Chapter 31 — That the divine perfection and the plurality of divine names are not inconsistent with the divine simplicity

From what has been said we can also see that the divine perfection and the various names applied to God are not inconsistent with his simplicity.

For we asserted that all the perfections to be found in other things are to be ascribed to God in the same way as effects are found in their equivocal causes, (Ch. 29.) which effects are in their causes virtually, as heat is in the sun. But the sun would not generate its like unless virtue of this sort were in the genus of heat. Therefore, by reason of this virtue the sun is said to be hot not only because it causes heat, but because the virtue by which it does this is something conformed with heat. Now, the sun causes many other effects in lower bodies (such as dryness) by this same virtue through which it causes heat. And so heat and dryness, which are distinct qualities in fire, are ascribed to the sun in respect of the one virtue. And so too the perfections of all things, which are becoming to other things in respect of various forms, must be ascribed to God in respect of his one virtue. And this virtue is not distinct from his essence, since nothing can be accidental to him, as we have proved. (Ch. 23.) Accordingly, God is said to be wise not only because he causes wisdom, but because insofar as we are wise, we imitate in some way the virtue by which he makes us wise. He is not, however, called a “stone,” although he made the stones, because by the term “stone” we understand a definite mode of being, in respect of which a stone differs from God. (Ch. 30.) But a stone imitates God as its cause, in respect of being, goodness and so forth, even as other creatures do.

The like of this may be found in human cognitive powers and operative virtues. For the intellect by its one virtue knows all that the sensitive faculty apprehends by various powers, and many other things besides. Again, the higher the intellect is, the more things is it able to know by means of one, while an inferior intellect can arrive at the knowledge of those things only by means of many. Again, the royal power extends to all those things to which the various subordinate powers are directed. Likewise, God, by his one simple being, possesses all manner of perfections which in a much lower degree other things attain by certain various means.

From this, it is clear how it is necessary to give several names to God. For, since we cannot know him naturally except by reaching him from his effects, (Ch. 11.) it follows that the terms by which we denote his perfection must be diverse, as also are the perfections which we find in things. If, however, we were able to understand his very essence as it is, and to give him a proper name, we should express him by one name only. And this is promised to those who will see him in his essence: on that day the Lord will be one and his name one (Zech 14:9).