Article 5 — Whether there is only one sanctifying grace in a man

Fifth, it is asked whether there is only one sanctifying grace in a man. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 26, a. 6; In IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qa. 5.)

Obj. 1: It seems that there is not, for nothing is divided against itself; but grace is divided by operative and cooperative; (Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 26, ch. 1.) therefore, different graces are operative or else cooperative; so there is not only one sanctifying grace in one man.

Obj. 2: But one might say that there is one operating and cooperating grace according to habit, whereas the division is taken according to diverse acts.

On the contrary, habits are distinguished by acts; therefore, if the acts are diverse, there will not be able to be one habit for each grace.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is not necessary for anyone to ask for what one already possesses; but it is necessary for the one having antecedent grace to ask for subsequent grace, according to Augustine; (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, ch. 32 (PL 40:248; CCSL 46) according to Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 1, d. 26, cc. 2, 4.) therefore antecedent and consequent grace are not one grace.

Obj. 4: But one might argue that the one possessing antecedent grace does not ask for consequent grace as though it were some other grace, but rather for the preservation of that same grace.

On the contrary, grace is more powerful than nature; but in the state of integral nature man was able to stand by himself in what he had received, as it says in the Sentences; (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 24, ch. 1.) therefore he who accepts antecedent grace is able to stand in it, and so it is not necessary to ask for this.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, form is distinguished with respect to the diversity of what can be perfected; but grace is the form of the virtues; therefore, since there are many virtues, grace cannot be one.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, antecedent grace pertains to this present life, but consequent grace pertains to the life of glory; and thus Augustine says it precedes so that we might live piously, and it follows so that we might live with God always; it precedes so that we might be called, it follows so that we might be glorified. (Augustine, On Nature and Grace, ch. 31 (PL 44:264); cf. ST I-II.111.3.) However, the grace of this life is other than the grace in heaven, since the perfection of created nature and glorified nature are not the same, as the Teacher says in book 2; (It is actually Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 3-4, ch. 1.) therefore antecedent and consequent grace are not the same.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, operating grace pertains to the interior act, but cooperating grace pertains to the exterior act; and so Augustine says that it precedes in order that we might will, and it follows that we might not will in vain; (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, ch. 23, 32 (PL 40:248; CCSL 46) according to Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 26, cc. 2, 4.) but the principle of the interior and the exterior act are not the same, as is clear in the case of the virtues, since charity is given for an internal act, but fortitude, justice, and the like for exterior acts; therefore, neither are operating and cooperating grace, nor antecedent and subsequent grace the same.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, just as guilt is a defect in the soul on the part of the will, in the same way is ignorance on the part of the intellect; but no single habit expels all ignorance from the intellect; therefore neither can there be one habit that expels all guilt from the will; but grace expels all guilt, and thus grace is not one habit.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, grace and guilt are contraries; but there is not one guilt that infects all the soul's powers; therefore, neither can one grace perfect all of them.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, commenting on Exodus 33:13: if I have found grace, the Gloss (Glossa ordin.) says: one grace is not enough for the saints; there is that which precedes, so that they might know and love God; and there is that which follows, so that they might keep themselves pure and unsullied and make progress; and so there is not only one grace in a single man.

Obj. 11: Furthermore, a different mode of acting having a particular difficulty requires a different habit; as for example, the bestowal of large gifts, which cause difficulty by their magnitude, requires a special virtue, namely magnanimity, beyond liberality, which is concerned with common gifts. But to will correctly in a steadfast manner has a particular difficulty beyond simply willing correctly. However, to simply will correctly pertains to antecedent grace, whereas to will correctly in a steadfast manner belongs to consequent grace: hence Augustine says that grace precedes so that a man might will, it follows so that he might carry out and persist; (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, ch. 32 (PL 40:248; CCSL 46); On Nature and Grace ch. 32.) therefore consequent grace is a different habit from antecedent grace.

Obj. 12: Furthermore, the sacraments of the New Law are causes of grace, as has been said; (A. 4.) but different sacraments are not ordered to the same effect; therefore, there are different graces in man, which are bestowed by different sacraments.

Obj. 13: But it might be said that the later sacraments are not conferred so as to bring about another grace, but rather to augment what is already had.

On the contrary, an increase of grace does not vary the species of grace; so if the proportion of causes is according to the proportion of effects, it would follow from the previous response that sacraments do not differ according to species.

