Chapter 55 — Reply to the arguments given above against the fittingness of the Incarnation

There should be no difficulty in solving the objections given above. (Ch. 53.)

It is not contrary to the order of the universe, as the first objection maintained, that God should become man. Although the divine nature infinitely surpasses the nature of man, nevertheless, according to the order of his nature, man has God for his end, and is adapted for union with God by his intellect. The personal union of God with man exemplifies and endorses that union, although each nature retains its own property, so that neither did the divine nature lose anything of its excellence, nor was the human nature raised above the limits of its species.

We must also note that by reason of the perfection and unchangeableness of the divine goodness, God suffers no loss of dignity through the approach, however near, of any creature, although this is a gain to the creature. Thus he communicates his goodness to creatures without any detriment to himself.

Likewise, though God’s will suffices to make all things, his wisdom requires that each individual thing should be the object of his providence, insofar as it is expedient for it. Thus to each thing he has fittingly appointed its appropriate cause. Consequently, although God was able by his will alone to bring about all the benefits that we ascribe to the Incarnation, as the second objection stated, it was nevertheless expedient for human nature that they should be brought about by God made man, as we may gather somewhat from the arguments given above. (Ch. 54.)

The third objection is easily answered. Man is composed of a spiritual and corporeal nature, standing on the boundaries of both, as it were, so that whatsoever is done for man’s good would seem to affect all creatures. Thus the lower material creatures are employed by man and, to a certain extent, are subject to him, while the higher spiritual creature—namely, the angel—has the same last end to obtain as man, as we have already shown. (Bk. 3, cc. 47. seqq.) Accordingly, it would seem fitting that the universal cause of all should assume, in unity of person, the creature in whom, more than in any other, he unites himself to all creatures.

We must also observe that the rational creature alone acts of itself, for irrational creatures are driven by their own bias, rather than act of themselves; thus they are to be regarded as instruments rather than principal agents. Now it was fitting that God should assume a creature capable of acting of itself as principal agent, because an instrumental agent acts through being moved to action, whereas the principal agent acts itself and of itself. Accordingly, if God were to do anything by means of an irrational creature, all that is required in accordance with that creature’s natural condition is that it be moved by God, and there is no need for it to be assumed into personal union so as to act itself, since this would be inconsistent with its natural condition, and is consistent with the rational nature alone. Hence it was fitting that God should assume not an irrational, but a rational creature—that is to say, either an angel or a man.

And though (as the fourth objection argued) the angelic nature is more excellent than human nature as regards its natural properties, it was nevertheless more expedient for the human nature to be assumed. First, because in man sin is reparable, inasmuch as his choice is not set upon a thing unchangeably, but may turn from good to evil, and return from evil to good; and man’s reason, gathering the truth from sensible objects and signs, can be led in opposite directions. On the other hand, just as an angel’s apprehension is unchangeable, since he has unchangeable knowledge by simple intuition, so too is his choice unchangeable. Consequently he is either not moved at all to evil, or if he is so moved, he is moved unchangeably. Therefore, his sin is irreparable. Since, then, the expiation of sins was apparently the chief motive of the Incarnation as we learn from Scripture, it was more fitting that God should assume the human than the angelic nature. Second, because God assumed the creature in unity of person, not of nature, as we have already proved. (Ch. 34.) Hence it was more fitting that he should assume the human than the angelic nature, because nature and person are distinct in man, inasmuch as he is composed of matter and form; but in the angel, they are not distinct because he is immaterial. Third, because an angel, by a property of his nature, is nearer to knowing God than man, whose knowledge arises from the senses. Hence for an angel it was enough that he learned divine things from God through his intelligence, but man’s natural condition required that through his senses he should learn about himself from God, and this was done by the Incarnation. Moreover, the very distance between man and God seemed to make it more difficult for him to arrive at the enjoyment of God; therefore he needed to be assumed by God more than the angel, so that he might conceive the hope of going to heaven. Again, since man was the terminus of creation, as though postulating all other creatures in the natural order of generation, he was fittingly united to the first principle of things, so as to complete the circle of creation.

The assumption of human nature by God does not prove an occasion of error, as the fifth argument suggested. The assumption of human nature, as we have stated, (Ch. 41.) was made in unity of person, and not in unity of nature. Consequently, there is no occasion for us to agree with those who held that God is not above all, and said that he is the soul of the world, or something of the kind.

