Article 3 — Whether any creature can be the cause of grace

Third, it is asked whether any creature can be the cause of grace. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 14, q. 3; d. 40, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3; In II Sent., d. 26, a. 3; In IV Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 1; Commentary on Romans, ch. 5, lect. 1; ST I-II.112.1; III.62.1; III.64.1.)

Obj. 1: It seems that one can. In John 20:23 the Lord said to his disciples whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; from which it is clear that men can forgive sins; but sins are not forgiven except by grace; therefore men can confer grace.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Dionysius says in the Heavenly Hierarchy, (It is actually Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 13, para. 3 (PG 3:301A).) that just as bodily things closer to the sun receive light from it and transmit it to other bodily things, so also do substances that draw closer to God receive his light more fully and hand it on to others; but the divine light is grace; therefore certain creatures that receive grace more fully can give it to others.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 4 (PG 3:700A).) the good tends to pour itself out; therefore, that pours itself out more which has more of the notion of goodness; but spiritual forms have more of the notion of goodness than do bodily forms, as being closer to the highest good; thus, since bodily forms existing in certain creatures are the principle of their sharing in a likeness of species, so much more will the one who possesses grace be able to cause it in others.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as the affection is perfected by the divine light of grace, so also is the intellect perfected by the light of truth; but one creature can offer the light of the intellect to another: which is clear from the fact that the higher angels illuminate the lower, according to Dionysius, (Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarachy, ch. 8, para. 2 (PG 3:240C).) which illumination is according to him, the taking up of divine knowledge; (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarachy, ch. 7, para. 3 (PG 3:209C).) therefore the rational creature is also able to offer grace to another.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, Christ is our head with respect to human nature; (Glossa ordinaria, at Eph 1:22, 6.532; Peter Lombard, Commentary on Ephesians, at Eph 1:22 (PL 192:178D).) but it belongs to the head to pour forth movement and sensation into the members; therefore, Christ also, with respect to human nature, poured forth into the members of the mystical body both spiritual sensation and movement, by which are understood graces according to Augustine. (See Peter Lombard, Commentary on Ephesians, at Eph 1:22 (PL 192:178D))

Obj. 6: But one might say that Christ, by his ministry with respect to human nature, poured out grace to men.

On the contrary, Christ is particularly the head of the Church before all others; but it also belongs to other ministers of the Church to work for the conferral of grace by way of a ministry; therefore, it is not enough for the notion of being a head that it pour out grace by way of a ministry.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, Christ's death and Resurrection belong to him with respect to human nature; but commenting on Psalm 29:6 weeping may tarry for the night, the Gloss (Glossa Petri Lomb. (PL 191, 294 D); illud Psal.: 29:6.) says that Christ's Resurrection is the cause of the soul's resurrection in the present and of the body's in the future; but the soul's resurrection in the present happens by grace; therefore Christ is the cause of grace with respect to human nature.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, the substantial form that gives existence and life is more noble than any accidental form; but certain created agents have power over the substantial form, which gives existence and life, namely the vegetative and the sensible; therefore all the more does it have power over the accidental form that is grace.

Obj. 9: But it has been argued that the reason the creature cannot cause grace is because, since it is not drawn forth from the potency of matter, it does not come to be except by creation: however, to create belongs to an infinite power because of the infinite distance between being and non-being; and thus it cannot belong to any creature.

On the contrary, one cannot pass over the infinite; (Aristotle, Physics 6.9, 237b23; as said above in q. 2, a. 2.) but the distance that is between being and non-being can be passed over, for the creature would fall by itself into nothing unless it were held by the hand of the Creator, according to Gregory; (Cf. Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 16, ch. 37 (PL 75:1143C).) thus, there is not an infinite distance between being and nothing*.*

Obj. 10: Furthermore, to be able to cause grace does not mean an infinite power simply speaking, but only in a certain respect: which is clear from the fact that if we were to say that God was capable of making nothing else than grace, we would not say he had an infinite power simply speaking; but there is nothing unsuitable if upon a creature there be conferred a power infinite in a certain respect, for grace also has in some way an infinite power, inasmuch as it joins one to an infinite good; therefore nothing prevents a creature from having the power to cause grace.

Obj. 11: Furthermore, it pertains to a king's glory that he have under him powerful and valorous knights; thus, it also pertains to God's glory that the saints subject to him have great power; therefore, if it were held that some saint were capable of conferring grace, in no way would this be prejudicial to divine glory.