Obj. 14: But one might say that the sacraments differ in species with respect to different gratuitous graces that are conferred in different sacraments, and these are also the proper effects of the sacraments.

On the contrary, a gratuitous grace is not opposed to guilt; therefore, since the sacraments are primarily ordered against guilt, it seems that the proper effects of the sacraments, according to which the sacraments are distinguished, are not gratuitous graces.

Obj. 15: Furthermore, different wounds are inflicted on the soul from different sins, which are all healed by grace; therefore, since different medicines correspond to different wounds, since according to the saying of Jerome what cures the heel does not cure the eye, (Glossa ordinaria, at Mark 4; 9:28, 5.577 (PL 114:215); from Pseudo-Jerome, Commentary on Mark, ch. 9 (PL 30:638C).) it seems that there are diverse graces.

Obj. 16: Furthermore, the same thing cannot both be had and not had by the same thing; but some have operating grace, who do not have cooperating grace, such as baptized children; therefore operating and cooperating grace are not the same.

Obj. 17: Furthermore, grace is proportioned to nature just as perfection is to what can be perfected; but in human nature being and activity are not from the same principle, for the soul is the principle of existence according to its own essence, but it is the principle of activity according to power; therefore, since in matters of grace operating or antecedent grace is the principle from which there is spiritual existence, whereas cooperating grace is the principle of spiritual activity, it seems that operating and cooperating grace are not the same.

Obj. 18: Furthermore, one habit cannot produce two actions at one and the same time; but the action of operating grace, which is to justify or heal the soul, and the action of cooperating or consequent grace, which is to act justly, exist in the soul together; therefore operating and cooperating grace are not the same, and so there is not only one grace in man.

On the contrary (1), it is superfluous that there be many things where one is enough; but one grace is sufficient for a man to be saved, as it says in 2 Corinthians 12:9 my grace is sufficient for you; therefore, there is only one grace in man.

Furthermore (2), a relation does not multiply a thing's essence; but cooperating grace only adds a relation to operating grace. Therefore operating and cooperating grace are essentially the same thing.

I answer that it must be said that, as is clear from what has been said, (Above: a. 1.) something is called grace either because it is given gratuitously, or else because it makes one to be in God's good graces. However, it is clear that there are different graces given gratuitously: for different things are divinely bestowed upon man gratuitously, beyond the merit and ability of human nature, such as prophecy, the working of miracles, and the like, about which the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 12:4: there are divisions of graces; but we are not asking about these at present. Yet grace that puts one in God's good graces, as can be made clear from what has been said, (Above: a. 1.) is taken in two ways: in one way for the divine acceptance itself, which is God's gratuitous will; or in another way for a created gift, which formally perfects man and makes him worthy for eternal life. Thus, taking grace in this second way, it is impossible that there exist in one man any more than one grace.

The reason for this is that grace is spoken of inasmuch as man is sufficiently ordered by it to eternal life; for something is said to be graced as being accepted by God so as to possess eternal life. However, whatever is held to sufficiently order toward something one must also be only one; for if they were many, none of them would be sufficient, or else any one of them would be superfluous. But it is not necessary because of this that grace be something one and simple; for it is possible that no one thing should make a man sufficiently worthy of eternal life, but rather a man would be made worthy from many things, namely from many virtues; which, if this were the case, none of these many things could be called a grace, but all together would be called one grace, since one dignity would be made from all of them in the man with respect to eternal life.

However, in this sense grace is not something one, but it is like one simple habit; and this is the case since habits are diversified in the soul as ordered to diverse acts. However, the acts themselves are not the reason for divine acceptance, but man is first accepted by God, and then his actions, as it says in Genesis 4:4: God looked upon Abel and upon his offerings. Thus, the gift that God grants to those whom he accepts into his kingdom and glory is presupposed to the perfections or habits by which human acts are perfected so as to be worthy of acceptance by God. So it is necessary that the habit of grace remain undivided, as preceding what makes there to be a distinction of habits in the soul.

However, if one takes grace making one to be gracious in the first way, namely as God's gratuitous will, then there is only one grace of God on the part of God himself, who does the accepting, not only with respect to one thing, but also with respect to all things; for whatever is in him cannot be diverse. However, it can be multiple on the part of the effects; as when we say that every effect that God causes in us from the graciousness of his will, by which he accepts us into his kingdom, pertains to that grace which makes one to be gracious; as when he places good thoughts and holy affections in us. Thus grace, inasmuch as it is a habitual gift within us, is one alone; but inasmuch as it denotes an effect of God within us, ordered to our salvation, there can be said to be many graces within us.

