1007–1008); cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 24, cc. 9, 12.) therefore sensuality is an appetitive power.

I answer that it must be said that sensuality seems to be nothing else than an appetitive power of the sensitive part of the soul; and it is called sensuality as being something derived from sense. (Cf. Huguccio Liber derivationum s. v. sentio (ms. Paris B. N. lat. 7625 A, f. 145ra).) For the motion of the appetitive part arises in some way from apprehension, because every activity of a passive principle takes its origin from an active principle: however the appetite is a passive power, for it is moved by what is desirable, which is something that moves others while being unmoved, as it says in On the Soul. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.15, 433b11.) Therefore, inasmuch as the lower appetitive power is moved by the desirable, as apprehended by sense, its motion is called sensual and the power itself is named sensuality. However, this sensible appetite is in the middle between natural appetite and the higher rational appetite, which is named will. This can be seen from the fact that two things are able to be considered in any desirable thing, namely the thing itself which is desired and the reason for desirability, such as pleasure or usefulness or other such things.

Therefore, natural appetite tends toward the desirable thing itself without any apprehension of the reason for desirability; for natural appetite is nothing else than a certain inclination of the thing and an order toward some other thing agreeable to itself, just like a stone that is borne toward a place down below. (This example is from Aristotle, Ethics 2.1, 1103a20; cf. ST I-II.71.2, obj. 2; see above: q. 6, a. 3, ad 7.) But since a natural things is determined in its own natural being, and its inclination toward some determinate thing is one, it does not need any apprehension by which the desirable thing is distinguished from what is not desirable with respect to the reason for desirability. But this apprehension is required in the one who established nature, who gave to each nature its own inclination toward what is agreeable to itself.

However, the higher appetite, which is the will, tends directly to the reason itself for desirability, taken absolutely, just as the will desires goodness itself first and principally, or else usefulness or something else of this kind; but it desires this or that thing secondarily inasmuch as it takes part in the previously mentioned reason: and this is the case because the rational nature has such a great capacity that an inclination to one determinate thing would not be sufficient for it, rather it needs many diverse things. Thus, its inclination is to something common that is found in many things; and so, by means of the apprehension of what is common, it tends to the desirable thing in which it knows to exist a reason for desirability of this kind.

But the lower appetite of the sensitive part, which is called sensuality, tends to the desirable thing itself inasmuch as the reason for desirability is found within it; for it does not tend to the reason itself for desirability, since the lower appetite does not desire goodness itself or usefulness or pleasure, but this useful thing or this pleasurable thing; and in this sense the sensible appetite is below the rational appetite. But since it does not tend so much to this or that thing, but rather to all that is useful or pleasurable for itself, it is therefore above the natural appetite; and because of this it also needs apprehension, by which it distinguishes the pleasurable from the non pleasurable.

A manifest sign of this distinction is that the natural appetite is bound by necessity with regard to the thing itself to which it tends, just as what is heavy necessarily desires a lower place; however, the sensitive appetite is not bound by necessity toward anything, prior to it being apprehended under the notion of being able to please or to be useful; but with it having been apprehended as pleasurable, it is borne toward it by necessity: for an irrational animal looking upon something pleasurable is unable not to desire it.

But the will is bound by necessity with regard to goodness itself and usefulness, for man necessarily wills the good, but he is not bound by necessity with regard to this or that thing, howsoever much it is apprehended by him as being good or useful; this is because each power possesses a certain necessary relationship with its own proper object. Hence, it is given as understood that the object of the natural appetite is this thing inasmuch as it is such a thing, but that of the sensible appetite is this thing inasmuch as it is appropriate or able to please: such as water, inasmuch as it is appropriate for tasting and not inasmuch as it is water; but the proper object of the will is the good itself taken absolutely. And so the apprehension of sense and that of the intellect differ, for it belongs to sense to apprehend this colored thing, but to the intellect to apprehend the very nature of color.

Therefore, it is clear that the appetite differs with regard to the form, either as will or as sensuality, just as goodness itself is desired under one notion and this good thing under another; for goodness is desired through itself, but this good thing is desired inasmuch as it participates in something. Thus, just as things participating are perfected by their participations, as this good thing by goodness itself, so also does the higher appetite rule the lower appetite, and in the same way the intellect judges regarding the things which sense apprehends.

Hence the proper object of sensuality is the thing that is good or appropriate for the one sensing; and this happens in two ways: in one way because it is appropriate to the existence itself of the one sensing, such as food, drink, and other such things; but in another way because it is appropriate for sensation to sense it, just as it is appropriate for sight to see a beautiful color, and it is appropriate for hearing to hear a moderate sound, and so on. In this way, the Teacher defines sensation completely: (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 24, ch. 4.) for when he says that it is a certain lower power of the soul, its distinction from the higher appetite is designated; but when he says that it is that from which there is a motion, which tends toward the body’s senses, he manifests its relationship with the things that are appropriate for sensation to sense; but when he says that it is also the appetite for things pertaining to the body, he manifests its relationship with the things appropriate for the preservation of the existence of the one sensing.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that something pertains to sensuality in three ways: in one way as what belongs to the essence of sensuality, and in this way only the appetitive powers pertain to sensuality; in another way as what is presupposed to sensuality, and in this way the sensitive apprehensive powers pertain to sensuality; in yet another way as what obeys sensuality, and in this way that which carries out motion pertains to sensuality: hence it is true that all things common to us and beasts pertain in some way to sensuality, even though not all of them belong to the essence of sensuality.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that Augustine adds what was said to show what are the acts of the exterior senses, to which the motion of sensuality inclines; but not that the sensing itself of bodily things is a motion of sensuality.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that lower reason has a motion with regard to the body’s senses, but not in the same way that the senses perceive their own objects: for the senses perceive their own objects particularly, whereas lower reason has its act concerning sensible things with respect to a universal intention. But sensuality tends toward the objects of sensation just as do the senses themselves, that is particularly, as has been said, and so the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that in the temptation of the first parents the serpent not only proposed something to be desired, but he deceived them by suggesting. (Cf. Petrus Lomb. Lib. Sent. II d. 24 c. 9.) However, man would not have been deceived by the proposal of sensible pleasure had not reason’s judgment been bound by the passion of the appetitive part; and therefore, sensation is an appetitive power.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that sensuality is said to be close to the reasoning of knowledge, not with respect to the genus of power, but with respect to the objects: for both are concerned with temporal things, even though in different ways, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that the diversity of apprehensions would be related to the appetitive powers accidentally unless a diversity of apprehended things were conjoined to a diversity of apprehensions: for sensation, which is only of particular things, does not apprehend goodness taken absolutely, but this good thing; but since the intellect is concerned with universals, it apprehends goodness itself taken absolutely, from which the lower appetite is distinguished from the higher, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that the good as existing now, toward which the sensible appetite is borne, is a particular good which is considered as being here and now, whether it be contingent or necessary; for even to see the sun is pleasing to the eyes as it says in Ecclesiastes 11:7, whether it be a true good or an apparent one.

Reply Obj. 8: Hence, the response to the eighth is also clear.

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that the sensitive part is taken in two ways: at times it is taken as being divided against the appetitive, and thus it contains the apprehensive powers alone; and in this way sensuality does not pertain to the sensitive part, except as to what is its source, as it were; and thus it is able to be named from it. But at other times it is taken as embracing within itself both the appetitive and the motive parts, insofar as the sensible soul is divided against the rational and the vegetative souls: and in this way also sensuality is included in the soul’s sensitive part.

Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that the lower reason tends toward the body’s senses and the things pertaining to the body in a different way than does sensuality, as was said before; and it is for this reason that the objection does not follow.