Article 2 — Whether sanctifying grace is the same as charity

Second, it is asked whether sanctifying grace is the same as charity. (Parallel texts: In II Sent, d. 26, a. 4; ST I-II.110.3.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it is: for the sanctifying grace within us is that gift of God by which we become dear to him; but this happens by charity; Proverbs 8:17: I love those loving me; therefore sanctifying grace is the same as charity.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, ch. 106 (PL 40:282; CCSL 46); Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 26, ch. 3.) that the benefit of God by which man's will is prepared and anticipated is faith, not uninformed but formed, which happens by charity; (cf. supra q. 14 a. 5.) therefore, since this benefit is anticipatory grace, it seems that this grace itself is charity.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Holy Spirit is sent invisibly to someone so as to dwell within them; thus he is both sent and dwells within by the same gift; however, he is said to be sent with respect to the gift of charity, just as the Son with respect to the gift of wisdom, (Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 1, d. 17, ch. 1; d. 15, ch. 8.) on account of the likeness of these gifts to the divine persons; but the Holy Spirit is said to dwell within the soul by grace, therefore grace is the same as charity.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, that gift of God, by which we are rendered worthy to possess eternal life, is grace; but man is rendered worthy for eternal life by charity, as is clear from John 14:21 (textus conflatus ut videtur ex John 14:23 and 14:21) if someone loves me, he will be loved by my Father, and I shall love him and make myself manifest to him, in which manifestation consists eternal life; therefore charity is the same as grace.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, two things can be understood regarding the notion of charity, namely that by it man is dear to God, and that by it man holds God dear: but that man is dear to God is prior in the notion of charity than that he holds God dear, as is clear from 1 John 4:10 not that we had loved God, but because he has loved us first. But this is the definition of grace, that by it man is made pleasing to God; thus, since being dear and being pleasing to God are the same, it seems that grace and charity are the same.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, Augustine says (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 18 (PL 42:1082); Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 1, d. 17, ch. 4.) that it is only charity that makes a division between the sons of the kingdom and the sons of perdition, for the rest of God's gifts are common to both the good and the evil; but sanctifying grace distinguishes between the sons of perdition and those of the kingdom, and neither does it exist except in the good; thus it is the same as charity.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, sanctifying grace, since it is a certain accident, cannot exist except in the genus of quality, but only within the first species which is habit and disposition, (Cf. Aristotle, Categories, ch. 8, 8b27.) and since it is not science, it does not seem to be anything else than virtue; but no virtue can be called grace except charity, which is the form of the other virtues; (Cf. above: q. 14, a. 5.) therefore grace is charity.

On the contrary (1), nothing precedes itself; but grace precedes charity as Augustine says in On the Predestination of the Saints; (It is actually Augustine, On the Gift of Perseverance, bk. 2, ch. 16, para. 41 (PL 45:1018).) therefore grace is not the same as charity.

Furthermore (2), Romans 5:5 the charity of God is poured forth into our hearts, by the Holy Spirit who is given to us; therefore the giving of the Holy Spirit precedes charity as a cause does an effect; but the Holy Spirit is given with respect to some one of his gifts; therefore, there is some gift within us that precedes charity, and this seems to be nothing else than grace; therefore grace is something other than charity.

Furthermore (3), grace is always in its own act, for it always makes man to be pleasing; but charity is not always in its own act, for the one possessing charity does not always love in act; therefore charity is not grace.

Furthermore (4), charity is a kind of love: however, there is only love inasmuch we are loving; thus charity is properly that according to which we are loving; but we are not accepted by God inasmuch we are loving, but rather the converse is true: for our acts are not the cause of grace, rather the reverse; thus, the grace by which we are made acceptable to God is something other than charity.

Furthermore (5), what is common to many is not in any one of them by reason of something that is proper to it; but it is common to every virtue to produce a meritorious act; therefore it belongs to none of them inasmuch as as being proper to it, and so neither to charity. Thus, it belongs to it with respect to something common to itself and to all the virtues. But an act is meritorious from grace; thus grace means something that is common to charity and to the other virtues; but it is not common by predication, as it seems, for then there would be as many graces as there are virtues; therefore it is common in the mode of a cause: and so grace is essentially other than charity.

