Article 4 — Whether the sacraments of the New Law are causes of grace

Fourth, it is asked whether the sacraments of the New Law are causes of grace. (Parallel texts: In IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qa. 1; d. 18, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 1, ad 1; ST I-II.112.1, ad 2; III.62.1; SCG IV.57; Quodlibet, bk. 12, q. 10; Commentary on Galatians, ch. 2, lect. 4; On the Articles of Faith and on the Sacraments of the Church.)

Obj. 1: It seems that they are not, for as Bernard says in the sermon On the Lord's Supper, (N. 2 (PL 183, 272 A).) just as a canon is invested with a book, an abbot with his staff, and a bishop with his ring, so are divisions of graces given over to various sacraments; but the book is not the cause of becoming a canon, nor the staff of the abbacy, nor the ring of the episcopacy; therefore, neither are the sacraments causes of grace.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, if a sacrament is a cause of grace, it is either primary or else instrumental; but it is not primary, since God alone is a cause of grace in this way, as has been said; (A. 3.) nor again is it instrumental, for every instrument has some natural activity, concerning which it acts instrumentally; however, since a sacrament is something bodily, it cannot have any natural activity with regard to the soul that is receptive of grace; and so it cannot be an instrumental cause of grace.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every active cause is either perfective or dispositive, as is had in the sayings of Avicenna; (Cf. Avicenna, Sufficientia, bk. 1, ch. 10.) but a sacrament is not a perfective cause of grace, for then it would be a primary cause of grace; nor again is it dispositive, for the disposition toward grace is in the same thing in which there is grace, namely in the soul, to which a bodily thing does not attain. Therefore a sacrament is in no way a cause of grace.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, if it is a cause of grace, it is either by its own power or else by something added beyond it: it is not by its own power, for then any water whatsoever would make something to be holy just like the water of baptism; similarly, it is not by any power added beyond it, for anything received in another is received in the mode of the receiver; and thus since the sacrament is the material element, as Hugh of Saint Victor says, (Cf. Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments, bk. 1, part 9, ch. 1-2 (PL 176:317D).) it only receives a material power, which is not sufficient for the production of a spiritual form; therefore, a sacrament is in no way a cause of grace.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the power received into the material element will be either corporeal or incorporeal: if it is incorporeal, since it is a kind of accident and its subject is a body, it will be an accident more noble than its subject, for the incorporeal is more noble than the corporeal. However, if it is a bodily power and causes grace, which is a spiritual and incorporeal form, it would follow that the effect is more noble than the cause, which is also impossible; therefore is it impossible that a sacrament causes grace.

Obj. 6: If one might say that such a superadded power is not complete in any species, but is rather something incomplete.

On the contrary, what is incomplete cannot be the cause of what is complete; however, grace is something complete; therefore, such an incomplete power cannot be the cause of grace.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, a perfect agent should have a perfect instrument; but the sacraments act as the instruments of God, who is the most perfect agent. Therefore, they should be perfect, and thus have a perfect power.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, (Cf. Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 1, part 1, a. 1, q. 4, contra 6.) according to Dionysius in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 5, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 5, para. 4 (PG 3:504C).) it is the law of divinity to conduct intermediary things by means of the first, and the last things by means of the intermediary, and thus it is against the law of divinity that primary or else intermediary things be led back to God by the last things. But in the order of creatures bodily things are last, whereas spiritual substances are first; therefore it is not suitable that by means of bodily elements grace should be conferred on the human mind, by which it is led back to God.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, (Cf. Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 1, part 1, a. 1, q. 4, contra 6.) Augustine distinguishes two of God's activities in the book the Eighty-Three Questions: (Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 53 (PL 40:36); q. 62.) one which he performs by means of a subordinate creature, and another which he performs by himself without intermediary, and of such a kind is the illumination of the soul; but to confer grace on the soul is to illuminate it; (Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, part 3, n. 631, p. 996.) therefore, God does not use a sacrament as an intermediary instrument for conferring grace.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, (Cf. Bonaventure, In III Sent., d. 40, dub. 3, difficultas 3.) if any power is conferred by a material element, through which it is able to cause grace, that power either remains once the sacrament has been completed or else it does not: if it remains, then should someone be baptized with no words being said, after it has been sanctified with the word of life, (The definition of baptism seems to be given here: baptismus est tinctio in aqua facta verbo vitae sanctificata, attributed to Augustine; cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 4, ch. "De baptismo Christi"; Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 3, a. 1; Aquinas, In IV Sent., d. 3, a. 1, ad 1; Peter Lombard, Commentary on Ephesians, at Eph 5:26 (PL 192:214A).) and after the baptism of someone else, then he will be baptized, which is false; but if it does not remain, since no corrupting contrary is to be assigned, it fails on its own; and it seems to be unsuitable that it should vanish so suddenly, since it is something spiritual and one of the greatest goods, (adluditur ad doctrinam augustinianam a Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 27, ch. 3 laudatam. Cf. Augustine, On Free Will, bk. 2, ch. 19 (PL 32:1268).) being a cause of grace.

