Chapter 85 — That the divine will does not remove contingency from things nor impose absolute necessity on them

From what has been said we may gather that the divine will does not exclude contingency, nor impose absolute necessity on things.

For God wills all that is requisite for the thing which he wills, as already stated. (Ch. 83.) Now it befits some things, according to the mode of their nature, that they be contingent and not necessary. Therefore, he wills certain things to be contingent. Now the efficacy of the divine will requires not only that what God wills to be should be, but also that it should be in the mode that God wills it to be. For even in natural agents, when the active force is strong, it likens its effects to itself not only in its species, but also in its accidents, which are a kind of mode of that thing. Therefore, the efficacy of the divine will does not remove contingency.

Moreover. God wills the good of the universe more especially than any particular good, according as the likeness of his goodness is more completely found in it. (Cf. ch. 75.) Now the completeness of the universe demands that some things should be contingent; otherwise not all the degrees of being would be contained in the universe. Therefore, God wills some things to be contingent.

Again. The good of the universe consists in a certain order, as stated in the Metaphysics. (It is actually Metaphysics 12.10, 1075a11–16.) Now the order of the universe requires that certain causes be changeable, since bodies belong to the perfection of the universe and they do not move unless they be moved. Now from a changeable cause contingent effects follow, since the effect cannot have more stable being than the cause. Hence we find that, though the remote cause be necessary, yet if the proximate cause be contingent, the effect is contingent. This is evidenced by what happens with the lower bodies: for they are contingent on account of the contingency of their proximate causes, although their remote causes, which are the heavenly movements, are necessary. Therefore, God wills some things to happen contingently.

Further. Necessity by supposition in a cause cannot argue absolute necessity in its effect. Now God wills something in the creature not of absolute necessity, but only of necessity by supposition, as we have proved. (Cc. 81–83.) Therefore, we cannot argue absolute necessity in creatures from the divine will. Now this alone excludes contingency, since even contingents that are indifferent to either of two alternatives become necessary by supposition: thus it is necessary that Socrates be moved if he runs. Therefore, the divine will does not exclude contingency from the things willed.

Hence it does not follow that a thing happens of necessity if God wills it, but that this conditional proposition is true and necessary: “if God wills a thing, it will be.” And yet the consequence is not necessary.