Article 3 — Whether the irascible and the concupiscible are only in the lower appetite, or also in the higher appetite

Third, it is asked whether the irascible and the concupiscible are only in the lower appetite, or also in the higher appetite. (Parallel texts: ST I.59.4; I.82.5; In III Sent., d. 17, a. 1, qa. 3; Commentary On The Soul, bk. III, lect. 14.)

Obj. 1: It seems that they are also in the higher, for the higher appetite extends to more things than the lower appetite, since it concerns bodily and spiritual things; therefore, if the lower appetite is divided into two powers, namely into the irascible and concupiscible, much more should the higher be divided.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever powers belong to the soul with respect to itself pertain to the higher part, for the lower powers are common to the body and the soul; but the irascible and the concupiscible belong to the soul with respect to itself, hence it is said in the book On the Spirit and the Soul (Pseudo-Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux), On the Spirit and the Soul, ch. 13 (PL 40:789).) that the soul possesses these powers before it is mixed up with the body, if indeed they are natural to it and nothing more besides it; for the entire, full, and perfect substance of the soul consists in these three things, namely in rationality, in concupiscibility, and irascibility; therefore, the irascible and the concupiscible pertain to the higher appetite.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the book On the Soul (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 413b25.) and the Metaphysics, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 11.3, 1070a24.) only part of the rational soul is separable from the body; but the irascible and the concupiscible remain in the separated soul, as is said in the book On the Spirit and the Soul; (Pseudo-Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux), On the Spirit and the Soul, ch. 15 (PL 40:791).) therefore the irascible and the concupiscible pertain to the rational part.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the image of the Trinity should be looked for in the higher part of the soul; but according to some that image is assigned to the rational, the irascible, and the concupiscible powers; (Pseudo-Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux), On the Spirit and the Soul, ch. 13 (PL 40:489) as referred by Albert the Great, In I Sent., d. 3, a. 38.) therefore the irascible and the concupiscible pertain to the higher part.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, charity is said to be in the concupiscible, but hope in the irascible; however charity and hope are not in the sensitive appetite, which is not able to extend to the immaterial; therefore the irascible and the concupiscible powers are not only in the lower appetite but also in the higher appetite.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, those powers that man possesses above the other animals are called human powers, which pertain to the soul’s higher part; but the irascible is distinguished into two by the teachers, (As referred by Albert the Great, In III Sent., d. 26, a. 3; cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 3, tract. 2, ch. 3, q. 2.) namely the human and the non-human, and similarly with the concupiscible; therefore the previously mentioned powers are not only in the lower appetite but also in the higher.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, the activities of the sensitive powers, both of the appetitive and the apprehensive, do not remain in the separated soul, inasmuch as they are exercised through the body’s organs; otherwise the sensitive soul in brute beasts would be incorruptible, such that it would have its activity through its very self. But joy and sadness, love and fear, and other such things attributed to the irascible and the concupiscible powers remain in the separated soul; therefore, the irascible and the concupiscible are not only in the sensitive part, but also in the intellectual part.

On the contrary is that John Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 12 (PG 94:928C).) Gregory of Nyssa, (Actually Nemesius (Pseudo-Gregory of Nyssa), On the Nature of Man, ch. 16 (PG 40:672B); ch. 17 (PG 40:676B).) and the Philosopher (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.14, 432b6.) all hold them to be in sensitive appetite alone.

I answer that it must be said that since the acts of the appetitive parts presuppose the act of the apprehensive parts, the distinction between the appetites is in some way similar to the distinction between the apprehensive powers. However, we find among the apprehensive powers that the higher apprehensive power remains one and undivided in relation to the rest, but that the lower apprehensive powers are distinguished in relation to it. For by one intellectual power we know all sensible things according to their natures, in light of which the sensitive powers are distinguished: hence according to Augustine (Cf. Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 10 (PL 42:1071).) what hears and sees exteriorly is different, whereas it is the same interiorly. It is similarly the case with the appetitive powers, since the higher appetitive power is one in relation to all desirable things, although the lower appetitive powers are distinguished according to the diversity of desirable things.