It is true, as the sixth objection states, that many errors arose concerning God’s Incarnation; yet, surely, many more came to an end after the Incarnation. Just as, in keeping with the defectible nature of the creature, some evils resulted from the creation of things, although it proceeded from the divine goodness, so neither is it a matter for astonishment if, after the manifestation of the divine truth, some errors arose through the defectible nature of the human mind. And yet these errors sharpened the wits of the faithful for a more diligent search of the truth in divine things, just as God directs the evils that occur among creatures to some good.

Although all created good is small in comparison with the divine goodness, nevertheless nothing among created things can be greater than the salvation of the rational creature, consisting, as it does, in the enjoyment of that same divine goodness. Now the salvation of mankind was the result of God’s Incarnation. Therefore, as the seventh objection argued, the world derived no little benefit from the Incarnation. But it does not follow that all men should be saved through God’s Incarnation, but only those who would adhere to the Incarnation by faith and the sacraments of faith. The efficacy of the Incarnation is indeed sufficient to save all men: that not all are saved is due to their evil disposition, in that they are unwilling to receive the fruit of the Incarnation by adhering to God incarnate by faith and love. For man was not to be deprived of his free-will, whereby he can adhere to God incarnate or not adhere to him; otherwise, man’s good would be compulsory, and would be rendered unmeritorious and undeserving of praise.

The Incarnation of God was made known to man by adequate signs. The divinity cannot be better evidenced than by those things that are proper to God. Now it is proper to God to be able to change the laws of nature by performing a work that is above nature, whose author he is. Hence it is a most appropriate proof of divinity if works are done that transcend the laws of nature, such as giving sight to the blind, cleansing lepers, and raising the dead to life. Now, Christ performed such works as thes. Hence when he was asked: Are you he who is to come, or shall we look for another? (Luke 7:20), he proved his divinity by these works, replying: The blind receive their sight, the lame walk . . . the deaf hear (Luke 7:22). And there was no need to create another world, for this was neither in the plan of Divine Wisdom, nor in the nature of things. If, however, it be contended that like miracles are related to have been done by others, as the eighth argument suggested, we must observe that Christ’s way of doing them was very different, and more divine. Others did these things by praying; Christ, by commanding, as acting by his own power. Moreover, not only did he do these things himself, but gave the power to do these and greater things still, to others who worked miracles by merely calling on his name. Again, Christ worked miracles not only on men’s bodies, but also on their souls: which latter works are much greater. Thus, for instance, through him and the invocation of his name, the Holy Spirit was given, by whom men’s hearts were kindled with the fire of divine love, their minds suddenly filled with the knowledge of divine things, and the tongues of simple men made eloquent in declaring God’s truth to the people. Such works are an evident proof of Christ’s divinity, for no mere man could have done them. Hence the Apostle says that the salvation of mankind was declared at first by the Lord, and it was attested to us by those who heard him, while God also bore witness by signs and wonders and various miracles and by gifts of the Holy Spirit distributed according to his own will (Heb 2:3–4).

Although God’s Incarnation was necessary for the salvation of all mankind, there was no need, as the ninth objection states, for God to become incarnate from the very beginning of the world. In the first place, the incarnate God was necessary that man might have a remedy for sin, as stated above. (Ch. 54.) Now it is not expedient to offer a man a remedy for sin unless he first acknowledge his fault, so that, no longer trusting in himself, he puts his trust in God, who alone can heal him of his sin, as stated above. (Ch. 54.) Now man could presume on himself in point of knowledge, and in point of strength. Hence it was expedient that he should be left to himself for a time, that he might learn by experience his inability to save his soul. His natural knowledge was insufficient, since he disobeyed the law of nature before the time of the written Law; and his own strength was inadequate since even when, by the Law, he knew what was sinful, he sinned through weakness. Thus, when at length man no longer presumed either on his knowledge or on his own strength, it was expedient that he should be given an efficacious assistance against sin by Christ’s Incarnation—namely, the grace of Christ supplies his lack of knowledge by removing his doubts, and strengthening him against the assaults of temptation, lest he fail through weakness. Hence it is that the human race has experienced three states, before the Law, under the Law, and under grace.

