Chapter 37 — That God is good

The goodness of God may be concluded from his perfection which we have proved. (Ch. 28.)

For that by reason of which a thing is said to be good is its own virtue, since the virtue of any thing is that which makes its subject good and renders its work good. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6.) Now virtue is a perfection, since we say that a thing is perfect when it attains its proper virtue, as is clear in the Physics. (Aristotle, Physics 7.3, 246b28–a4.) Therefore, a thing is good because it is perfect. And hence every thing desires its own perfection as its proper good. Now it has been proved that God is perfect. (Ch. 28.) Therefore, he is good.

Again. It has been proved above (Ch. 13.) that there is an immovable first mover, which is God. Now he moves as a mover absolutely immovable, and this moves as the object of desire. Therefore, God is the first object of desire since he is the first immovable mover. Now a thing is desired in two ways: either because it is good, or because it seems good. The former is that which is good, for the seeming good does not move essentially, but according as it has some appearance of good, whereas the good moves essentially. Therefore, the first object of desire, which is God, is good.

Further. The good is that which all things desire, which the Philosopher quotes as very well said in Ethics 1.1. Now all things desire to be in act according to their mode, which is evident from the fact that everything, by its nature, shrinks from corruption. Therefore, the essential notion of the good is to be in act, and consequently evil (which is opposed to good) results from the privation of act by potency, as the Philosopher declares in Metaphysics 9**. Now God is a being in act and not in potency, as we have proved above. (Ch. 15.) Therefore, he is truly good.

Moreover. The bestowal of being and goodness proceeds from goodness. This is proved from the very nature of the good, and from the notion it conveys. For the good of a thing is naturally its act and perfection. Now a thing acts through being in act. But by acting, it bestows being and goodness on other things. Therefore, it is a sign of a thing’s perfection that it is able to produce its like, as the Philosopher declares in Meteorology. (Aristotle, Meteorology 4.3.) Again, the notion of the good is that it is something appetible, and this is an end. And the end moves the agent to act. Hence good is said to be diffusive of itself and being. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4.) Now, this diffusion is becoming to God: for it has been shown above (Ch. 13.) that he is the cause of being in other things, since he is the essentially necessary being. Therefore, he is truly good.

Therefore, it is said in the Psalm: truly God is good to Israel, to those who are pure in heart (Ps 73[72]:1); and: the Lord is good to those who wait for him, to the soul that seeks him (Lam 3:25).