The reason for this comes from both sides, for the higher power has a universal object, but the lower powers have particular objects. However, many things belong to particulars through themselves, which are related to the universal accidentally; therefore, since an accidental difference does not distinguish a species, but only what is through itself, the lower powers are found to be distinct according to species where the higher power remains undivided; as is manifest with the intellect’s object, that it is the “what it is” of a thing; (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 3.6, 430b28.) thus by the same power the intellect extends to all things that possess a whatness, and neither is it made to be distinct by any differences that do not distinguish the account of the thing’s whatness.

But since the body is the object of sense, which has such a nature as to move the organ of sense, the sensitive powers must be distinguished according to the different notions of being moved: thus the powers of sight and hearing are different, for color and sound move the sense according to a different account. It is likewise the case on the part of the appetitive powers, for the object of the higher appetite, as has been said above, (Above: a. 1.) is the absolute good, but the object of the lower appetite is the thing that is in some way beneficial for the animal.

However, what is difficult and what is delightful are not agreeable for the animal according to the same notion, as is clear from what was said. (Above: a. 2.) And thus the object of the lower appetite is essentially distinguished by this, but not the object of the higher appetite, which tends to the good in any way whatsoever, taken absolutely.

It must be known, nevertheless, that just as the intellect has a certain activity with regard to the same things upon which the senses act, though in a more elevated way, since it knows universally and immaterially what sensation knows materially and particularly, so also does the higher appetite have an activity regarding the same things as the lower appetites, though in a more elevated way. For the lower appetites tend toward their objects materially and with a bodily passion, from which passion the names "irascible" and "concupiscible" are imposed; however, the higher appetite possesses certain acts that are similar to the lower appetite, but without any passion. Thus the activities of the higher appetite are sometimes given the names of the passions; as when the will for revenge is called anger (Aristotle, Ethics 4.13, 1126a6; John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 16 (PG 94:932D) according to Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 2, obj. 3; Augustine, Confessions, bk. 2, ch. 6 (PL 32:681), according to ST I-II.46.2, s.c. 1.) and the will’s resting upon something lovable is called love; and for the same reason the will itself which produces these acts is sometimes called irascible and concupiscible, not however properly but by a certain likeness; nevertheless, it is not the case that there are certain diverse powers within the will similar to the irascible and the concupiscible powers.

Reply Obj. 1: Thus, to the first it must be said that although the higher appetite extends to more than the lower, yet since it has the universal good as its proper object, it is not divided into many powers.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that that book is not Augustine’s nor should it be taken as an authority; nevertheless, it can be said that it either speaks of the irascible and the concupiscible with figurative speech or that it speaks with respect to the origin of the powers, for all the powers, even the sensitive, flow from the soul’s essence.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that there are two opinions with regard to the sensitive powers of the soul: for some say that they remain in the separated soul according to essence, (Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 4, d. 44, ch. 7.) but others that they remain in the soul’s essence as in a root. But whichever way one speaks, the irascible and the concupiscible do not remain in any other way than do the other sensitive powers; hence even in the previously mentioned book, (Pseudo-Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux), On the Spirit and the Soul, ch. 15 (PL 40:791).) it says that the soul withdrawing from the body brings with itself sense and imagination.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that in the book On the Trinity (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 11, cc. 2–5 (PL 42:985–92); cf. above: q. 10, a. 7, resp.) Augustine is investigating the many ways that the Trinity is within our soul, in which there is some likeness of the uncreated Trinity, even though the true notion of image is only in the mind; and by reason of the aforementioned likeness some place the image in the rational, the irascible, and the concupiscible, though this is not said properly.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that charity and hope are not in the irascible and the concupiscible properly speaking, for the love of charity and the expectation of hope are without passion; but charity is said to be in the concupiscible inasmuch as it is in the will as having acts similar to the concupiscible; and hope is said to be in the irascible for a similar reason.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that the irascible and the concupiscible are said to be human or rational not by essence, as though they pertain to the higher part, but rather by participation, inasmuch as they obey reason and participate in its rule, as Damascene also says. (Cf. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 12 (PG 94:928C).)

Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that joy and fear, which are passions, do not remain in the separated soul, for they are brought about together with a bodily change; but the will’s acts remain similar to those passions.