Article 6 — Whether the concupiscible is more corrupt and stained than the irascible

Sixth, it is asked whether the concupiscible is more corrupt and stained than the irascible. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 31, q. 2, a. 2; ST I-II.83.4; Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 4, a. 2, ad 12; a. 5, ad 1.)

Obj. 1: It seems not: for the corruption and staining of human nature comes from original sin; but original sin is in the soul’s essence as in a subject, as some say, (Cf. Albert the Great, q. "De peccato originali," a. 3; Aquinas, In II Sent., d. 31, q. 2, a. 1.) because the soul contracts it by its being conjoined to the body, to which it is joined by its own essence: therefore, since all the powers approach in some way to the soul’s essence, namely as being rooted in it, it seems that stain and corruption are not more in the concupiscible than in the irascible and other powers.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, from the corruption of nature there is within us a certain inclination toward sin; but the sins of the irascible power are more serious than those of the concupiscible, for according to Gregory, (Cf. Moral. XXXIII c. 12 (PL 76, 688 B).) spiritual sins are of greater fault than carnal ones; therefore the irascible is more corrupt than the concupiscible.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, sudden movements of the soul happen in us from the corruption of nature; but the movements of the irascible power seem to be more sudden than those of the concupiscible: for the irascible is moved with a certain forcefulness of spirit, but the concupiscible with a certain weakness of spirit; therefore, the irascible is more corrupt than the concupiscible.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, such a corruption and stain, of which we are speaking, is a corruption of nature and transmitted by generation; however, the sins of the irascible are more natural and are more given by parents to their children than are the sins of the concupiscible, as the Philosopher says in the Nichomachean Ethics. (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 7.6, 1149b6.) Therefore the irascible is more corrupt than the concupiscible.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the corruption within us comes the sin of our first parents; but the first sin of our first parents was pride or self-exaltation, which is in the irascible; (Cf. Petrus Lomb. Lib. Sent. II d. 22 c. 1.) therefore, in us the irascible is more corrupted and stained than the concupiscible.

On the contrary (1), where there is greater ugliness there is also a greater corruption and stain; but according to the Philosopher in the Nichomachean Ethics 8, (It is actually Aristotle, Ethics 7.6, 1149b1.) unrestrained concupiscence is uglier than unrestrained anger; therefore the concupiscible is more corrupt and stained than the irascible.

Furthermore (2), we are more corrupt wherein we resist with greater difficulty; but it is more difficult to fight against pleasure, which pertains to the concupiscible, than it is against anger, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Nichomachean Ethics. (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 2.3, 1105a7.) Therefore, we are more corrupted in the concupiscible than in the irascible.

I answer that it must be said that the corruption and stain of original sin differ in this way, for stain pertains to fault, but corruption to punishment. (Cf. Albertus Summa de homine q. 66 a. 3.) But the original fault is said to be in a power of the soul in two ways: in one way essentially, and in another way causally. It is indeed essentially in either the soul's very essence, or else in the intellectual part, where there was original justice, of which it was deprived by original sin. However, it is causally in other powers that touch upon the act of human generation, by which original sin is handed on; however, the generative power affects this act as the one carrying it out, the concupiscible power as the one commanding it by reason of its pleasure, and the sense of touch as the one perceiving its pleasure. Therefore, among the senses, the stain is ascribed to touch, among the appetitive powers to the concupiscible, and among all the soul’s powers to the generative, which is said to be stained and corrupted. (Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, bk. 2, part 2, n. 239, p. 254; Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 31, a. 1, q. 3.)

