Article 1 — Whether grace is something positively created in the soul.

The question is on grace. First, it is asked whether grace is something positively created in the soul. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 26, a. 1; ST I-II.110.1; SCGIII.150.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it is not, for according to Augustine, as the soul is the body's life, so is God the life of the soul; (E. g. Enarr. in Ps. 50:17 (PL 36, 893), Sermo 62 c. 1 (PL 38, 415), Sermo 65 c. 4 (PL 38, 428), Serma 161 c. 6 (PL 38, 881), Sermo 180 c. 7 (PL 38, 976), Sermo 273c. 1 (PL 38, 1247), cf. etiam De civ. Dei XIII c. 2 (PL 41, 377), ibid. XIX c. 26 (PL 41, 656).) but the soul is the body's life by means of no other form; therefore it is similarly the case with God and the soul; and so the life that is by grace does not exist by any created form existing in the soul.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, sanctifying grace, of which we are speaking, seems to be nothing else than that according to which man is made pleasing to God; but a man is said to be pleasing to God inasmuch as he is accepted by God: but one is said to be accepted by God's acceptance, which is indeed something within God himself, as when someone is said to be acceptable to another man not by something that is in the one being accepted, but by an acceptance that is in the one doing the accepting; therefore grace places nothing in man but in God alone.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, we draw closer to God by spiritual being of grace than by natural being; but God caused natural being in us by no other intermediate cause, for he created us immediately; therefore, he also causes gratuitous spiritual being in us by nothing else mediating, and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, grace is a kind of health of the soul; (cf. Alex. Halensis Glossa in Lib. Sent. II d. 26 nota 2 (p. 243).) but health seems to place nothing else in the healthy person than the balanced humors themselves; (Cf. Avicenna, Canon medicinae, bk. 1, fen. 1, doctrine 4, ch. 1; Averroes, Metaphysics, bk. 5, comm. 25; Moses Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, part 3, ch. 11.) thus, grace also does not place any form in the soul, but it presupposes that the soul's powers are balanced by an equality of justice.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, grace seems to be nothing else than a certain liberality; for it seems to be the same thing to give gratuitously as to give liberally; yet liberality is not in the one receiving but in the one giving; thus grace is in God, who gives his good things to us, but it is not in us.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, no creature is more noble than Christ's soul; but grace is more noble than it, for Christ's soul is ennobled by grace; therefore, grace is not something created in the soul.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, truth is related to the intellect as grace is to the affections; but according to Anselm, (Anselm, De veritate, ch. 13 (PL 158:486C); ut dicitur supra q. 1 a. 4) there is one truth which all intellects understand; thus also is there one grace by which all affections are perfected: but nothing created as one can exist in many things; therefore grace is not something created.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, nothing is in a genus except what is composed; however, grace is not composed, but rather of a simple form; thus it is not in a genus: but everything created is in a genus; therefore grace is not something created.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, if grace is something in the soul, it seems to be nothing else than a habit; for there are three things in the soul according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 2.4, 1105b20.) power, habit, and passion: but grace is not a power since it would then be natural; neither is it a passion since then it would primarily regard the irrational part; and again, neither is it a habit, for a habit is a quality that is able to be moved with difficulty, according to the Philosopher in the Categories, (Aristotle, Categories 8, 9a4; cf. Peter of Spain, Summulae logicales, tract. 3, n. 23.) whereas grace is easily removed, since it is by one act of mortal sin; therefore grace is not something that is in the soul.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, according to Augustine, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 3, ch. 8 (PL 42:876); cf. above, q. 11 a. 3.) nothing falls in the middle between our soul and God. But grace falls in the middle between our soul and God, for our soul is united to God by grace; therefore grace is not something created.

Obj. 11: Furthermore, man is more noble and more perfect than the other creatures; but there is not something that is applied to the other creatures beyond their natural gifts, so that they are made acceptable to God, since they have been approved by God according to Genesis 1:31, God saw all that he had made, and it was very good; therefore, neither is something added to man over and above his natural gifts according to which he is said to be acceptable to God; and so grace is not something that exists positively in the soul.