Obj. 12: Furthermore, it says in Romans 3:23: the justice of God by the faith of Christ Jesus; but as it says in Romans 10:17: faith comes by hearing, but hearing by Christ's word; therefore since Christ's word is from a preacher, it seems that grace or justice is from the faith of the one preaching.

Obj. 13: Furthermore, anyone can give to another what is his own; but grace or the Holy Spirit belongs to some person, since it is given to him; therefore it belongs to someone to give to another either grace or the Holy Spirit.

Obj. 14: Furthermore, no one should render an account of what is not in one's own power; but the prelates of the Church must render an account for the souls of their subjects: for at the end of Hebrews (Hebr. 13:17 according to Augustine, Sermon 35, para. 3 (PL 38:214); Sermon 82, ch. 12 (PL 38:513).) it says they are keeping watch over your souls, as men who will have to give account; therefore the souls of subjects are in the power of prelates, such that they are able to justify them by grace.

Obj. 15: Furthermore, God's ministers are more dear to God than are the ministers of a temporal king to the king himself; but the king's ministers are able to bestow upon another the king's graces; therefore God's ministers are also able to bestow God's grace.

Obj. 16: Furthermore, whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause of that which is caused; (Cf. Alan of Lille, De arte seu articulis catholiae fidei, bk. 1, rule 1 (PL 210:597D).) but a priest is the cause of the imposition of hands, which is the cause of the Holy Spirit being given; Acts 8:17: they placed hands upon them, and they received the Holy Spirit; therefore the priest is the cause of grace, in which the Holy Spirit is given.

Obj. 17: Furthermore, every power able to be shared with a creature is shared with it, for if God was able and did not wish to share it, he would be envious, as Augustine (Cf. Augustine, Conta Maximinum, bk. 2, ch. 7 (PL 42:462); ch. 15 (PL 42:782); Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 1, d. 20, ch. 3.) argues in proving the equality of the Son; but the power for conferring grace was able to be shared with the creature, as the Teacher says in the Sentences; (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 4, d. 5, ch. 3.) therefore, the power for conferring grace is shared with some creature.

Obj. 18: Furthermore, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 5, part 1, para. 4 (PG 3:504C); cf. Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4, para. 3 (PG 3:181A).) it is the law of the divinity to lead the last things back to God by intermediate things; but the leading back of the rational creature to God happens primarily by grace; therefore, lower rational creatures attain grace by means of higher rational creatures.

Obj. 19: Furthermore, it is a greater thing to expel what is a primary than what is an accessory; but the power has been given to men to expel demons, who are for us causes of wickedness, as is clear from Luke 10:17 and at the end of Mark; therefore the power has also been given to men to expel sins, and thus to confer grace.

Obj. 20: But one might argue that one does this by ministry alone.

On the contrary, the priest of the gospel is stronger than the priest of the Law; but the priest of the Law acts as a minister; thus the priest of the gospel has something more than just a ministry.

Obj. 21: Furthermore, the soul lives both the life of nature and the life of grace; but it imparts the life of nature to another, namely the body; therefore it can also impart the life of grace to another.

Obj. 22: Furthermore, guilt and grace are contraries; but the soul can be the cause of guilt for itself; therefore it can it can also be the cause of grace for itself.

Obj. 23: Furthermore, man is said to be a lesser world inasmuch as he bears within himself a likeness of the greater world; (Aristotle, Physics 8.4, 252b26; cf. ST I-II.2.8, obj. 2.) but there is in the greater world a spiritual effect, namely the sensitive and vegetative soul, that is from another creature; therefore, in the lesser world, that is in man, there is a spiritual effect of grace from another creature.

Obj. 24: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Meteorology, (Aristotle, Meteorology 4.3, 380a12.) anything is perfect when it can make another like itself, and he is speaking of the perfection of nature; but the perfection of grace is greater than that of nature; thus the one possessing the perfection of grace is able to establish another in grace.

Obj. 25: Furthermore, the activity of a form is attributed to the one possessing a form, just as heating, which is the activity of heat is attributed to fire; but to make one to be just is an act of justice, thus it must be attributed to the just man; however, justification does not happen except by grace, therefore the just man can also give grace.

On the contrary (1), is what Augustine says in On the Trinity, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 26 (PL 42:1093); according to Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 1, d. 14, ch. 3.) that holy men cannot give the Holy Spirit; but the Holy Spirit is given in the gift of grace; therefore a holy man cannot give grace.

Furthermore (2), if the one who possesses grace is able to give grace to another, this does not happen by creating grace in him from nothing, for to create belongs to God alone; nor again by giving to him something of the grace that he possesses, for then his grace would be diminished, and he would be less dear to God from the fact that he performs a work agreeable to God, which is incompatible; therefore, no man can give grace to another in any way.