Reply Obj. 1: Thus, to the first it must be said that operating and cooperating grace can be distinguished both on the part of God's gratuitous will and on the part of the gift given to us. For grace is called operating with respect to that effect which God's will causes in us, whereas it is called cooperating with respect to that effect which he does not do alone, but with the cooperation of free will. Therefore, on the part of God's gratuitous will, operating grace is called the justification itself of the wicked, which happens by the infusion of the gratuitous gift itself; for only God's gratuitous will causes this gift within us, and free will is not its cause in any way, except in the manner of a disposition that is also insufficient. From the same point of view grace is called cooperating inasmuch as it acts in free choice, causing its motion, facilitating the execution of its exterior act, and giving it perseverance, in all of which free choice does something.

And so it is clear that operating and cooperating grace are different. Yet on the part of the gratuitous gift the same grace is essentially said to be operating and cooperating: it is operating inasmuch as it informs the soul, such that operating is formally understood in the manner of speech in which we say that whiteness makes the wall to be white; for in no way is this an act of free choice. But it is called cooperating inasmuch as it inclines toward the intrinsic and the extrinsic act, and inasmuch as it gives the ability of persevering to the end.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that the different effects that are attributed to operating and cooperating grace cannot diversify a habit; for the effects that are attributed to operating grace are the causes of the effects attributed to cooperating grace: for from the fact that the will is informed by some habit, it follows that it comes forth in the act of willing, and the exterior act is caused from the act of willing itself. Also, the firmness by which we resist sin is caused by a firmness of habit. Thus, it is one and the same habit of grace that informs the soul and elicits the interior and exterior act, and it causes perseverance in some way inasmuch as it resists temptations.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that however much a man has a habit of grace, yet he always needs a divine activity by which God acts in us in the previously mentioned ways; and this is because of the weakness of our nature and the multitude of impediments, which indeed did not exist in the original condition of created nature. Thus, man was more capable at that time of standing fast by himself than he is now capable, even possessing grace, not indeed on account of a defect of grace, but because of nature's weakness; even though he also needed divine providence at that time, directing and helping him: and thus it is necessary that the one possessing grace ask for divine help, which pertains to cooperating grace.

Reply Obj. 4: The solution to the fourth is clear from this.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that grace is not called the form of the virtues as being an essential part of the virtues, for then it would have to be multiplied if the virtues were multiplied; rather, it is called the form of the virtues inasmuch as it formally completes the acts of the virtues. However, an act of virtue is informed in three ways: in one way inasmuch as the appropriate conditions are applied to the act's substance, and by this limitation it is constituted in the mean of virtue. And an act of virtue possesses this from prudence, for the mean of virtue is understood to be according to right reason, as is said in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 2.7, 1107a1.) and in this way prudence is said to be the form of all the other virtues. However, an act of virtue, constituted in the mean in this way, is like matter with respect to the order toward the last end, which order is applied to an act of virtue by charity's command; and so charity is said to be the form of all the other virtues. But grace applies further the efficacy of meriting: for the value of none of our works is reputed as worthy of eternal glory, without presupposing divine acceptance; and so grace is said to be the form of both charity and the other virtues.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that antecedent and consequent grace are distinguished according to their order that they have in gratuitous existence: the first of these is the informing of the subject by grace or else the justification of the wicked, which are the same; but the second is the will's act, the third is the exterior act, the fourth is spiritual improvement and perseverance in the good, and the fifth is the attainment of the reward. Therefore, antecedent and consequent grace are distinguished in one way inasmuch as that by which the wicked are justified is called antecedent grace, whereas it is called consequent grace inasmuch as one who has already been justified engages in activity.

In a second way such that it is called antecedent inasmuch as someone wills correctly, whereas it is consequent inasmuch one carries out in exterior activity that correct will; in a third way such that antecedent grace is referred to all of these, whereas consequent grace is referred to perseverance in those previously mentioned; in a fourth way such that antecedent grace is referred to the whole state of merit, but consequent grace is referred to the reward. However, it is clear from what has been said regarding operating and cooperating grace how, in the first three distinctions, antecedent and consequent grace are the same or different: for it seems that, according to these ways, antecedent and consequent grace are the same as operating and cooperating grace. Also, with respect to the fourth distinction, if one takes the gratuitous gift in itself, which is called grace, then antecedent and consequent grace are found to be the same.

