Chapter 32 — That nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things

From the above it is clear that nothing can be predicated univocally of God and other things.

For an effect which does not receive the same form specifically as that by which the agent acts cannot receive the name derived from that form in a univocal sense: for the sun and the heat generated from the sun are not called hot univocally. Now the forms of things which God causes do not come to the species of the divine virtue, since they receive severally and particularly that which is in God simply and universally. (Cc. 28–29.) It is evident, therefore, that nothing can be said univocally of God and other things.

Further. If an effect attains to the species of its cause, the name of the latter will not be predicated of it univocally, unless it receives the same specific form according to the same mode of being. For “house” in art is not univocally the same as “house” in matter, since the form of house has a dissimilar existence in each. Now, other things, even though they receive entirely the same form, do not receive it according to the same mode of being: for there is nothing in God that is not the divine being itself, as shown above, (Ch. 23.) which does not apply to other things. Therefore, it is impossible for anything to be predicated univocally of God and other things.

Moreover. Whatever is predicated of several things univocally is either genus, or species, or difference, or accident, or property. Now, nothing is predicated of God as genus or as difference, as we have proved above, (Cc. 24–25.) and consequently neither as definition nor as species, which consists of genus and difference. Nor can anything be accidental to him, as was shown above, (Ch. 23.) and consequently nothing is predicated of God either as accidental or as proper, for the proper is a kind of accident. It follows, therefore, that nothing is predicated of God and other things univocally.

Again. That which is predicated univocally of several things is more simple than either of them, at least in our way of understanding. Now nothing can be more simple than God, either in reality or in our way of understanding. Therefore, nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things.

Further. Whatever is predicated univocally of several things belongs by participation to each of the things of which it is predicated: for the species is said to participate in the genus, and the individual in the species. But nothing is said of God by participation, since whatever is participated is confined to the mode of a participated thing, and thus is possessed partially, and not according to every mode of perfection. It follows, therefore, that nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things.

Again. That which is predicated of several things according to priority and posteriority is certainly not predicated of them univocally, since that which comes first is included in the definition of what follows, as substance is in the definition of accident (considered as a being). If, therefore, we were to say “being” univocally of substance and accident, it would follow that substance also should enter into the definition of being as predicated of substance, which is clearly impossible. Now, nothing is predicated in the same order of God and other things, but according to priority and posteriority, since all predicates of God are essential (for he is called “being” because he is being itself, and “good” because he is goodness itself), whereas predicates are applied to others by participation (thus Socrates is said to be a man not as though he were humanity itself, but because he has humanity). Therefore, it is impossible for any thing to be predicated univocally of God and other things.