Furthermore (3), Anselm proves in the book Why God Became Man (Anselm, Why God Became Man, bk. 1, ch. 5 (PL 158:365C).) that the restoration of human kind could not be carried out by an angel, for then man would be a debtor for his salvation to an angel, and in no way could he arive at an equality with the angel; but man's salvation happens by grace; therefore the same inconsistency would follow if an angel were to give grace to man: but even less does one man give grace to another man; therefore no creature can give grace.

Furthermore (4), according to Augustine, (Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, tract. 72, para. 3 (PL 35:1823); cf. ST I-II.113.9, s.c.) it is a greater thing to make the wicked just than to create heaven and earth; but the wicked man is justified by grace; therefore, since no creature can create heaven and earth, neither will one be able to confer grace.

Furthermore (5), every activity happens by a conjunction of an agent and a patient; (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.6, 322b22; cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 16, a. 10, obj. 3; Averroes, On Generation and Corruption, bk. 1, comm. 45.) but no creature penetrates the mind in which grace exists; (Pseudo-Augustine, De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, ch. 83 (PL 58:999B); cf. ST III.8.8, ad 1.) therefore no creature can confer grace.

I answer that it must be conceded simply that no creature can efficiently cause grace, even though some creature is able to employ a ministry that is ordered toward the acceptance of grace. There are three reasons for this.

The first is taken from the nature of grace itself. For grace, as has been said, (Above: a. 1.) is a certain perfection elevating the soul to a supernatural existence; but there can be no supernatural effect from any creature for two reasons: the first is because it pertains to the one alone who establishes and limits a degree of nature to promote something beyond its natural condition, which it is clear belongs to God alone; the second is that no created power acts except by presupposing the power of matter or of something in the place of matter; but a creature's natural power does not extend beyond natural perfections; hence, there is no creature able to carry out a supernatural activity: and this is why miracles only happen by divine power, even though some creature may cooperate for the performance of the miracle either by praying or by employing a ministry in some other way. It is for this reason that no creature is able to efficiently cause grace.

The second reason is taken from grace's activity. For man's will is changed by grace, since it is that which prepares man's will to want the good, according to Augustine: (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, ch. 32 (PL 40:248; CCSL 46) according to Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 26, cc. 2, 4.) however, it belongs to God alone to change the will, even though someone can change another's intellect in some way. This is the case because the act of any power can be changed in two ways, since the principle of any act is both the power and the object: it changes in one way on the part of the power when someone acts within the power itself, which pertains to God alone with respect to powers that are not joined to organs, namely intellect and will; for in the other powers one can act to some extent incidentally, inasmuch as one has an activity within their organs. It is changed in another way on the part of the object, namely by employing the object that moves the power. However, the object does not move the will by necessity, except what is naturally willed, such as happiness or the like, which is proposed to the will by God alone; but other objects do not move the will by necessity. Yet it is not only the first naturally known principles that naturally move the intellect, but also the conclusions that are not naturally known, on account of their necessary relation to the principles. This necessary relationship is not found on the part of the will with respect to the naturally desired good when willing other good things, since one can arrive at that naturally desired good by many ways, at least with respect to one's opinion. Thus, on the part of the object, a creature can sufficiently move the intellect, but not the will; yet it can neither move the intellect nor the will on the part of the power. Therefore, since no creature can move the will, neither can any creature confer grace by which the will is changed.