On the contrary (1) is what is said in the Gloss (Vulgate: Psalm 103:15; Glossa ordinaria, at Ps 103:15, 3.1231; Peter Lombard, Commentary on the Psalms, at Ps 103:15 (PL 191:936A); from Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, at Ps 103:15, sermon 3 (PL 37:1369).) on Psalm 104:15: that he might make his face shine with oil: that grace is a certain splendor of the soul, winning over holy love. But splendor is something positively in the soul, since it is created; therefore, it is also the case with grace.

Furthermore (2), God is said to be in the saints by grace in some special way beyond other creatures; but God is not said to be in anything in a new way except because of some effect; therefore grace is some effect of God in the soul.

Furthermore (3), Damascene (Non invenimus. Cf. tamen Alex. Halensis Glossa in Lib. Sent. II d. 26 nota 1 (p. 243)) says that grace is the soul's pleasure; but pleasure is something created in the soul; therefore, grace is as well.

Furthermore (4), every action comes from some form; but meritorious action is from grace; therefore grace is some form in the soul.

I answer that it must be said that the name of grace is usually taken in two ways: in one way for something that is given gratuitously, as we are accustomed to say: I give you this favor; in another way for the acceptance by which one is made to be dear to another, as when we say: he has the king's graces, for he is dear to the king. Both of these meanings have a certain order between them; for something is not given gratuitously except insofar as the one to whom it is given is in some way held dear.

In the same way, we say that there are two kinds of grace in divine things, one of which is called gratuitous grace, such as the gifts of prophecy, wisdom, and the like, about which we are not concerned right now, since it is clear that such gifts are something created in the soul; but the other is called sanctifying grace, according to which a man is said to be dear to God, and about which we are now speaking. That this grace places something in God is manifest: for it places an act of the divine will accepting this man; but there was a doubt for some (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 1, d. 17, ch. 1, according to Aquinas, In I Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 1.) as to whether it places something together with this in the man who is held to be dear, namely for those asserting that such a grace is nothing created in the soul but only something in God. But this cannot be.

For that God accepts or loves someone, which is the same, is nothing else than to will him some good. But God wills to all creatures the good of nature, for which reason he is said to love all things, Wisdom 11:25: you love all things that exist and so on, and to approve all things, Genesis 1:31: God saw all that he had made and so on. Yet we are not accustomed to say that someone has God's grace by reason of this acceptance, rather, inasmuch as God wills him a supernatural good, which is eternal life, as it says in Isaiah 64:4: no eye has seen, O God, apart from you, what you have prepared for those who love you. Thus, in Romans 6:23 it says: the grace of God is eternal life.

But God does not will this good to anyone unworthy. However, man is not worthy by nature for so great a good, since it is above nature; and thus, from the fact that someone is held to be dear to God with respect to this good, it is held that there is something in him by which he is worthy for such a good above his natural gifts; but this certainly does not move the divine will such that it orders man to that good, rather the converse is true: from the very fact that God, by his own will, orders someone to eternal life, he presents him with something by which he is made worthy for eternal life. This is what is said in Colossians 1:12: who made us worthy to share in the inheritance of the saints in light. The reason for this is that just as God's knowledge is the cause of things, not being caused by things as ours is, so also is his will the originator of goodness, and not caused by goodness as ours is.

Therefore, man is said to have God's grace in this way, not only from the fact that he is loved by God with respect to eternal life, but from the fact that some gift is given to him by which he is made worthy for eternal life; and this gift is said to be sanctifying grace. Otherwise, even someone in mortal sin could be said to be in a state of grace if grace only meant divine acceptance, since it can happen that some sinner is predestined to possess eternal life. Thus, sanctifying grace can also be called gratuitous grace, but the converse is not true, for not every gift of gratuitous grace makes us to be worthy of eternal life.

