Article 6 — Whether grace is in the soul's essence

Sixth, it is asked whether grace is in the soul's essence. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 26, a. 3; In IV Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 3, ad 1; ST I-II.110.4.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it is not: for as a habit within a power is related to that power's effect, so also must a habit or a perfection existing in an essence be related to the essence's effect. But a habit which is in any power perfects that power for its own act; as for example charity, which perfects the will for willing; however, the proper effect of the soul's essence is existence, which the soul bestows on the body, since the soul is the body's form according to its own essence. Therefore, since grace does not perfect in such a way that it confers natural existence on a body, it will not be in the soul's essence as in a subject.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, things are made to be opposed with respect to the same thing; but grace and guilt are opposed; therefore, since guilt is not in the soul's essence, which is clear from the fact that the soul's essence is deprived of nothing, yet because sin or guilt is a privation of mode, species, and order, according to Augustine, (Augustine, On the Nature of the Good, ch. 4 (PL 42:553); cf. ST I-II.84.3, ad 2.) it seems that grace is not in the soul's essence as in a subject.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, grace presupposes nature; but the powers are natural properties of the soul, according to Avicenna; (Cf. Avicenna, On the Soul, bk. 5, ch. 7.) therefore, grace is not in the soul's essence, without having presupposed the powers; and so it exists in the powers immediately as in a subject.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a habit or any form is there where its effect is found to exist; but any effect of grace, whether of operating or cooperating grace, is found to be in the powers, as is clear by bringing up individual cases. Therefore, grace is in the soul's powers as in a subject.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the image of re-creation corresponds to the image of creation, which two images are distinguished in the Gloss on Psalm 4:7, (Glossa Petri Lomb. (PL 191, 88 B); illud Psal.: 4:7) the light of your face, O Lord, has been signed upon us; but the image of creation is understood with respect to the powers, namely according to memory, understanding, and will, which are three powers of the soul, as the Teacher says in the Sentences; (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 1, d. 3, ch. 2.) therefore, grace likewise regards the soul's powers.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, acquired habits are distinguished against infused habits; but all acquired habits are in the soul's powers; thus also is grace, which is a habitual infused gift.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, according to Augustine, (Augustine, On Grace and Free Will, ch. 17 (PL 44:901); Augustine, Retractions, ch. 12; Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 26, ch. 1.) man's good will is prepared by grace; but only inasmuch as the will is perfected by grace; therefore grace is the will's perfection, and so it is in the will as in a subject and not in the soul's essence.

On the contrary (1), grace is in the soul inasmuch as it is ordered to God; but the whole soul is ordered to God as being in potency to receiving something from him; therefore, the soul is receptive of grace according to its totality: but the totality of the soul is the soul's very substance, but its parts are the powers; therefore the soul is the subject of grace according to its substance.

Furthermore (2), a gift of God is prior inasmuch as it is first in us and closer to God; but grace is God's first gift in us: for it precedes both faith and charity and the like, as is clear from Augustine in book 2 of On the Predestination of the Saints. (It is actually Augustine, On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 16 (PL 45:1018).) However, what is first in us and closer to God is the soul's essence, from which the powers flow. Therefore, grace is in the soul's essence as in a subject.

Furthermore (3), the same creature cannot exist in different things; but grace is something created; therefore it cannot exist in different powers; but since grace extends to the acts of all the powers inasmuch as they can be meritorious, it is either in the soul's essence, or else it is in all the powers. But it is not in all of them. Therefore, it is in the soul's essence as in a subject.

Furthermore (4), a secondary cause receives the influence of the first cause before an effect of a secondary cause. (cf. Liber de causis comm. 1.) But the soul's essence is the principle of the powers, and so it is a secondary cause of those things whose first cause is God. Therefore, the soul's essence receives the influence of grace before the powers do.

I answer that it must be said that, as was discussed previously, (A. 2.) there are two opinions regarding grace. One says that grace and virtue are essentially the same, and according to this one must say that grace is really in the soul's power as in a subject, inasmuch as the virtue that makes something perfect for acting can only exist in a power, which is the principle of an activity; but by a certain appropriation it can said that, (Cf. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 26, a. 1, q. 5.) according to this opinion, grace regards the essence, whereas virtue the powers, inasmuch as both grace and virtue at least differ according to reason, even though they do not according to essence; for being graced pertains to the soul itself before it pertains to its act, for the soul is not accepted by God because of its act but rather the opposite, as has been said. (A. 1 et 2.)

But the other opinion, which we hold, is that grace and virtue are not essentially the same; and in this respect one must say that grace is in the soul's essence as in a subject and not in the powers; for since a power, as being of such and such a kind, is ordered to activity, the power's perfection must be ordered to activity according to its own definition. However, this is what makes the definition of virtue, namely that it is the closest perfecting thing to acting rightly. Thus, if grace were in the soul's powers, it would have to be the same as some of the virtues. Therefore, if this cannot be upheld, one must say that grace is in the soul's essence, perfecting it inasmuch as it gives to it a certain spiritual existence and, by a certain assimilation, makes it to be a sharer in the divine nature, as it says in 2 Peter 1:4, in the same way that the virtues perfect the powers so as to act rightly.

Reply Obj. 1: Therefore, to the first it must be said that although grace is not the principle of natural existence, yet it perfects natural existence, inasmuch as it adds on to it spiritual existence.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that spiritual guilt can only exist in a power, (Cf. above: q. 25, a. 6.) which is the principle of an act; but original guilt is in the soul according to its essence, by which it is joined to the flesh as a form, and from which original stain is contracted in the soul. And although nothing of what is essential is removed from the soul, yet the order of the soul's very essence to grace is impeded by means of some kind of distance, just as contrary dispositions distance the potency of matter from the act of a form.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that grace presupposes nature if both are taken proportionally; and so the virtue that is a gratuitous principle of an activity presupposes a power that is the natural principle of that same activity; and grace, which is a principle of spiritual being, presupposes the soul's essence, which is the principle of natural being.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that the first and immediate effect of grace is in the soul's essence, namely an informing according to spiritual existence.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that the image of creation consists in both essence and in power, inasmuch as the unity of the divine essence is represented by the soul's essence; and the distinction of the persons is represented by the distinction of the powers; and in a similar way, the image of re-creation consists in grace and the virtues.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that acquired habits are caused by our actions, and so they do not pertain to the soul except by means of the powers of which they are the actions. However, grace comes from divine influence, and so the argument is not the same.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that grace prepares the will by means of charity, of which grace is the form.