Chapter 33 — That not all terms applied to God and creatures are purely equivocal

It is also clear from what has been said that things predicated of God and other things are not all pure equivocations, as are the effects of an equivocal cause.

For in the effects of an equivocal cause we find no mutual order or relationship, and it is altogether accidental that the same name is applied to various things, for the name applied to one does not signify that it has any relationship to another. But it is not so with the terms applied to God and creatures, for, in employing these common terms, we consider the order of cause and effect, as is clear from what we have said. (Ch. 32.) Therefore, certain things predicated of God and other things are not pure equivocations.

Moreover. Where there is pure equivocation, we observe no likeness of things, but merely sameness of name. Now things have some kind of likeness to God, as shown above. (Ch. 29.) Therefore, it follows that they are not said of God by pure equivocation.

Again. When one thing is predicated of several by pure equivocation, we cannot be led from one to the knowledge of the other, for the knowledge of things depends not on words but on the meaning of names. Now, we come to the knowledge of divine things from our observation of other things, as shown above. Therefore, such things are not pure equivocations when said of God and other things.

Further. The use of equivocal terms breaks the continuity of an argument. Therefore, if nothing were said of God and creatures except by pure equivocation, no argument could be made by proceeding to God from creatures. But the contrary is evidenced by all who speak of divine things.

Moreover. It is useless to predicate a name of a thing unless by that name we understand something about that thing. Now, if names are predicated equivocally of God and creatures, we understand nothing of God by those names, since the meanings of those names are known to us only as applied to creatures. It would, therefore, be useless to say or prove about God that God is being, good, or any thing else of the kind.

If, however, it be asserted that by such terms we only know of God what he is not (namely, so that he is called “living” because he is not in the genus of inanimate beings, and so forth), it follows at least that “living” when said of God and creatures agrees in the negation of inanimate being: and thus it will not be a pure equivocation.