Chapter 80 — Of the order between one angel and another

Since corporeal things are governed by spiritual, as we have proved, (Ch. 78.) and since there is order of a kind among corporeal things, it follows that the higher bodies are governed by the higher intellectual substances, and the lower bodies by the lower intellectual substances. And seeing that the higher a substance is, the more universal is its power, while the power of an intellectual substance is more universal than the power of a body, the higher intellectual substances have powers entirely independent of any corporeal power. Consequently, they are not united to bodies. But the lower intellectual substances have powers confined to certain limits and dependent on certain corporeal organs for their exercise, and consequently they need to be united to bodies.

And just as the higher intellectual substances have a more universal power, so too they receive from God more perfectly the divine disposal of things in that they are acquainted with the scheme of order, even as regards individuals, through receiving it from God. This manifestation of the divine governance made by God reaches to the uttermost intellectual substances: thus it is said: Is there any number to his armies? Upon whom does his light not arise? (Job 25:3). On the other hand, the lower intelligences do not receive this manifestation so perfectly as to be able to know thereby every detail of the order of divine providence left to their execution, but only in a general way. The lower their position, the less detailed knowledge of the divine government do they receive through this first manifestation received from above; so much so that the human intellect, which is the lowest in point of natural knowledge, has a knowledge of only certain most general things.

Accordingly, the higher intellectual substances receive immediately from God the perfection of the knowledge in question, which perfection the other lower intellectual substances need to receive through them: just as we have said above (Ch. 75.) that the general knowledge of the disciple is brought to perfection by means of the specific knowledge of the master.

Hence it is that Dionysius speaking of the highest intellectual substances, which he assigns to the first hierarchy or holy sovereignty, says that they are not sanctified by means of other substances, but that they are placed by God himself immediately around him, and as far as possible close to his immaterial and incomprehensible beauty on which they gaze, and in which they contemplate the intelligible concept of his works; and by these, he says, the inferior ranks of heavenly substances are instructed. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 7.) Accordingly, the higher intelligences receive their perfection from a higher source of knowledge.

Now in every disposition of providence, the order of effects is derived from the form of agents, since the effect must proceed from its cause in some kind of likeness. Now it is for the sake of an end that the cause communicates the likeness of its form to the effect. Hence the first principle in the dispositions of providence is the end; the second is the form of the agent; the third is the appointment of the order of effects. Consequently, in the order of the intellect the highest degree is the consideration of the idea of order in the end; the second degree is the same consideration in the form; while the third is the knowledge of the disposition of order in itself and not in a higher principle. Therefore, the art which considers the end governs the art which considers the form, as the art of sailing governs the art of shipbuilding. And the art which considers the form governs the art which considers only the order of movements which prepare the way for the form, as the art of shipbuilding governs the handiwork of the builders.

Accordingly, there is a certain order among the intelligences who take from God himself immediate and perfect cognizance of the order of divine providence. The first and highest perceive the ordered scheme of providence in the last end itself which is the divine goodness, some of them, however, clearer than others; and these are called ‘seraphim,’ that is, fiery or setting on fire, because fire is used to designate intensity of love or desire, which are about the end. Hence Dionysius says that this name indicates both their fervent and quivering activity towards God, and their leading lower things to God as their end. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 7.)

The second place belongs to those who acquire perfect knowledge of the scheme of providence in the divine form. These are called ‘cherubim,’ which signifies fullness of knowledge, for knowledge is made complete through the form of the thing known. Hence Dionysius says that their name indicates that they contemplate the highest operative power of the divine beauty. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 7.)

The third grade is of those who contemplate the disposition of divine judgements in itself. They are called ‘thrones,’ because the throne is significative of judicial power, according to the Psalm: You have sat on the throne, giving righteous judgment (Ps 9:5). Hence Dionysius says that this name signifies that they are God-bearers and adapted for the obedient fulfilment of all divine undertakings. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 7.)

What has been said must, however, be understood not as though the divine goodness, essence, and knowledge of the disposition of things were three distinct things, but in the sense that, according to what we have been saying, we may look at the matter in question from different points of view.

Again, there must be order among even the lower spirits, who receive from the higher spirits perfect knowledge of the divine order to be fulfilled by them. For the higher ones are also more universal in their power of understanding, so that they acquire their knowledge of the order of providence from more universal principles and causes, but those beneath them from more particular causes. For a man who could consider the entire physical order in the heavenly bodies would be of a higher intelligence than one who needed to turn his mind to lower things in order to perfect his knowledge. Accordingly, those who are able to know perfectly the order of providence from the universal causes which stand midway between God (the supremely universal cause) and particular causes are themselves between those who are able to consider the aforesaid order in God himself, and those who need to consider it in particular causes. Dionysius assigns these to the middle hierarchy, which he says governs the lowest even as it is governed by the highest. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 8.)

Again, among these intellectual substances there must also be some kind of order, since the universal disposition of providence is divided first among many executors. This belongs to the order of ‘dominations,’ because to command what others execute belongs to one having dominion. Hence Dionysius says that the name of domination signifies a certain liberty free from servile condition and any subjection. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch.8.)