Obj. 11: Furthermore, (See Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 1, part 1, a. 1, q. 4, contra 1.) an agent is more excellent than the patient, hence Augustine proves in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 12, ch. 16 (PL 34:467).) that the body does not impress upon the soul the likenesses by which it knows; but that a body not conjoined to the soul should cause in it a supernatural form of grace is more to be rejected than that the conjoined body should cause a natural effect in it; therefore it does not seem in any way possible that such bodily elements in the sacraments be causes of grace.

Obj. 12: Furthermore, the soul disposes itself to possess grace more efficaciously than do the sacraments, for the disposition by which the soul disposes itself leads to grace even without the sacrament, but not conversely; but even though the soul should dispose itself for grace, this does not show the cause of grace; therefore, even though the sacraments dispose for grace in some way, they should not be called causes of grace.

Obj. 13: Furthermore, no wise craftsman uses an instrument except according to the convention of that instrument, such as the carpenter who does not use a saw for chopping; but God is the most wise craftsman; therefore he does not use a bodily instrument for a spiritual effect, which is not befitting to a bodily nature.

Obj. 14: Furthermore, a wise doctor uses more potent remedies for more virulent diseases; but the disease of sin is the most virulent; therefore, in order to cure it by the conferral of grace God ought to use stronger remedies, and not bodily elements.

Obj. 15: Furthermore, the soul's restoration ought to correspond by likeness to its creation; but God created the soul with no intermediary creature; thus it ought to be similarly recreated by grace without the mediation of a sacrament.

Obj. 16: Furthermore, to have help is a sign of the weakness of an agent; but instruments help with the primary agent's effect; therefore it does not befit God, who is the most powerful agent, that he should confer grace by the sacraments as though by instruments.

Obj. 17: Furthermore, any instrument needs its own natural activity, which conveys something upon the effect intended by the primary agent; but the natural activity of a material element seems to confer nothing on the effect of grace, which God intends to effect in the soul: for in baptism the washing does not bear any closer upon the soul than the water itself; thus such sacraments do not effect grace as instruments.

Obj. 18: Furthermore, sacraments are not conferred without a minister; therefore, if sacraments are in some way causes of grace, then man will also be a cause of grace in some way; which is contrary to the teaching of Augustine, (Cf. In Ioh. ev. tract. V n. 7 (PL 35, 1417; On the Trinity ch. 15; ch. 26.) who says that the power for justifying is not bestowed upon the minister, lest hope be placed in men.

Obj. 19: Furthermore, the Holy Spirit is given in grace; thus, if the sacraments are causes of grace, they will be causes of the giving of the Holy Spirit, which is contrary to Augustine who says that no creature can give the Holy Spirit; (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 26 (PL 42:1093); cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 1, d. 14, ch. 3.) therefore, the sacraments are not the cause of grace in any way.

