Chapter 39 — That no evil can be in God

Hence it is manifestly apparent that evil cannot be in God.

For “being” and “goodness” and all essential predicates have nothing besides themselves added to them, although “that which is” or “the good” may have something besides being or goodness. For nothing hinders the subject of one perfection being the subject of another besides: thus that which is a body may be white and sweet. But every nature is confined within the bounds of its essence, so that it admits of nothing extraneous within itself. Now God is goodness, and not merely good, as we have proved above. (Ch. 38.) Therefore, nothing that is not goodness can be in him, and consequently evil can in no way be in him.

Moreover. As long as a thing remains, that which is contrary to its essence is altogether incompatible with it: thus irrationality or insensibility is incompatible with man, unless he ceases to be man. Now the divine essence is goodness itself, as we have proved. (Ch. 38.) Therefore, evil (which is contrary to good) can have no place in God unless he ceases to be God, which is impossible, since he is eternal, as was proved above. (Ch. 15.)

Again. Since God is his own being, nothing can be said of him by participation, as is clear from the argument given above. (Ch. 38.) If, then, evil were predicated of him, it would be a predicate not by participation, but by essence. But evil cannot be predicated of any thing in such a way as to be the essence of that thing, for it would lack being, which is a good, as we have shown above. (Ch. 37.) And in evil there can be no extraneous admixture, as neither can there be in goodness. Therefore, evil cannot be predicated of God.

Again. Evil is opposed to good. But the notion of good consists in perfection. (Ch. 37.) And therefore the notion of evil consists in imperfection. Now defect or imperfection cannot be in God, since he is completely perfect, as shown above. (Ch. 28.) Therefore, evil cannot be in God.

Further. A thing is perfect according as it is in act. (Ch. 28.) Therefore, it will be imperfect according as it is deficient in act. Therefore, evil is either privation or includes privation. Now the subject of privation is a potency. But this cannot be in God. (Ch. 16.) Consequently, neither can evil.

Moreover. If good is what is desired by all, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.1.) it follows that evil as such is shunned by every nature. Now that which is in a thing against the mode of its natural appetite is violent and unnatural. Therefore, evil in a thing is violent and unnatural insofar as it is an evil to that thing (although in composite things it may be natural in respect of some part). But God is not composite, nor can anything be violent or unnatural in him, as shown above. (Cc. 18–19.) Therefore, evil cannot be in God.

This is moreover confirmed by Sacred Scripture. For it is written in the first canonical epistle of John: God is light and in him is no darkness at all (1 John 1:5); and: far be it from God that he should do wickedness, and from the Almighty that he should do wrong (Job 34:10).