The third reason is taken from the end of grace itself. For the end is proportioned to the principle agent, inasmuch as the end and the beginning of the whole universe is one. Thus, just as the first action by which things come into being, namely creation, is from God alone who is the first principle of creatures and the last end, so is the conferral of grace, by which the rational mind is immediately joined to the last end, also from God alone.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that only God remits sins by authority, as is clear from Isaiah 43:25: I am he who blots out your transgressions for my own sake; but men are said to remit by their ministry.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that Dionysius is speaking of the outpouring of divine light through teaching, for in this way the lower angels are illuminated by the higher, which he intends to say there.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that the fact that one possessing grace cannot share it with another does not come from a defect of the goodness of grace, rather it is equally from both its preeminence and the defect of the one possessing it, for it transcends the natural condition, and the one possessing it does not take part in it with such perfection that he is able to share it.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that there is not a similar situation for both the will and the intellect for the reason already given.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that Christ disperses grace efficiently inasmuch as he is God; but as man he does so by his ministry: hence it says in Romans 15:8: but I say that Christ Jesus became a minister because of God's truth, so as to confirm the promises of the fathers.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that Christ is called the head of the Church with respect to human nature before other ministers, since he had a ministry higher than the rest, inasmuch as we are justified by faith in him, and we are filled with the sacraments by the invocation of his name, and all human nature is purified from the sin of the first parent by the power of his Passion; and many other such things which especially belong to Christ.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that as Damascene says in the third book, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 15 (PG 94:1060A); ch. 19 (PG 94:1080B).) Christ's humanity itself was a kind of instrument of his divinity; and so what belongs to his humanity, such as the Resurrection, the Passion and the like, are related instrumentally, as it were, to the effect of the divinity. Thus, Christ's Resurrection does not cause spiritual resurrection in us as an agent cause primarily, but as an instrumental cause. Or one can say that it is a cause of our spiritual resurrection inasmuch as we are justified by his faith. Or one can say that it is the exemplar cause of spiritual resurrection, inasmuch as there is a certain likeness of our spiritual resurrection in Christ's Resurrection itself.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that the sensitive and vegetative soul do not surpass the condition of created nature, as neither do other natural forms; and so a natural agent, presupposing a power in nature with respect to these forms, is capable in some way of drawing them forth: but the case is not similar with grace, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that the argument is not sufficient in every respect, for to be created belongs properly to the subsisting thing, to which it belongs properly to exist and to be made; however, non-subsisting forms, whether they are incidental or substantial, are not properly created but co-created, just as they neither have being through themselves but rather in another.

And although they do not have matter from which they come, which is one of their parts, yet they do have matter in which they exist, upon which they depend, and by whose transformation they are brought into being; and so their coming to be is what properly underlies their transformation. Hence, by reason of the matter "in which" they exist, creation does not properly belong to them.

But it is otherwise with respect to the rational soul, which is a subsistent form; and thus, to be created belongs properly to them. But granting this argument, the reply to the objection must be answered, which concludes something false in a false manner. Hence, it must be said that the distance of two things between each other can be related in three ways: in one way such that it is infinite on both sides, such as if one had infinite whiteness and the other infinite blackness; and in this way there is an infinite distance between divine existence and non-existence, simply speaking.

In another way such that it is finite on each side, as when one has a finite whiteness and the other a finite blackness; and in this way created being is separated from relative non-being. In a third way such that it is finite on the one side and infinite on the other, such as if one had a finite whiteness and the other an infinite blackness. Such is the distance between created being and simple non-being, for created being is finite, but non-being is simply infinite, inasmuch as it exceeds every defect that can be thought. Therefore, this distance can be crossed on that side which is finite, inasmuch as finite being itself is either acquired or lost, but not on that side which is infinite.

Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that being able to cause grace pertains to an infinite power simply speaking, inasmuch as it belongs to the power of the one originating nature, which is infinite; and so these two things are incompatible, namely that someone could give grace and not be able to do something else.

Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that it pertains to the power of a king that his soldiers have such a power and of such magnitude, which does not withdraw from being subject to him; but not if they are withdrawn by that power from being subject to him. However, by having a power to confer grace, a creature would be made equal to God, as having an infinite power; hence it would detract from divine glory if some creature were to have such a power.

Reply Obj. 12: To the twelfth it must be said that hearing is not a sufficient cause of faith, which is clear from the fact that many hear who do not believe; but the cause of faith is what makes the believer to assent to what is said. Yet one is not forced to assent by reason's necessity, but rather that of the will; and so the man who announces exteriorly does not cause faith, rather it is God alone who can change the will. However, he causes faith in the believer by inclining the will and by enlightening the intellect with the light of faith, so that it is not averse to what is proposed by the preacher; but the preacher works as one who exteriorly disposes for faith.

Reply Obj. 13: To the thirteenth it must be said that I can give to another what is mine as a possession, but not what is mine as an inherent form; for I cannot give to another my color or my quantity. However, grace belongs to man in this way and not in the first way.

Reply Obj. 14: To the fourteenth it must be said that although a prelate cannot give grace to a subject, yet he can cooperate such that grace be given to someone or that by his warning or his rebuking what is given be not lost; and for this reason he is bound to give an account for the souls of his subjects.

Reply Obj. 15: To the fifteenth it must be said that the minister of an earthly king does not bestow the king's grace on another except by way of intercession; and in this way God's ministers can also bestow divine grace on a sinner by obtaining it with their prayers, but not by causing it effectively.

