Article 4 — Whether sensuality obeys reason

Fourth, it is asked whether sensuality obeys reason. (Parallel texts: ST I.81.3; I-II.17.7; Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 1, lect. 20.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it does not, for in Romans 7:19 it says: for the good which I will, I do not: but the evil which I hate, that I do: (Rom. 7:19: textus conflatus ut videtur ex 7:15 et 7:19) but this is said, as a certain Gloss expounds, (It is actually the Glossa interlinearis at Rom 7:20 (in Glossa ordinaria).) due to the motion of sensuality; therefore sensuality does not obey will or reason.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it says in the same place (Rom 7:23), I see another law in my members opposed to the law of my mind: but this law is concupiscence; (Cf. Glossa interlinearis and Glossa ordinaria, at Romans 7:23, 6.99; Peter Lombard, Commentary on Romans, on Romans 7:23 (PL 191:1430C).) therefore it is opposed to the mind’s law, that is to reason, and so it does not obey it.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the appetitive powers are ordered to each other just as the apprehensive powers; but the intellect does not have the acts of the exterior senses in its power, for we do not see or hear all that the intellect determines; therefore neither are the movements of sensuality in the power of the rational appetite.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, what is natural in us is not subject to reason; but sensuality tends by a natural impulse toward its own desirable thing; therefore the movement of sensuality is not subject to reason.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the movements of sensuality are the soul’s passions, for which determinate dispositions of the body are required, as Avicenna shows; (Cf. Avicenna, On the Soul, bk. 4, ch. 6.) for as hot and subtle blood is to anger so is duly proportioned blood to joy; but bodily disposition is not subject to reason; therefore neither is the motion of sensuality.

On the contrary is what Damascene says, (Cf. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 12 (PG 94:928C).) that the irascible and the concupiscible, which are parts of sensuality, participate in reason in some way; therefore the motion of sensuality is also in the power of reason. The same thing is found in what the Philosopher says in the Nichomachean Ethics; (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 1.20, 1102b30.) and in Gregory of Nyssa. (Actually Nemesius (Pseudo-Gregory of Nyssa), On the Nature of Man, ch. 16 (PG 40:672B); ch. 17 (PG 40:676B).)

I answer that it must be said that in the order of movers and the moved one must come to something first which is moving itself, by which is moved what is not moved by itself; for all that is through another is reduced to what is through itself, as is shown in the Phyics. (Aristotle, Physics 8.9, 256a4.) Thus, since the will moves itself insofar as it is lord over its own acts, (Above: q. 22, a. 5, ad 7; Aristotle, Ethics 3.1, 1110a17; cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 6, a. 1, s.c. 3; Nemesius, On the Nature of Man, ch. 41 (PG 40:776A).) other powers which do not move themselves must be moved by it in some way. However, each of the other powers participates more in its motions to the extent that it is closer to it. Hence, the lower appetites obey the will with regard to their primary actions, as being closest to it, though the other more remote powers, such as the nutritive and generative, are moved by the will with regard to their exterior acts.

However, the lower appetites, namely the irascible and the concupiscible, are subject to reason in three ways: the first is on the part of reason itself; for since the same thing, considered under different conditions, is able to be rendered delightful or dreadful, reason sets up some thing opposite to sensuality by means of imagination, but under the notion of being delightful or able to cause sadness, according as how it appears to it; and thus sensuality is moved to either joy or sadness; for this reason the Philosopher says in the Nichomachean Ethics, (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 1.20, 1102b15.) that reason persuades to what is best.

The second is on the part of the will: for among powers that are conjoined and ordered to one another, an intense motion in one of them, especially in one that is higher, overflows into another; thus, since by choice the movement of the will intends regarding some thing, the irascible and the concupiscible also follow the will’s movement. Hence, it is said in On the Soul, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.11, 434a13.) that one appetite moves another appetite, namely the higher moves the lower, just as one sphere moves another sphere among the heavenly bodies.

The third is on the part of the movement of the one carrying out the act; for just as in an army the going forth into battle rests on the general’s order, so also in us, the motive power does not move the members, for whatever kind of motion that occurs in the lower powers, except at the command of what rules within us, namely reason. Hence, reason restrains the irascible and the concupiscible powers so that they do not engage in an external act; it is for this reason that it says in Genesis 4:7 its desire shall be under you. (Above: q. 22, a. 9, ad 6; ST I-II.10.3, s.c.; I-II.77.3, obj. 3; II-III.58.2, obj. 2; Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 28, a. 1, q. 2, arg. 1.)

Thus it is clear that the irascible and the concupiscible are subject to reason, and likewise sensuality, even though the name sensuality pertains to these powers not inasmuch as they participate in reason, but with regard to the nature of the sensitive part. Thus, being subject to reason is not as properly said of sensuality as it is of the irascible and the concupiscible.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that the quotation from the Apostle should be understood in this respect, that it is not universally in our power to impede all the inordinate motions of sensuality, even though we are able to impede individual ones, as is clear from what was said. (Above: q. 24, a. 12.)

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that sensuality, with respect to itself, is opposed to reason; yet reason is able to restrain it, as is clear from what was said.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that even the lower apprehensive power obey the higher, as is clear with imagination and the other interior senses; but that the exterior senses do not obey reason comes from the fact that the exterior sensation needs sensible thing in order to sense, without which it cannot engage in activity.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that the lower appetite does not naturally tend toward anything except after it is proposed to itself under the notion of its proper object, as is clear from what was said. (Above: a. 1.) Thus, since it is in reason’s power to propose one and the same thing under different notions, as for example food being both pleasurable and deadly, it can move sensuality toward different notions.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that the bodily disposition which pertains to the body’s complexion is not subject to reason; but this is not required in order for the aforementioned passions to be in act, but rather that man be fit for them. However, the actual change of the body, such as the rising of blood around the heart, (Cf. Arist. De anima I 1 (403 a 30) sec. transl. veterem (ed. Alonso, p. 93,1).) or something else of this kind which accompany such passions in act, follows upon the imagination, and because of this it is subject to reason.