For just as the charity of this life is not taken away but remains in heaven, having been increased, since it implies no defect in its definition: so likewise does grace, since it implies no defect in its definition, become glory by its own increase. Nor is there said to be a different perfection of nature in this current life and in heaven with respect to grace, on account of the different perfecting form, but rather on account of the different measure of perfection. However, if we take grace with all the virtues that it informs, then in this way grace and glory are not the same, for some virtues in heaven will be eliminated, such as faith and hope. (cf. I Cor. 13:13)

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that although the exterior and interior acts are different perfectible things, nevertheless they are ordered, for one is the cause of the other, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that there are two things to consider in sin, namely a turning towards creatures and a turning away from God. Indeed sins are distinguished from each other with respect to turning toward creatures, but they are connected in turning away from God, inasmuch as man is turned from the unchangeable good by any mortal sin. (Cf. Augustine, On Free Will, bk. 2, ch. 1 (PL 32:1269).)

Therefore, virtues are opposed to sins from the viewpoint of turning toward creatures; and so different sins are expelled by different virtues, just as different kinds of ignorance by different kinds of knowledge. But from the viewpoint of turning toward God, all of them are removed by one thing, which is grace. However, kinds of ignorance are not connected in something one, and so the argument is not similar.

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that there is not one kind of guilt that formally perfects all kinds of guilt, in the same way that one habit of virtue or grace perfects all the virtues; and for this reason one kind of guilt does not infect all the powers in the same way that one grace perfects them: yet not such that it is in all of them as in a subject, but inasmuch as it informs the acts of all the powers.

Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that the grace which follows is understood either to be another effect of the gratuitous divine will, or it is understood to be the same habit of grace related to another effect, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that it is a condition required for every virtue to act and to possess a habit firmly and unchangeably, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Ethics; (Aristotle, Ethics 2.4, 1105a32.) and so this kind does not require a special habit.

Reply Obj. 12: To the twelfth it must be said that just as different virtues and different gifts of the Holy Spirit are ordered to different acts, so also are different effects of the sacraments like different remedies for sin and participations in the power of the Lord's Passion, which depend upon sanctifying grace, just like the virtues and the gifts. But the virtues and the gifts have a special name from the fact that the acts to which they are ordered are manifest; thus they are distinguished from grace according to name.

However, the defects of sin, against which the sacraments are instituted, are hidden: hence, the effects of the sacraments do not have their own proper name, rather they are named by the name of grace; for they are called sacramental graces, and the sacraments are distinguished with respect to these as though according to their proper effects. These effects also pertain to sanctifying grace, which are also conjoined to these effects; and so they have a common effect together with these proper effects, which is sanctifying grace, which is given by the sacrament to the one who does not have it, and is increased in the one who does.

Reply Obj. 13–14: And from this the solution to the thirteenth and fourteenth is manifest.

Reply Obj. 15: To the fifteenth it must be said that every sin inflicts one wound from the point of view of turning away from God, as has been said, and so they are healed by one gift of grace; but from the point of view of turning toward creatures, they inflict different wounds, which are healed by different virtues and by different effects of the sacraments.

Reply Obj. 16: To the sixteenth it must be said that although there is not cooperating grace in children in act, yet there is cooperating grace in potency; for the operating grace that they receive will be enough to cooperate with free choice when they will be able to make use of it.

Reply Obj. 17: To the seventeenth it must be said that just as the soul's essence is immediately the principle of existence, whereas it is the principle of activity by means of the powers, so also is it an immediate effect of grace to convey spiritual existence, which pertains to the informing of the subject, or else to the justification of the wicked, which is an effect of operating grace; but it is an effect of grace to elicit meritorious acts by means of the virtues and the gifts, which pertains to cooperating grace.

Reply Obj. 18: To the eighteenth it must be said that one habit cannot, at one and the same time, cause two acts that are distinct activities and not ordered to one another. But one habit can cause two acts of which one is an activity and the other the informing of a subject, or else two activities of which one is a cause of the other, such as an interior act being the cause of an exterior: and in this way the activities of operating and cooperating grace are related, as is clear from what was previously said.