On the contrary (1) is what the Teacher says in the Sentences, (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 4, d. 1, cc. 2–4.) defining a sacrament of the New Law in this way: a sacrament is the visible form of an invisible grace, such that it bears the image and is the cause of that grace.

Furthermore (2), Ambrose says that grace is stronger than guilt; (Cf. Pseudo-Ambrose, Commentary on Romans, Romans 5:17 (PL 17:101C).) and this is also clear from the Apostle in Romans 5:15; but guilt is caused in the soul by a contamination of the body; therefore, grace can also be caused in the soul by the sanctification of a bodily element.

Furthermore (3), by the institution of the sacraments something is either added to the natural sacraments, or nothing is: if nothing, then there is nothing conferred upon the world in the institution of the sacraments, which is unacceptable; but if something is added, since it is not added in vain, it will be capable of effecting something that it was incapable of effecting before; but this cannot happen except by grace, since the sacraments were instituted for this purpose; therefore the sacraments are capable of effecting grace.

But it might be argued (4) that nothing is added except a certain ordering toward grace.

On the contrary, order is a kind of relation; but a relation is always grounded upon something absolute, for which reason there is accidental motion in the category of towards another; so if order is added, it is necessary that something absolute be added.

Furthermore (5), something absolute is not caused by something relative, for the relative has the weakest existence; thus, if nothing is added to the sacraments except a relation by their institution, they will not be able to sanctify from their institution, which is contrary to Hugh of Saint Victor. (Cf. Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments, bk. 1, part 9, ch. 1-2 (PL 176:317D).)

But it might be argued (6) that that relation is not the cause of sanctification, but rather the divine power assisting in the sacraments.

On the contrary, either the divine power, which is God himself, assists in the sacraments in a different way before their institution than after, or else it does not. If it is not in a different way, they will not have a different effect after their institution than before. But if it is in another way, then since God is not said to exist in creatures in a new way except insofar as he causes a new effect in them, it will be necessary that something new be added to the sacraments themselves, and so the conclusion is the same as before.

Furthermore (7), sanctified matter is required in some of the sacraments, as in the case of extreme unction and in confirmation; but that sanctification does not happen uselessly; therefore a spiritual power is conferred on the sacraments by it, for which reason graces can cause in some way, since grace is ordered to this end.

I answer that it must be said that it is necessary to hold that the sacraments of the New Law are in some way the cause of grace. It is for this reason that the Old Law was said to kill and to increase transgression, (2 Cor 3:6–11 as referred by Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 3, d. 40, ch. 2.) since it brought about the knowledge of sin, but it did not bestow the assistance of grace against sin. Thus, if the New Law does not bestow grace, it would similarly be said to be killed and to increase transgression, to which the Apostolic doctrine declares the contrary. (Cf. Rom 5:9–21.) But it does not bestow grace by instruction alone, for the Old Law also did this, rather by causing grace in some way by its own sacraments; hence the Church is not simply content with the catechism by which it instructs the catechumen, (cf. Hebr. 11:6.) but adds to it the sacraments that they might possess grace, which the sacraments of the Old Law did not bestow, but only signified: (Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 4, d. 1, ch. 6; d. 22, ch. 2.) but signification pertains to instruction. Thus, since the Old Law only instructed, its sacraments were only signs of grace; whereas, since the New Law both instructs and justifies, its sacraments are both a sign and a cause of grace. However, not everyone teaches how they are causes in the same way.