Second, perfect law and doctrine were to be given to man by God incarnate. Now, the condition of human nature is such that it does not reach perfection at once, but is led through a stage of imperfection before it reaches that of perfection. We have an example of this in the education of children: we instruct them at first in very little things, because they cannot grasp the great things from the very beginning. In like manner, if a man were to tell his audience things they have never heard before, or that are above their intelligence, they would not grasp them at once; he must prepare their minds beforehand with things that are less out of the ordinary. Accordingly, it was expedient that in things concerning his salvation, man should receive at first a slight and elementary instruction through the patriarchs, the Law, and the prophets; and that at length in the fullness of time, the perfect teaching of Christ should be published on earth. Hence, the Apostle says: When the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son (Gal 4:4). And again it is said that the Law was our pedagogue until Christ . . . but we are no longer under a pedagogue (Gal 3:24–25).

It must also be noted that just as the coming of a great king should be preceded by heralds so that his subjects may be ready to receive him with due respect, so was it proper that the coming of God on earth should be heralded by many things, in order that men might be ready to receive God incarnate. This was done by promises and admonitions preceding him, whereby man’s mind was prepared to believe more easily in one who was already announced, and to receive him more earnestly on account of the promises made of old.

Although the coming of God incarnate into the world was so necessary for man’s salvation, there was no need for him to live among men until the end of the world, as the tenth objection contended. This would have been detrimental to the reverence which men owe to the incarnate God, since, seeing him in the flesh and like the rest of men, they would have esteemed him no better than others. On the other hand, when he withdrew his presence from among men after doing wonders on earth, they began to revere him all the more. For this very reason he did not give his disciples the fullness of the Holy Spirit while as yet he lived among them, because his absence would make their souls more ready to receive the gifts of the spirit. Hence he said to them: If I do not go away, the Counselor will not come to you; but if I go, I will send him to you (John 16:7).

It was not expedient for God to take impassible and immortal flesh, as the eleventh objection stated, but rather that he should assume a flesh that was subject to suffering and death. In the first place, it was necessary for man to know of the blessing bestowed on him through the Incarnation, in order that he might be inflamed with divine love. Now, that the truth of the Incarnation might be evident to man, it was necessary that God should take flesh like that of other men—namely, passible and mortal. For had he taken impassible and immortal flesh, men (who were unacquainted with flesh of that kind) would have deemed it to be imaginary and not real.

Second, it was necessary for God to take flesh in order to atone for the sin of mankind. Now, as we have shown, (Bk. 3, ch. 158.) one man can atone for another; on the condition, however, that he take upon himself willingly the punishment due to another and not due to himself. And the punishment resulting from the sin of the human race is death as well as other sufferings of the present life, as indicated above. (Cc. 50-53.) Therefore, the Apostle says that sin came into the world through one man and death through sin (Rom 5:12). Hence it was expedient that God should take suffering and mortal flesh without sin, so that by suffering and dying for us he would make atonement and take sin away. This is expressed in the words of the Apostle, God . . . sent his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh (Rom 8:3)—that is to say, having flesh like to that of sinners, passible and mortal. He adds, that of sin he might condemn (Vulgate: and of sin he condemned, etc.) *sin in the flesh—*that is to say, that by the pain he bore in his flesh for our sins he might take our sins away.

Third, since his flesh was subject to suffering and death, he was the more able to give us an example of virtue by his fortitude in overcoming the sufferings in the flesh, and by the godly use he made of them.

Fourth, we are all the more raised to the hope of immortality by seeing that he was transformed from the state of suffering and mortal flesh to that of a flesh that knows neither suffering nor death: and so we also hope that it will be the same with us, who are now clothed in flesh, passible and mortal. But if he had taken impassible and immortal flesh from the very first, we who know ourselves to be mortal and corruptible would have had no reason to hope for immortality. Moreover, the office of mediator required that he should be a partner with us in suffering and mortal flesh, and with God in power and glory, so that he might take away from us that which he shared with us—namely, suffering and death—and lead us to that which he shared with God. For he was the mediator so that he might unite us to God.

