Article 2 — Whether sensuality is one simple power, or else is divided into many powers, namely into the irascible and the concupiscible

Second, it is asked whether sensuality is one simple power, or else is divided into many powers, namely into the irascible and the concupiscible. (Parallel texts: ST I.81.2; I.83.5; In III Sent., d. 26, q. 1, a. 2; Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 8, a. 3; Commentary On the Soul, bk. 3, lect. 14.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it is one simple power, not divided into many powers, since in the definition of sensuality it is called a certain lower power of the soul; (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 24, ch. 4.) which would not have been said if it contained many powers within itself; therefore, it seems that it is not divided into many powers.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the same power of the soul pertains to one contrariety, like sight being of black and white, as it says in On the Soul; (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.11, 422b24.) but what is agreeable and what is harmful are contraries, (Cf. Avicenna, On the Soul, bk. 1, ch. 5; bk. 4, ch. 4.) therefore the same power of the soul is concerned with both of them. But the concupiscible is concerned with the agreeable, whereas the irascible is concerned with the harmful; therefore the irascible and the concupiscible are the same power, and so sensuality is not divided into many powers.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, by the same power something recedes from one extreme and draws near to another, just as a stone by reason of its heaviness recedes from a higher place and draws near to a lower place. (This example is from Aristotle, Ethics 2.1, 1103a20; cf. ST I-II.71.2, obj. 2.) But the soul recedes from what is harmful by means of the irascible power, fleeing from it, whereas it draws near to what is agreeable by means of the concupiscible power, by desiring it; therefore, the irascible and the concupiscible are the same power of the soul, and so the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the proper object of joy is what is agreeable; however, there is no joy except in the concupiscible power; therefore the proper object of the concupiscible is what is agreeable. But what is agreeable is the object of the whole of sensuality, as is clear from the definition of sensuality expounded above; for the things pertaining to the body are things agreeable to the body; therefore, the whole of sensuality is nothing other than the concupiscible power: thus, either the irascible and the concupiscible are the same, or the irascible does not pertain to sensuality; and whichever of these is granted, the conclusion follows that sensuality is one simple power.

Obj. 5: But one might respond that the object of sensuality is also the harmful or the disagreeable, with which the irascible is concerned.

On the contrary, just as the agreeable is the object of joy, so also is the harmful or the disagreeable the object of sadness. But both joy and sadness are in the concupiscible power; therefore, both the agreeable and the harmful are the object of the concupiscible power; and so whatever is the object of sensuality is also the object of the concupiscible; thus the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, the sensible appetite presupposes apprehension; but the agreeable and the harmful are apprehended by the same apprehensive power; therefore, the same appetitive power is related to both of them, and so the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, according to Augustine hate is deep-seated anger; (Cf. Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Ps 54:4, para. 7 (PL 36:632); Sermon 49, ch. 7 (PL 38:324); Sermon 58, ch. 7 (PL 38:397); Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, bk. 4, ch. 9, n. 21; ST I-II.46.3, obj. 2.) but hate is in the concupiscible appetite, as is proved in the Topics; (Aristotle, Topics 2.7, 113a33.) for love is in the same power, but anger is in the irascible; therefore the irascible and the concupiscible are the same power: for otherwise anger could not be in both of them.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, that which in the soul belongs to any power whatsoever does not require a determinate power distinct from the others; but to desire pertains to each of the soul’s powers, which is manifest from the fact that any of the soul’s powers delights in and desires its own object; therefore, a power for desiring ought not to be designated as distinct from the others, and so the concupiscible is not a power distinct from the irascible.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, powers are distinguished according to their acts; but the concupiscible is included in any act of the irascible, for anger has a desire for revenge, (Aristotle, Ethics 4.13, 1126a6; John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 16 (PG 94:932D); Augustine, Confessions, bk. 2, ch. 6 (PL 32:681).) and likewise for the rest; therefore, the concupiscible is not a power distinct from the irascible.