Reply Obj. 16: To the sixteenth it must be said that the imposition of hands does not cause the coming of the Holy Spirit; but rather the Holy Spirit comes together with the imposition of hands. Thus, it does not say in the text that the apostles, imposing their hands, gave the Holy Spirit, but that they imposed their hands and the others received the Holy Spirit, that is from God. But if the imposition of hands is said in some way to be the cause of the receiving of the Holy Spirit, in the way that the Sacraments are the cause of grace, as will be said later, (infra a. 4) the imposition of hands will not have this inasmuch as it is from men, but by divine institution.

Reply Obj. 17: To the seventeenth it must be said that the Teacher's opinion here is not commonly held, namely that the power for creating and justifying can be conferred upon a creature, although the Teacher (Vide Chart. Univ. Paris. 1, n. 194 (p. 221).) also does not say that the power for justifying can be conferred on a creature by authority but only by ministry. But neither does it follow, if it is able to be shared with a creature, that it is shared. For when it is said that whatever is able to be shared with a creature is shared with it, this must be understood of what the nature of the thing requires, but not of what can be added over and above their natural attributes from divine liberality alone; for there would not be any envy about these things, even if they were not granted. Therefore, it is not the same argument with regard to the Son, for it belongs to the notion of sonship that a son possess the nature of the one who generates; thus if God the Father did not share the fullness of his own nature with the Son, it would seem to pertain either to weakness or else to envy; and especially according to those who say that the Father generated the Son by his will. (haeretici Eunomiani ut refert Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 20 (PL 42:1087); cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 1, d. 6, ch. 1.)

Reply Obj. 18: To the eighteenth it must be said that the saying of Dionysius should not be understood to mean that the lowest are joined to the final end by the power of intermediate causes, but that the intermediate causes dispose for this joining either by illumination or else by some other ministry.

Reply Obj. 19: To the nineteenth it must be said that that power was given to the apostles to expel demons from the body, which is clearly less than expelling sin from the soul; therefore, it was not given to them to expel demons by their own power, but by invoking Christ's name, asking for it in prayer, which is clear from the end of Mark 16:17: they shall cast out devils in my name.

Reply Obj. 20: To the twentieth it must be said that not even the priest of the Law worked for the conferral of grace as a ministry, except remotely by exhortation and by teaching; for the sacraments of the Old Law, of which he was a minister, did not confer grace in the same way as do the sacraments of the New Law, of which the gospel priest is the minister. Hence, the new priesthood is more worthy than the old, as the Apostle proves in the letter to the Hebrews. (Ch. 7)

Reply Obj. 21: To the twenty-first, it must be said that the soul is related differently to natural life and to the life of grace. It stands to the life of grace as that which lives by something else, but to the life of nature as that by which something else lives. Thus it cannot share the life of grace, but it receives what has been shared. But it does share the life of nature, nevertheless, it does not share it except inasmuch it is formally united to the body. However, it is not possible that the soul be formally united to another soul, which is able to live by the life of grace; and so the argument is not similar.

Reply Obj. 22: To the twenty-second, it must be said that it is not impossible for an agent to act according to its own form or else below it, but nothing can act above its own form. However, grace is above the soul's nature, whereas guilt is either on the same level as nature with respect to the animal part or else below nature with respect to reason; and thus it is not a similar argument with regard to guilt and grace.

Reply Obj. 23: To the twenty-third, it must be said that even in the lesser world, namely in man, a spiritual accident that does not exceed nature is caused in some way by a created power, namely knowledge in the student from the teacher, but not grace, since it exceeds nature: but the sensitive or vegetative soul is contained under the order of natural things.

Reply Obj. 24: To the twenty-fourth it must be said that grace's perfection is more excellent than the perfection of nature on the part of the perfecting form, though not on the part of the perfected thing. For what is natural is in some way possessed more perfectly than what is above nature, inasmuch as it is proportioned to an active natural power; and the supernatural gift exceeds this proportion. Thus, it cannot pour out a supernatural gift by its own power, even though it can cause something like itself in nature. Yet this is not true universally, for more perfect creatures cannot make something like themselves, such as the sun not being able to produce another sun, or an angel another angel; but this is only true in corruptible creatures, for which a generative power has been divinely provided so that their existence according to species might be continued, which cannot be continued according to the individual.

Reply Obj. 25: To the twenty-fifth, it must be said that there are two acts of a form: one that is an activity, such as heating, which is also the second act; and such an act of the form is attributed to the subsisting individual; but the other act of the form is the informing of matter, which is the first act; as for example, making a body to be alive is the soul's act, and such an act is not attributed to the subsisting individual of the form: but in this way justification is an act of justice or of grace.