In like manner, it was not expedient that God incarnate should lead a life replete with wealth and the highest honor or dignity in this world, as the twelfth objection argued. In the first place, because man’s mind was given to earthly things, he came to withdraw it from them and to raise it to heavenly things. Hence he had to draw men to the contempt of riches (and of other things on which worldly men set their heart) by his example, and that he should lead a poor and hidden life in this world. Second, if he had abounded in riches, and occupied a high position, the works he did as God would have been put down to his worldly power rather than to his Godly might. Hence it was a very strong proof of his divinity that, without the help of the secular arm, he converted the whole world to better things.

Hence it is plain how the thirteenth objection is to be answered.

It is, indeed, far from being untrue that, according to the Apostle’s teaching, the incarnate Son of God suffered death in obedience to his Father’s command. God’s commands to men concern acts of virtue; and according as a man’s virtuous acts are more perfect, the more is he obedient to God. Now the greatest of the virtues is charity, to which all the others are referred. Hence Christ, whose act of charity was most perfect, was most obedient to God, for no act of charity is more perfect than that a man die for love of another, as our Lord himself declared: Greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends (John 15:13). Therefore, Christ, by dying for the salvation of man and for the glory of God the Father, performed an act of perfect charity, and was most obedient to God. Nor was this incompatible with his divinity, as the fourteenth objection averred. For the union was so made in the person that both natures retained their respective properties (namely, divine and human, as we have stated above). (Chs. 41, 46.) Hence, though Christ suffered even death besides those things which belonged to his human nature, his divinity remained impassible, although on account of the unity of person, we say that God suffered and died. This is exemplified in ourselves, since although the body dies, the soul remains immortal.

It must also be observed that although God does not will the death of man, as the fifteenth objection stated, nevertheless he wills the virtue whereby man suffers death with fortitude and braves the danger of death through charity. Thus God willed Christ’s death insofar as Christ accepted death through charity and bore it with fortitude.

Hence it is clear that it was not wicked and cruel for God the Father to have willed Christ’s death, as the sixteenth objection argued. For he did not compel him against his will, but it pleased him that Christ should accept death through charity. Indeed, he wrought this charity in Christ’s soul.

Likewise, there is nothing unseemly in saying that Christ was willing to suffer death on the cross, in order to give an example of humility. It is true, as the seventeenth objection asserted, that humility is not in God, since the virtue of humility consists in that a man keeps to his own place, and does not reach out to things above him, but is subject to his superior. Hence it is evident that humility is not becoming to God, who has no superior, but is above all. If, however, someone subjects himself out of humility at times either to an equal or to an inferior, this is because he looks upon one who is simply his equal or inferior as superior to himself in some respect. Accordingly, though the virtue of humility is not becoming to Christ in his divine nature, it is becoming to him in his humanity. And his humility is rendered the more praiseworthy by reason of his divine nature, because personal worth adds to the praise of humility—for instance, as when a great man has to suffer an indignity through necessity. Now no man is of greater worth than one who is God: consequently, most praiseworthy was the humility of the Man-God, who suffered the infamies which he had to suffer for man’s salvation. For pride had made men lovers of worldly glory. Therefore, that he might transform man’s mind from the love of worldly glory to the love of divine glory, he was willing to suffer death—not any kind, but the most humiliating death. There are those who, though they do not fear death, abhor an ignominious death, and it was that men might despise even this that our Lord heartened men by the example of his death.

Again, although men might have been taught humility by divine discourses, as the eighteenth objection urged, nevertheless deeds incite more to action than words, and all the more effectively as the goodness of the doer is known with greater certainty. Hence, however many other men might be examples of humility, it was still most expedient that we should be incited by the example of a Man-God, who certainly could not err, and whose humility is all the more wonderful as his majesty is the more sublime.

It is also clear from what has been said that Christ had to suffer death not only that he might give an example of the contempt of death for love of the truth, but also that he might wash away the sins of others. This was done when he who was sinless was willing to suffer the death due to sin, in order that he might take upon himself the punishment due to others by atoning for them. And, though God’s grace alone suffices for the remission of sins, as the nineteenth objection argued, nevertheless when sin is remitted something is required of him whose sin is forgiven—namely, that he offer satisfaction to the one he offended. And seeing that other men were unable to do this for themselves, Christ did so for all by suffering a voluntary death through charity.