Second, it is distributed by the operator and executor in reference to many effects. This is done by the order of ‘virtues,’ whose name, as Dionysius says in the same passage, designates a certain strength and virility in carrying out the divine operations, without so much as swerving, through weakness, from the divine movement. Hence it is evident that the principle of universal operation belongs to this order. Thus it also seems the movement of the heavenly bodies belongs to this order, from which particular effects ensue in nature as from universal causes. Thus they are called ‘powers of heaven,’ where it is said: The powers of the heavens will be moved (Luke 21:26). To the same spirits apparently belongs the execution of those divine works which are done outside the order of nature, for these are the highest of God’s ministries: for which reason Gregory says that the virtues are those spirits through whom miracles are frequently wrought. (Gregory, Homilies on the Gospels, hom. 34.) And if there be anything else of a universal and prominent nature in the fulfilment of the divine ministry, it is fittingly ascribed to this order.

Third, the universal order of providence, once established in its effects, is guarded from confusion by curbing the things which might disturb that order. This belongs to the order of ‘powers.’ Hence Dionysius says in the same place that the name of powers implies a well-established order, without confusion, in the divine undertakings. And so Gregory says that it belongs to this order to check contrary powers. (Gregory, Homilies on the Gospels, hom. 34.)

The lowest of superior intellectual substances are those who receive the knowledge of the order of divine providence in relation to particular causes: these are placed in immediate authority over human affairs. Of them Dionysius says: This third rank of spirits presides, in consequence, over the human hierarchy. (Gregory, Homilies on the Gospels, hom. 9.) By human affairs we must understand all lower natures and particular causes that are subordinated to man and serve for his use, as we have already explained. (Ch. 71.)

Among these also there is a certain order. For in human affairs there is a common good, namely, the good of the city or of the nation, (Nicomachean Ethics 1.2.) and this apparently belongs to the order of ‘principalities.’ Hence Dionysius says in the same chapter that the name of principality indicates leadership in a sacred order. Hence mention is made of Michael, the prince of the Jews, and of the prince of the Persians, and of the prince of the Greeks (Dan 10:13, 20). And thus the government of kingdoms and the change of supremacy from one nation to another must belong to the ministry of this order. It would also seem part of their office to instruct those men who are in positions of authority in matters pertaining to the administration of their office.

There is also a human good not common to many, but belonging to an individual by himself, yet useful not to one only, but to many: for instance, those things which all and each one must believe and observe, such as the articles of faith, the divine worship, and the like. This belongs to the ‘archangels’ of whom Gregory says that they announce the greater things: (Nicomachean Ethics 1.2.) thus we call Gabriel an archangel because he announced the Incarnation of the Word to the Virgin, which is an article of faith for all.

There is also a human good that belongs to each one singly. This pertains to the order of ‘angels’ of whom Gregory says that they announce minor matters. Hence they are called ‘guardian angels’ according to the Psalm: He will give his angels charge of you to guard you in all your ways (Ps 91[90]:11). Hence Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 9.) that the archangels are between the principalities and angels, because they have something in common with both. With the principalities, inasmuch as they lead the lower angels, and rightly so, because in human affairs matters of restricted interest must be regulated according to those that are of common interest. And with the angels, because they announce to the angels, and to us through the angels, for it is the duty of the latter to announce to men what concerns each individual. For this reason the lowest order has received the name common to all as its proper one, namely, because its duty is to announce to us immediately. And so the name ‘archangel’ is as it were composed of both, since archangel means a ‘principal angel.’

Gregory assigns the ordering of the heavenly spirits differently: (Gregory, Homilies on the Gospels, hom. 34.) for he places the principalities among the spirits of the second rank, immediately after the dominations, and the virtues among the lowest, above the archangels. But to one who considers the matter carefully, the difference is but small. For, according to Gregory, the principalities are not placed over nations but over good spirits, as holding the principal place in the execution of the divine ministry, because he says that to be a principal is to stand in a higher place than others. According to the explanation given above, we said that this belonged to the virtues. As to the virtues, according to Gregory they are assigned to certain particular operations when, in some special case, outside the usual order of things, miracles have to be wrought. In this way, they are fittingly numbered among the lowest angels.

Both explanations have the authority of the Apostle. For he says: Setting him, namely Christ, on his right hand in heavenly places, above all principality, and power, and virtue, and dominion (Eph 1:20–21), where it is clear that in the ascending order he places the powers above the principalities, and the virtues above these, and the dominations above the last named. This is the order adopted by Dionysius. Whereas speaking of Christ to the Colossians he says: Whether thrones or dominations or principalities or powers, all things were created through him and for him (Col 1:16). Here we see that beginning with the thrones, in the descending order, he places the dominations under them, beneath these the principalities, and lower still the powers. This is the order adopted by Gregory.

Mention is made of the seraphim (Isa 6:2, 6); of the cherubim (Ezek 1:3); of the archangels in the canonical epistle of Jude: The archangel Michael, contending with the devil, disputed about the body of Moses (Jude 9:9); and of the angels in the Psalms, as already observed.

In all ordered powers there is this in common: the lower all work by virtue of the higher. Hence all the lower angels accomplish by virtue of the seraphim what we have stated as belonging to the order of seraphim, and the same applies to the other orders.