On the contrary (1) is that in the second book (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 12 (PG 94:928C).) Damascene distinguishes the sensitive appetite into the irascible and the concupiscible, and Gregory of Nyssa writes similarly in the book On the Soul and its Powers; (Cf. Nemesius (Pseudo-Gregory of Nyssa), On the Nature of Man, ch. 16 (PG 40:672B); ch. 17 (PG 40:676B).) however, the lower appetite is sensuality; therefore, sensuality contains many powers within itself.

Furthermore (2), in the book On the Spirit and the Soul (Pseudo-Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux), On the Spirit and the Soul ch. 4 (PL 40:781); ch. 13 (PL 40:789).) these three motive powers are distinguished, the rational, the concupscible, and the irascible; but the rational is a power other than the irascible; and so also is the irascible other than the concupiscible.

Furthermore (3), the Philosopher also places desire and spiritedness, that is the concupiscible and the irascible, within the sensitive appetite in On the Soul. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.14, 432b6.)

I answer that it must be said that sensuality’s appetite contains these two powers, namely the irascible and the concupiscible, which powers are different from each other; which can indeed be seen in the following way:

The sensitive appetite possesses a certain agreement with the natural appetite, inasmuch as both tend toward the thing that is agreeable to the one desiring. However, the natural appetite tends toward two things according to the natural thing's two activities: one of these is that by which the natural thing seeks to acquire what conserves its own nature, such as the heavy thing that is moved downward so as to be preserved there; (Cf. Arist. e. g. Phys. II 15 (200 a 2).) another is that by which the natural thing destroys its contrary by means of an active quality; and this is indeed necessary for the corruptible thing since, unless it were to have the power to overcome its contrary, it would be corrupted by it.

Hence, the natural appetite tends to two things, namely, to attaining what is agreeable and friendly to its nature, and to having a certain victory over whatever stands against it; the first of these is, as it were, in the mode of reception, whereas the second is in the mode of action; hence they also are reduced to two different principles: for to receive and to act are not from the same principle, such as fire which, borne upwards by lightness, corrupts its contrary by means of heat. (exemplum Arist. Topic. I c. 7 (103 a 29), Phys. II 1 (192 b 36) et passim.) So also are these two found to exist in the sensitive appetite: for an animal desires by the appetitive power what is agreeable and friendly toward its nature, and this happens by means of the concupiscible power whose proper object is what is desirable according to sense; it also desires to have dominance and victory over the things that are contrary to itself, and this is through the irascible power; hence, it is said that its object is something difficult. (Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, bk. 2, part 1, inq. 4, tract. 1, sect. 2, q. 2, tit. 2, memb. 2, n. 367, 2:445; Albert the Great, Summa de homine, q. 67, a. 2; Bonaventure, In III Sent., d. 26, a. 2, q. 4.)

And so it is clear that the irascible is a power other than the concupiscible, for something possesses a different notion of desirability from the fact that it is desirable, than from the fact that it is difficult; for sometimes what is difficult separates from pleasure and intermingles with sorrowful things, as when an animal, abandoning the pleasure with which it was idling itself, engages in combat and does not withdraw on account of the pains that it endures.

Hence one of them, namely the concupiscible power, seems to have been ordered in such a way as to be receptive: for this power desires such that what is pleasing to it might be joined to itself; but the other power, namely the irascible, is directed toward acting, for it overcomes what is harmful or contrary to itself by means of some action, thus putting itself in a higher position of victory over it. However, it belongs to the powers of the soul in common that receiving and acting should pertain to different powers, as is clear from the agent intellect and the potential intellect. For this reason also, according to Avicenna, (Cf. De anima IV c. 6 (f. 21vb A).) strength and weakness of heart pertain to the irascible power, as to the power that is directed toward action, but its expansion and constriction pertain to the concupiscible, as to the power ordered toward receiving.