For some say that they are causes of grace not because they do something so as to make grace be possessed through a power within them, but that, in their reception, grace is given by God, who assists in the sacraments, so that they are called causes of grace in the manner of an indispensable cause; (This opinion is in Bonaventure, In III Sent., d. 40, dub. 3; see William of Auvergne, De sacramento baptismi, ed. Opera omnia (Paris: 1674), cc. 2–3, 1:418–22.) and they give as an example of this someone who, in handing over a lead token, receives one hundred dollars, not because the lead token is the cause effecting the reception of the one hundred dollars, but because it has been decreed by the one who is able to give it that whoever hands over such a token receives so much money. Likewise, it has been decreed by God that whoever receives the sacraments without guile should receive grace, not indeed from the sacraments but from God himself; and they say that the Teacher thought this same thing in the Sentences, (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 4, d. 1, ch. 5.) when he said that someone receiving a sacrament seeks salvation in what is lower than himself, although not from them. However, this opinion does not seem to sufficiently preserve the dignity of the sacraments of the New Law.

For if one rightly considers the example given by them and others similar to it, one does not find that what they call an indispensable cause is related to the effect except as a sign: for a lead token is only a sign for the reception of the money, and also the staff of power that is conferred on an abbot. Hence, if the sacraments of the New Law are related to grace in this way, it would follow that they are only signs of grace, and then they would have nothing more than the sacraments of the Old Law; unless perhaps someone were to say that the sacraments of the New Law are signs of grace that is given together with them, whereas the sacraments of the Old Law are signs of promised grace. (Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 4, d. 1, ch. 6.)

But this pertains more to the condition of the time rather than to the dignity of the sacraments, for grace was promised in that time, but now is the time of the fullness of grace on account of the restoration of human nature that has already been performed. Thus, according to this opinion, if these sacraments existed then with all that they now have, they would accomplish nothing more than those, nor would those accomplish any less now than these, even with no addition being made to them.

Thus, one must say otherwise that the sacraments of the New Law do accomplish something for the possessing of grace. But something accomplishes an effect in two ways; in one way as by an agent that acts through itself; and something is said to act through itself which acts by means of some form within itself in the manner of a complete nature, whether it possesses that form from itself or else from another, and whether it does so naturally or violently. In this way, the sun and the moon are said to illuminate; and fire, red-hot iron, and hot water are said to heat. But in another way something accomplishes its effect instrumentally, which indeed does not accomplish its effect by a form within itself, but only inasmuch as it is moved by an agent that acts through itself.

For this is the definition of an instrument, inasmuch as it is an instrument, that it moves with itself being moved. Thus, just as a completed form stands to an agent acting through itself, so does the motion by which the primary agent is moved stand to its instrument, such as a saw that is working upon a bench. However, although the saw has an activity which belongs to it according to its very own form, namely to divide, yet it has another effect that does not belong to it, except insofar as it is moved by a craftsman, namely to make a straight cut and one that befits the form of the art. Thus an instrument has two activities, one that belongs to it according to its own proper form, and another that belongs to it inasmuch as it is moved by an agent acting through itself, which exceeds the power of its own proper form.

Thus, it must be said that neither a sacrament nor any creature can give grace in the manner of an agent acting through itself, for this only belongs to the divine power, as is clear from the preceding article; but the sacraments work instrumentally for the production of grace. This is clear from the following: Damascene says in book 3 (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 15 (PG 94:1060A); ch. 19 (PG 94:1080B).) that the human nature in Christ was like a certain organ of the divinity; and thus human nature contributed something in the divine power's activity, as when Christ healed the leper by touching him. (Cf. Matthew 8:2–3; Mark 1:40–41.)

In this way, Christ's very touch instrumentally caused the health of the leper. However, just as in bodily effects the human nature within Christ contributed instrumentally to the divine power's effect, so also is this the case in spiritual things. Hence, Christ's blood poured out for us had the power for cleansing sins, as it says in the Apocalypse 1:5: he washed us from our sins in his own blood, and in Romans 3:24: having been justified in his blood.