Furthermore, charity perfects the soul as ordered toward a lovable object; but grace does not imply a relationship toward some object, since it is not toward an act but rather toward some kind of existence, namely being pleasing to God; therefore grace is not charity.

I answer that it must be said that some say (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 27, ch. 6; ST I-II.110.3.) grace is essentially the same as virtue in reality; but that it differs according to reason, such that it is called a virtue inasmuch as it perfects an act, whereas it is called grace inasmuch as it makes man and his act pleasing to God; and according to them, it is chiefly charity among the other virtues that is grace. But others say the contrary, (Albert the Great, In III Sent., d. 26, a. 11.) that charity and grace differ essentially, and that no other virtue is grace essentially: and this opinion seems more reasonable.

For since there are different ends for different natures, three things are needed for the attainment of any end in natural things, namely a nature proportioned to that end, an inclination to that end, which is the natural appetite for the end, and movement toward the end; as is clear in earth, where there is a certain nature by which it belongs to it to be in the center; and an inclination toward the central place follows upon this nature, inasmuch as it naturally desire such a place, even when it is detained outside of it by violence; and thus when what is preventing it is removed, it moves downwards. However, man is proportioned to an end according to his nature, for which he has a natural desire; and he is able to act according to his natural powers for the attainment of that end; which end is the contemplation of divine things, possible for man according to nature's capability, in which the philosophers also placed man's final happiness.

But there is an end for which man is prepared by God, exceeding the proportion of human nature, namely eternal life which consists in the vision of God by his essence, and which exceeds the proportion of any created nature, being natural only for God. Hence, something must be given to man not only by which he acts for the end, or by which his appetite is inclined toward that end, but also by which man's nature itself is raised to a certain dignity, according to which such an end becomes suitable for him; and grace is given for this purpose. However, charity is given to incline the affections toward this end; but the other virtues are given so as to carry out the works by which the previously mentioned end is acquired. Thus, just as in natural things the nature itself is other than nature's inclination and its movement or activity, so also in man's gratuitous gifts is grace other than charity and the other virtues. That this comparison is understood correctly is clear from Dionysius in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 2, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 2, part 1, para. 1 (PG 3:392B).) where he says that one cannot have a spiritual activity without first receiving spiritual existence, just as neither can one have an activity of some nature without first having existence in that nature.

Reply Obj. 1: Therefore, to the first it must be said that God loves those who love himself, yet not such that the love for those loving himself is the reason why he loves, but rather the converse.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that faith is said to be an antecedent grace, inasmuch as there first appears in the movement of faith the effect of antecedent grace.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that the whole Trinity dwells within us by grace; but this indwelling can be appropriated to a person by some other particular gift that has a likeness with the person himself, for which reason the person is also said to be sent.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that charity does not suffice for meriting an eternal good except by having presupposed the worthiness of the one meriting, which happens by grace; for otherwise our love would not be deserving of so great a reward.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that it is not unsuitable that something be really before which is nevertheless after with regard to some name; as when the cause of health is before health itself in the subject of that health, and yet healthy signifies the one having health before it signifies the cause of health. Similarly, even though the divine love by which God loves us is prior to the love by which we love him, yet with respect to the definition of charity, that it makes God dear to us is prior to it making us dear to God: for the first pertains to love insofar as it is love, but not the second.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that the fact charity alone distinguishes between the sons of perdition and those of the kingdom belongs to it inasmuch as it cannot be unformed like the other virtues; thus grace, by which charity itself is formed, is not excluded by this.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that grace is in the first species of quality, even though it cannot properly be called a habit, for it is not immediately ordered to action, but rather to a certain spiritual existence which it causes in the soul, and it is like a certain disposition in regard to glory, which is perfected grace. Nevertheless, there is nothing found in what the philosophers knew that is similar to grace among the soul's accidents, for the philosophers did not know any accidents except those that are ordered to actions proportionate to human nature.

We grant the other objections even though some of them did not arrive at their conclusions correctly.