Reply Obj. 1: Thus, to the first it must be said that the soul is the formal cause of bodily life; hence it makes the body to live by means of no form. But God makes the soul to live not as a formal cause but as an efficient cause; thus there is a form that falls in the middle, as when a painter makes a wall to be effectively white by means of an intermediary whiteness, but whiteness does it by means of no intermediary form, for it makes it to be white formally.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that the acceptance itself which is in the divine will with respect to the eternal good produces in the acceptable man something by which he is made worthy to attain that good, which does not happen in the case of human acceptance; and in this case sanctifying grace is something created in the soul.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that God causes natural being in us by creation without the mediation of any agent cause, but rather by the mediation of some formal cause; for a natural form is the principle of natural being. Similarly, God causes gratuitous spiritual being in us without the mediation of any agent, but rather by the mediation of some created form, which is grace.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that health is a certain bodily quality caused from balanced humors, (Cf. Aristotle, Categories, ch. 8, 8b37.) for it is placed in the first species of quality, and so the argument proceeds from a false premise.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that from God's very liberality, by which he wishes an eternal good for us, it follows that there is something in us given by him, by which good we are made to be worthy.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that no creature is simply more noble than Christ's soul; but every accident of the soul is more noble than it in a certain respect, inasmuch as it is compared to it as its form. Or it can be said that grace is not more noble than Christ inasmuch as it is a creature, but rather inasmuch as it is a certain likeness of divine goodness that is more pronounced than the natural likeness which in Christ's soul.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that there is one first uncreated truth, yet by which many truths, being likenesses of the first truth, are caused in created minds, as the Gloss (Glossa interlinearis, at Ps 11:2 (in Glossa ordinaria 3.511); Peter Lombard, Commentary on the Psalms, at Ps 11:2 (PL 191:155A); from Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, at Ps 11:2 (PL 36:138).) says in Psalm 11:2: truths are diminished from among the children of men. Similarly, there is one uncreated goodness, of which there are many likenesses in created minds by a participation in grace. Nevertheless, it must be known that grace is not related to the affections in the same way that truth is to the intellect; for truth is to the intellect as an object, but grace is to the affections as a molding form. But it can happen that there is the same object of different things, though not the same form.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that everything in the genus of substance is composed by a real composition, inasmuch as what is in the category of substance subsists in its own being, and it is necessary that its existence is other than itself; otherwise it would not be able to differ with respect to existence from other things with which it agrees in the definition of its own whatness, which is required for all things that are directly in a category; therefore, all that is directly in the category of substance is at least composed of existence and what it is. (Boetius, Hebdomads rules 2, 5 [1, 4] (PL 64:1311):)

Nevertheless, some things are in the category of substance by reduction, as are the principles of subsistence of a substance, in which the previously mentioned composition is not found; for these do not subsist, and so they do not properly have existence. Similarly, since accidents do not subsist, it does not properly belong to them to exist, but the subject exists in some way with respect to them, and so they are more properly said to be of a being rather than beings. (cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.9, 1017a19; ibid. 7.1, 1028a18.) Therefore, in order for something to be in some category of accident, it is not necessary that it be composed by a real composition, but only by a composition of reason out of genus and difference, and such a composition is found in grace.

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that although grace is lost by one act of mortal sin, yet grace is not lost easily, for it is not easy for the one possessing grace to exercise that act, because of the inclination to the contrary, as the Philosopher also says in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 5.15, 1137a17.) that it is difficult for the just man to do injustice.

Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that nothing falls in the middle between our mind and God, neither as an efficient cause, since it is created and justified immediately by God; nor as an object that makes it blessed, for the soul is made to be blessed from the enjoyment itself of God: but something can be in the middle formally, by which the soul is made similar to God.

Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that some irrational creatures are accepted by God only with respect to natural goods; thus, the divine acceptance adds nothing to them beyond their natural condition, by which they are made proportionate to such goods: but man is accepted by God with respect to a supernatural good; and thus something is required to be added above and beyond his natural gifts, by which he is made proportionate to another good.