Thus Christ's humanity is an instrumental cause of justification; which cause is applied to us spiritually by faith and bodily by the sacraments; for Christ's humanity is both body and spirit, so that we might perceive in us the effect of sanctification which is through Christ. Hence, that sacrament is most perfect in which Christ's body is really contained, namely the Eucharist, and it is also the consummation of all the others, as Dionysius says in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy. (Pseudo Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 3, para. 1 (PG 3:424 D).) But the other sacraments share in some of the power by which Christ's humanity works instrumentally for justification, for which reason the one who is sanctified by baptism is said by the Apostle in Hebrews 10:29 to be sanctified by Christ's blood. Hence, Christ's Passion is also said to act in the sacraments of the New Law; (Peter Lombard, Commentary on Romans, at Rom 5:14 (PL 191:1392C); cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qa. 3, s.c. 1; from Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, at Ps 103:26,* sermon 4 (PL 37:1381); at Ps 126:2 (PL 37:1672); at Ps 127:3 (PL 37:1684); at Ps 128:1 (PL 37:1785).)* and in this way the sacraments of the New Law are causes of grace as working towards grace instrumentally.

Reply Obj. 1: Therefore, to the first it must be said that Bernard does not sufficiently expound the definition of the sacraments of the New Law; for he is speaking of them inasmuch as they are signs and not inasmuch as they are causes.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that the sacraments of the New Law are not the primary causes of grace as though acting through themselves, but rather as instrumental causes; and they have two effects in the manner of other instruments: one that exceeds their own form, which is to justify; but this is from the power of the primary agent's form, namely of God; and there is another which they exercise according to their own form, such as washing or anointing. And this action in fact attains bodily to the man himself who is justified, essentially according to the body and incidentally according to the soul, which itself senses such bodily action. But it attains spiritually to the very soul, inasmuch as it is perceived by it with the intellect as a sign of spiritual healing.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that since the last end corresponds to the first agent as principle to a principle, thus the last end is not attributed to things acting instrumentally, but rather a disposition for the last end. And so the sacraments are said to be causes of grace as disposing instruments.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that the sacraments do not work for the production of grace by the power of their own form, for then they would work as acting through themselves; but they rather work through the power of the primary agent, namely God, who exists in them. Indeed, this power does not have a complete existence in nature, but is rather something incomplete in the genus of being; which is clear from the fact that an instrument moves inasmuch as it is moved. However, motion is an imperfect act, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Physics III.15) Thus, just as whatever moves as being now at the end of its motion, and likened to the agent, itself moves by a perfect motion, so likewise does whatever move as existing in the act of being moved move by an incomplete power.

And there is such a power to move sight within the air, inasmuch as it is changed by the wall's color in an act of coming to be, but not as being already accomplished. Hence, the form of color is in the air in the manner of an intention, and not in the manner of a complete existence, as it is in the wall. The sacraments work toward grace in a similar way inasmuch as they are moved, as it were, toward this effect by God. Indeed, this motion is understood with respect to institution, sanctification, and the application to him who comes to the sacrament. Thus, they do not have power in the manner of a complete being, but incompletely, as it were; so it is not unacceptable that a spiritual power exists in a material thing, just like the forms of colors that exist spiritually in the air.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that that power cannot properly be corporeal, nor incorporeal, properly speaking; for corporeal and incorporeal are differences of complete being; rather, it is properly called a power for what is incorporeal, just as motion is also said more to be towards a being than a being: (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.1, 1003b7; Averroes, Metaphysics, bk. 4, comm. 2.) however, the objection argues as though this power were a complete form.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that what is incomplete cannot be the cause of what is complete as acting through itself; yet the incomplete can be ordered in some way to what is complete in the manner of a cause, as when we say that the movement of an instrument is the cause of the form induced by the primary agent.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that it does not pertain to the perfection of an instrument that it act by means of a complete power, but rather that it act insofar as it is moved, and so by means of an incomplete power; thus, it does not follow that the sacraments are imperfect instruments, even though their power is not a complete being.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that an instrument is compared to an action more as that by which it is done, rather than what is done; for it belongs to a principal agent to act by means of an instrument, and so although the last things do not bring the middle or the highest things back to God, yet the last can be that by which there is a leading back of the highest and middle things to God. Thus Dionysius also says that it is connatural for us that we be led to God by sensible things; (Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 1, para. 3 (PG 3:121D).) and he also gives this reason for the necessity of visible sacraments in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 1, para. 5 (PG 3:377A); ch. 2.)

