Article 5 — Whether there can be sin in sensuality

Fifth, it is asked whether there can be sin in sensuality. (Parallel texts: In II Sent, d. 24, q. 3, a. 2; ST I-II.74.3-4; Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 7, a. 6; Quodlibet, bk. 4, q. 11, a. 1.)

Obj. 1: It seems not, for according to Augustine, one never sins except by means of the will; (Augustine, De duabus anim. cap. 10 (PL 42, 103 et 104) ut refert Petrus Lomb. Lib. Sent. II d. 41 c. 3.) but sensuality is distinguished from the will; therefore there is not sin in sensuality.

The objection is missing.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, sins remain in the separated soul; but sensuality does not remain in the separated soul, for it is a power of the composite, since its activity is exercised by means of the body; however, that whose power it is, is also the activity according to the Philosopher in the book On Sleep and Waking; (Aristotle, On Sleep, ch. 1, 454a8.) therefore there is not sin in sensuality.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to Augustine in the City of God (Augustine, City of God, bk. 5, ch. 9 (PL 41:151).) there is something that acts but is not acted upon, namely God, and in him there is no sin; there is something that acts and is acted upon, namely the will, and in this there is sin; and then there is something that is acted upon but does not act, namely sensuality; therefore, neither is there any sin in it.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, one might say that there can be sin within sensuality by the fact that reason is able to impede its own motion.

On the contrary, by the fact that reason is able to impede something and does not show reason's inferred consent, which indeed is not sufficient for sin since it is not sufficient for merit without express consent; for God is more prone to be merciful than to punish, as it says in some Gloss on the beginning of Jeremiah; (See above: q. 15, a. 4, obj. 13; Glossa ordinaria, at Jeremiah, prologue from Origen, 4.579; Origen, Homilies on Jeremiah, hom. 1, para. 1 (PG 13:255A); see also William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 2, tract. 30, ch. 1.) therefore, neither can it be said for this reason that there is sin in sensuality.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, no one sins in what one cannot avoid; (Augustine, On the Two Souls, ch. 10 (PL 42:103); ch. 11 (PL 42:105); On Free Will, bk. 3, ch. 18 (PL 32:1295); cf. ST I-II.109.8, obj. 1.) but we cannot help but that the movements of sensuality be disordered: for as Augustine says, (Cf. Augustine, On Free Will, bk. 3, ch. 18 (PL 32:1296); cf. Peter Lombard, Commentary on Romans, 6 (PL 191:1422B).) since man did not wish to avoid evil when he was able to, it was inflicted upon him that he should not be able to when he wished; therefore sin is not in sensuality.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, it is not a sin when sensuality’s motion is toward something licit, as when a husband is aroused towards his wife; but sensuality does not distinguish between what is licit and what is illicit, therefore neither will there be sin when it is moved toward what is illicit.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, virtue and vice are contraries; but virtue is not able to exist in sensuality; therefore neither can vice.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, sin is in that to which it is imputed; but sin is not imputed to sensuality, for it is not in command of its own acts, but rather to the will; therefore, there is no sin in sensuality.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, that which is material in mortal sin is able to exist in sensuality: but we do not say that mortal sin is there, for there is not in it what is formal to mortal sin; however, what is formal in venial sin, namely the privation of due order, is not in sensuality but in reason, to which it belongs to order things; therefore venial sin is not in sensuality.

Obj. 11: Furthermore, if a blind man falls into a pit, being led by someone who sees, it is not the fault of the of the blind man but of the one who sees; therefore, since sensuality is as though blind with respect to divine things, if it should fall into something illicit, it will not be its own sin but reason's, which ought to rule it.

Obj. 12: Furthermore, just as sensuality is ruled by reason in some way, so also are the exterior members; yet in which we do not say that there is sin; therefore, neither is it in sensuality.

Obj. 13: Furthermore, both disposition and form are in the same thing, for the actions of those who act are in both what undergoes and what is disposed; but venial sin is a disposition toward mortal sin; therefore, since mortal sin cannot be in sensuality, neither can venial sin.

Obj. 14: Furthermore, the act of fornication is closer to sensuality than to reason; therefore, if sin can exist in sensuality, it would be a mortal sin, namely that of fornication; and because that is false, it would seem that sin cannot be in it.

On the contrary (1) is what Augustine says, (Cf. De civ. Dei XIX c. 4 (PL 41, 629), vide praeterea Petrum Lomb. Lib. Sent. III d. 17 c. 2.) that there is some vice when the flesh lusts against the spirit; however this concupiscence of the flesh pertains to sensuality; therefore, sin can exist in it.

Furthermore (2), the Teacher says in the Sentences (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 24, cc. 9, 12.) that there is venial sin in sensuality.