Therefore, it is clear from what has been said that the irascible power is ordered in some way to the concupiscible power, as being its protector; for this power is necessary in order for the animal to attain victory over what is contrary to it, so that the concupiscible might obtain what it desires without impediment. A sign of this is that there is conflict between animals for the sake of what is pleasurable, namely for food and sex, as it says in History of Animals. (It is actually Aristotle, History of Animals 9.1, 608b19; 6.18, 571b8–572b24; see Albert the Great, De animalibus, bk. 8, tract. 1, ch. 2, n. 8 sqq.; bk. 6, tract. 3, ch. 1, n. 97 sqq.) That is why all the passions of the irascible power have both their beginning and end in the concupiscible power; for anger begins from some afflicting sadness within the concupiscible power, and it ends in joy, once revenge has been attained, which is also in the concupiscible power; and similarly hope begins from desire or love and ends in delight.

It should also be known that both on the side of the apprehensive powers as well as on the side of the appetitive powers of the sensitive part, there is something that belongs to the sensitive soul according to its own nature, but something else that belongs to it inasmuch as it possesses some small participation in reason, attaining as it does at its highest part to what is lowest in reason; as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7, para. 3 (PG 3:872B).) that divine wisdom joins the ends of primary things to the beginnings of secondary things. In the same way, the imaginative power belongs to the sensible soul according to its own account, since the forms that are received through sense are kept within it; whereas the estimative power, (Cf. Avicenna, On the Soul, bk. 1, ch. 5.) by which an animal apprehends intentions not received through sense, such as friendship and enmity, is within the sensitive soul inasmuch as it participates something of reason. Hence, animals are said to have a kind of prudence by reason of this estimative power, as is clear in the beginning of the Metaphysics, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1, 980b21.) such as when the sheep flees the wolf, whose enmity it never feels. (Cf. Avicenna, On the Soul, bk. 1, ch. 5; bk. 4, ch. 3.) It is similarly the case on the side of the appetitive power. For that an animal desires what is pleasurable according to sense, which pertains to the concupiscible power, is in accord with the proper notion of the sensitive soul; however, that having abandoned what is pleasurable it should desire something for the sake of victory, which it wins with pain and which pertains to the irascible power, belongs to it inasmuch as it attains in some way to a higher appetite. Hence, the irascible is closer to reason and will than the concupiscible; and because of this, unbridled anger is less ugly than unbridled concupiscence, as being less deprived of reason, as the Philosopher says in the Nicomachean Ethics 2. (It is actually Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.6, 1149b1.)

Therefore, it is clear from what has been said that the irascible and the concupiscible are different powers, and what is the object of both, and how the irascible helps the concupiscible, and that it is superior and more worthy than it, just as the estimative power is among the other apprehensive powers of the sensitive part.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that sensuality is said to be a power singularly because it is one of its kind, even though it is divided into other species or parts.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that both the agreeable thing that delights as well as the harmful thing that causes sadness pertain to the concupiscible power, according as one is to be fled and the other pursued. But to have a certain loftiness over both of them, namely such that what is harmful is able to be overcome and what is pleasing is able to be possessed with some security, pertains to the irascible power.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that to draw back from what is harmful and to approach what is pleasing both pertain to the concupiscible; but to fight against and overcome what can be harmful pertains to the irascible.

Reply Obj. 4–5: From this the response to the fourth and the fifth is also clear, for what is agreeable is the object of the concupiscible inasmuch as it is pleasing; but it is the object of the whole of sensuality inasmuch as it is in some way profitable to the animal, either by way of the arduous or by way of the pleasurable.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that it belongs to the same appetitive concupiscible power to pursue what is agreeable and to flee what is disagreeable; hence the irascible and concupiscible powers are not distinguished by the agreeable and the harmful, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that when it is said that hate is deep-seated anger, it is a predication through the cause and not through the essence; for the passions of the irascible terminate in the passions of the concupiscible, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that to crave with an animal appetite pertains to the concupiscible power alone, but to crave with a natural appetite pertains to any power; for any power of the soul is a certain nature and is naturally inclined toward something: and one must similarly distinguish regarding love, delight, and other such things.

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that in the definition of the passions of the irascible power is placed the common act of the appetitive power, namely to desire; however, it does not pertain to the concupiscible power except as a beginning or an end, as when one says that anger is the appetite for revenge because of a preceding affliction.