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that it belongs to God to illuminate the soul without any intermediary creature, which produces the soul's illumination like a principal agent acting through itself; yet there can be something in the middle acting instrumentally and dispositively.

Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that there are some sacraments in which a sanctified matter is required, as in final anointing and confirmation; but there are others in which it not required of necessity for the sacrament. Thus, it is true that in all of them the sacrament's power does not consist in matter alone, but in both matter and form together, which two are one sacrament. Hence, however much a sacrament's matter is applied to a man, without the due form of the words and whatever else is required, the sacrament's effect does not follow. But in those sacraments that require a sanctified matter, the sacrament's power partially remains in the matter after the use of the sacrament, though not completely; whereas in those sacraments that do not need sanctified matter, nothing remains after the use of the sacrament, and thus the water in which a baptism has been celebrated has nothing more than other water, except perhaps on account of a mixture of chrism, which nevertheless does not pertain to the sacrament by necessity. But neither is it incompatible if that power should suddenly cease, for the power exists as in a state of becoming and of being moved, as has been said; (Above: ad 4.) and such things cease with the motion of the mover having ceased; for as soon as the mover ceases to move, the mobile also ceases being moved.

Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that although the bodily element is more ignoble than the soul, and for this reason it cannot effect anything within the soul in virtue of its own nature, nevertheless, it can effect something in the soul inasmuch as it is an instrument acting by divine power.

Reply Obj. 12: To the twelfth it must be said that the soul acts by disposing towards grace in virtue of its own nature, but a sacrament acts by divine power and as its instrument, and so the argument is not similar.

Reply Obj. 13: To the thirteenth it must be said that a sacrament signifies according to its own form, or else it is such a nature as to signify the effect to which it is divinely ordered; and in this sense it is suitable instrument, for the sacraments cause by signifying.

Reply Obj. 14: To the fourteenth it must be said that the sacraments of the New Law are not weak remedies, but powerful ones, inasmuch as Christ's Passion works in them; but the sacraments of the Old Law, which preceded Christ's Passion, are called weak, as is clear from Galatians 4:9: you have turned to the weak and needy elements.

Reply Obj. 15: To the fifteenth it must be said that creation presupposes nothing in which the action of an instrumental agent can terminate, but re-creation does presuppose something, and so the argument is not the same.

Reply Obj. 16: To the sixteenth it must be said that God does not use instruments or intermediary causes in his action because of his own weakness, but on account of the appropriateness of the effects: for it is proper that divine remedies should be shown to us according to our own manner, that is by means of sensible things, as Dionysius says in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 1, para. 5 (PG 3:377A); ch. 2.)

Reply Obj. 17: To the seventeenth it must be said that the natural action of a material instrument assists in the sacrament's effect inasmuch as, by means of it, the sacrament is applied to the one receiving it and inasmuch as the sacrament's signification is completed by the previously mentioned action, as for example the signification of baptism by means of washing.

Reply Obj. 18: To the eighteenth it must be said that there are some sacraments in which a determinate minister is not required, as is clear in the case of baptism; and in such sacraments the sacrament's power does not consist in the minister in any way. But there are some sacraments in which a determinate minister is required, and their power partially consists in the minister, as it does in the matter and in the form: yet neither is the minister said to be justified except in the manner of the ministry, inasmuch as he cooperates in justification by conferring the sacrament.

Reply Obj. 19: To the nineteenth it must be said that the Holy Spirit is not given except by the one who causes grace as a primary agent, which belongs to God alone, and so only God gives the Holy Spirit.