I answer that it must be said that sin is nothing else than a certain act falling short of the right order, which it ought to have; and sin is understood to be in this way in what exists according to nature and what exists according to art, as the Philosopher say in the Physics; (Aristotle, Physics 2.14, 199a33.) but there is only a moral sin when the deficient act itself is moral. Yet there is a moral act within us in some way by that fact that it exists within us; for it is in that case that someone is owed either praise or blame; (Cf. Arist. Ethic. II 5 (1106 a 1).) hence, the act that is fully within our power is a fully moral act, and in that act there can exist the complete notion of mortal sin, as is the case with those acts that the will elicits or commands. However, the act of sensuality is not perfectly within our power since it precedes reason’s judgment; nevertheless, it is in our power in some way inasmuch as sensuality is subjected to reason, as is clear from what has been said, (Above: a. 4.) and therefore its acts attain to the genus of moral actions, though imperfectly: thus mortal sin, which is fully sin, cannot exist in sensuality, but only venial sin, in which is found an imperfect notion of mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Therefore, to the first it must be said that there is twofold subject of anything, namely what is first and what is secondary; as for example, a surface is the primary subject of color, but a body is secondary inasmuch as it is subject to the surface. (exemplum Arist., cf. e. g. Topic. V c. 8 (138 a 15).) Similarly one must say that the first subject of sin is the will; but sensuality is the subject of sin inasmuch as it participates in the will in some way.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that the act of sensuality is in us in some way, not, however, from the nature of sensuality, but inasmuch as sensuality’s powers are rational by participation.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that the marks of sins (Origen, Commentary on Romans, bk. 2, para. 10 (PG 14:894A-B); from Peter Lombard, Commentary on Romans, at Rom 2:15 (PL 191:1346C); cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent., d. 43, a. 5, qa. 1, obj. 2.) remain in any conscience according to the force that they were committed; thus, given that sensuality does not wholly remain in the previously mentioned way, sensuality’s sin is able to remain. However, whether or not sensuality remains must be discussed elsewhere. (e.g. De anima a. 19.)

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that although it does not pertain to sensuality in itself to act, yet it does pertain to it inasmuch as it participates in reason in some way.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that sin is not said to be in sensuality on account of reason’s interpretative consent. For when the motion of sensuality precedes reason’s judgment, there is neither an interpreted consent nor an expressed consent; but from the fact that sensuality can be subject to reason, its own act, even if it precedes reason, has the notion of sin.

Nevertheless, it must be known that although at times interpretative consent suffices for sin, yet it is not necessary that it suffice for merit; for more things are required for goodness than for evil, for evil happens from individual defects, but goodness from a whole and entire cause, as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 30 (PG 3:729C).)

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that we are indeed able to avoid individual sins of sensuality, but not all, as is clear from what has been said in another question. (Above: q. 24, a. 12.)

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that when someone approaches his wife out of concupiscence, though not exceeding the bounds of matrimony, it is a venial sin; thus it is clear that the motion itself of concupiscence within the one who is joined by marriage, when it precedes reason’s judgment, is a venial sin. But when it is determined by reason that it is permissible to desire, even though sensuality should be carried toward it, there will be no sin.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that moral virtue is in the power of sensuality, that is in the irascible and the concupiscible, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Nichomachean Ethics, (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 3.19, 1117b23.) where he says that temperance and fortitude belong to the irrational parts. But since sensuality denotes these powers with respect to their natural inclination toward sensation, which is contrary to reason, and not with respect to how they participate in reason, therefore it is more properly said that vice is in sensuality and virtue is in the irascible and the concupiscible powers: nevertheless, the sin that is in sensuality is not opposed to virtue, thus the objection does not follow.

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that all sin is imputed to man inasmuch he has a will; and yet sin is said to be in some way within that power whose activity happens to be deformed.

Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that what is material in mortal sin is able to taken in three ways: in one way inasmuch as the object is the matter of the action: and in this way the matter of mortal sin is sometimes in sensuality, as when someone consents to the pleasure of sensuality; in another way inasmuch as the exterior act is said to be material with respect to the interior act, which is itself formal in mortal sin, for the exterior and the interior act are one sin: and in this way the act of sensuality is also able to be related materially in mortal sin; in a third way, what is material in mortal sin is the turning toward the changeable good as toward an end, whereas the formal notion is the turning away from the unchangeable good; (Cf. Augustine, On Free Will, bk. 3, ch. 1 (PL 32:1269).) and so what is material in mortal sin cannot be in sensuality. Nor does it follow that, if mortal sin cannot be there, venial sin is not there, for the previously mentioned reason.

Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that sin is said to be in sensuality, not because it is imputed to it, but because it is committed by its act; however, it is imputed inasmuch as that act is in its power.

Reply Obj. 12: To the twelfth it must be said that the external members are only moved; but the lower appetitive powers are movers like the will; hence, inasmuch as they participate in the will in some way they are able to be the subject of sin.

Reply Obj. 13: To the thirteenth it must be said that disposition is twofold: one by which the one undergoing is disposed to receive a form, and such a disposition is in the same thing as that form; another disposition is that by which the agent is disposed to act, and regarding this it is not true that it is in the same thing as the form to which it disposes. However, a disposition of such a kind is venial when it is in sensuality, but it is a disposition toward mortal sin when it is in reason, for sensuality is like the agent in mortal sin inasmuch as it inclines reason to sin.

Reply Obj. 14: To the fourteenth it must be said that although the act of fornication is closer to the concupiscible power than to reason, with respect to the notion of the object, yet it is closer to reason with respect to the notion of command; for the external members are not applied to action without reason’s command; thus mortal sin can exist in them, though not in sensuality’s act that precedes reason’s judgment.