And although in the punishment of sins the sinner himself should be punished, as the twentieth objection urged, nevertheless in the atonement for sin, one man can bear the punishment of another. The reason is that when a punishment is inflicted for sin, we consider the wickedness of the person to be punished; but when it is a question of atonement, if a person accepts punishment willingly in order to placate one whom he has offended, we look at the charity and goodwill of him who atones. This is especially the case when one man atones for another. Consequently, one man’s atonement for another man is acceptable to God, as we have shown. (Bk. 3, ch. 158.)

No mere man can make satisfaction for all mankind, as proved above; (Ch. 54.) nor could an angel suffice for the purpose, as the twenty-first objection suggested. An angel, though superior to man in certain natural properties of his, is man’s equal in the participation of heavenly bliss, to which man was to be restored by means of atonement. Moreover, man’s dignity would not be fully repaired if he were beholden to an angel for his atonement.

It must be borne in mind, however, that Christ’s death derived its power of atonement from his charity whereby he accepted death voluntarily, and not from the wickedness of his executioners, who sinned by slaying him. As the twenty-second objection states, sin is not blotted out by sin.

Although Christ’s death atoned for sin, there was no need for him to die as often as men sin, as the twenty-third objection maintained. Christ’s death sufficed to expiate the sins of all men both by reason of the sublime charity whereby he suffered death, and on account of the dignity of the person who made satisfaction, since he was both God and man. And it is clear that even in human affairs, the higher a person is placed, of so much greater account is the punishment suffered by him, whether in reference to the humility and charity of the sufferer, or to the guilt of the offender.

Christ’s death sufficed to atone for the sins of all mankind, because, although he died only in his human nature, as the twenty-fourth objection argued, yet his death was rendered precious by the dignity of the person who suffered, namely, the person of God the Son. For just as it is a greater crime to injure a person of greater dignity, (Bk. 3, ch. 144.) so is it a mark of greater virtue and of greater charity that a person of higher rank suffer willingly for others.

Yet, although by his death Christ made sufficient satisfaction for original sin, it is not unreasonable, as the twenty-fifth objection argued, that the penalties resulting from original sin still remain in all, even in those who have become participators in Christ’s redemption. It was fitting and profitable that the punishment should remain after the guilt had been removed. In the first place, that the faithful might be conformed to Christ, as members to their head. Therefore, just as Christ bore many sufferings before entering into everlasting glory, so was it fitting that his faithful should suffer before attaining to immortality. Thus they bear in themselves the emblems of Christ’s suffering, that they may obtain the likeness of his glory, according to the words of the Apostle: Heirs of God and fellow heirs with Christ, provided we suffer with him in order that we may also be glorified with him (Rom 8:17). Second, if man were to become immune from death and suffering as soon as he comes to Christ, many would come to him for the sake of these advantages of the body rather than for the sake of the good of the soul. This is against Christ’s purpose, since he came into the world to draw men away from the love of bodily goods to spiritual things. Third, if men became impassible and immortal as soon as they came to Christ, they would be compelled, in a sense, to believe in Christ; this would diminish the merit of faith.

Although Christ atoned sufficiently for the sins of mankind by his death, as the twenty-sixth objection argued, each one must seek the means of his own salvation. Christ’s death is by way of being a universal cause of salvation, just as the sin of the first man was like a universal cause of damnation. Now a universal cause needs to be applied to each individual, that the latter may have its share in the effect of the universal cause. Accordingly, the effect of the sin of our first parent reaches each individual through carnal origin: and the effect of Christ’s death reaches each individual through spiritual regeneration, whereby man is united to and incorporated with Christ. Therefore, each one must seek to be regenerated by Christ, and to receive the other things in which the power of Christ’s death is effective.

Hence it follows that the outflow of salvation from Christ to mankind is not through the channel of natural procreation, but through the endeavor of the goodwill whereby a man adheres to Christ. Consequently, that which each one receives from Christ is his own personal good, so that it is not transmitted by him to his children, as the sin of our first parent is, through having its source in natural procreation. Hence it is that although parents be cleansed of original sin by Christ, it is not unreasonable, as the twenty-seventh objection argued, that their children be born in original sin, and need the sacraments of salvation.

In some measure, then, we have shown that the teaching of the Catholic faith concerning the mystery of the Incarnation is neither impossible nor unreasonable.

The sacraments