However, the soul’s corruption, about which we are speaking, should be considered as being like bodily corruption, which indeed happens from the fact that, if one removes what contains it, the individual contrary parts tend toward what belongs to them according to nature, and so the dissolution of the body takes place. Similarly, if one removes original justice, by which reason contained the lower powers wholly subject to itself in a state of innocence, each of the lower powers tend toward what is proper to them, namely, the concupiscible tends toward the pleasurable, the irascible toward anger and other things of this kind; hence the Philosopher compares such parts of the soul to the dissolved parts of the body in the Ethics. (Aristotle, Ethics 1.20, 1102b18.) However, just as bodily corruption is not said to be in the soul, which being removed from the body, the body itself is dissolved, but instead to be in the dissolved body; so also is such corruption in the sensitive powers, inasmuch as, being deprived of reason’s holding them together, they are borne in different directions; but it is not in reason itself, except insofar as it itself is deprived of its own perfection by being separated from God. Therefore, to the extent that any of the lower powers is made to be more distant from reason, so much more is it corrupt; thus, since it pertains to the irascible to be closer to reason, as participating in some aspect of reason in its own movement, according to the Philosopher in Nichomachean Ethics, (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 7.6, 1149b1.) the irascible will be less corrupt than the concupiscible.

Reply Obj. 1: Therefore, to the first it must be said that although all the powers are rooted in the soul’s essence, yet some flow from the soul’s essence before others, and they have a different relationship to the cause of original sin; and so the corruption and stain of original sin is not similar for all of them.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that since reason’s movement is participated more in the irascible than in the concupiscible, it happens that the sins of the irascible are more serious, but the sins of the concupiscible are more ugly; for reason’s discretion increases fault, just as ignorance alleviates fault; however, a falling away from reason, in which all of human dignity consists, pertains to ugliness: hence, from this it is clear that the concupiscible is more corrupt, as departing farther from reason.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that the movement of the irascible and the concupiscible can be considered in two ways, namely as desiring and as carrying out. The motion of the concupiscible is certainly more sudden in desiring than that of the irascible, for the irascible is moved as though by deliberating and conferring regarding a received injury and an intended revenge, syllogizing, as it were, as said in the Nichomachean Ethics, (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 7.6, 1149a33.) but the concupiscible is moved to enjoyment at the mere apprehension of what is pleasurable, as it says in the same place. (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 7.6, 1149a35.) But in carrying out its motion, the irascible is more sudden than the concupiscible, since the irascible acts with a certain strength and assurance, whereas the concupiscible tends stealthily to the attainment of its goal with a certain effeminacy. Hence, the Philosopher says in the Nichomachean Ethics (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 7.7, 1149b14–17. Sec. transl. Lincolniensis (ed. Gauthier, p. 283).) that the angry man is not one who lies in ambush but is out in the open, whereas concupiscence lays traps, and he alludes to the verse of Homer who says that Venus is treacherous, and her girdle is variously adorned, signifying the deception by which Venus snatches away the understanding of even a very wise man.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that something is said to be natural in two ways: either with regard to the nature of the species or with regard to the nature of the individual. However, with regard to the nature of the species the sins of the concupiscible are more natural than the sins of the irascible, thus the Philosopher says in the Ethics (Aristotle, Ethics 2.2, 1105a1.) that sensual delight is nourished in all of us from childhood as though coexistent with life; but with respect to the individual’s nature, the sins of the irascible are more natural. This is because, if one considers the movement of the sensual appetite on the soul’s part, the concupiscible tends more naturally towards its own object, as being more natural and agreeable with respect to itself, for it regards food, drink, and other such things, by which nature is preserved. *(Cf. Arist. Ethic. III 20 (1118 b 8 sqq.).)*But if one considers movements of this kind on the body’s part, there is a greater change and bodily motion from anger’s movement than from that of concupiscence, speaking commonly and proportionately. Hence, the physical constitution, according to which most children are likened to their parents, does more for the control of anger than the control of concupiscence; and because of this children imitate their parents more in sins of anger than in sins of concupiscence; for what comes from the soul pertains to the species, but what comes from the determinate constitution of the body pertains more to the individual. However, original sin is the sin of the whole human nature. Hence, it is clear that the objection does not follow.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that corruption happens in us and in Adam according to a contrary order, for in Adam the soul corrupts the body, and the person the nature; but in us it is the inverse. Thus, although Adam’s sin would pertain first of all to the irascible power, yet in us the corruption pertains more to the concupiscible.