Chapter 52 — Reply to the above arguments

We must, in the first place, observe that there are certain probable signs of original sin in the human race. For, since God watches over men’s actions so as to assign rewards to good deeds, and punishments to evil deeds, as we have already shown, (Bk. 3, ch. 140.) we can conclude that where there is punishment, there has been sin. Now the whole human race suffers various punishments, both bodily and spiritual. Of bodily punishments the chief is death, to which all others are conducive and subordinate, such as hunger, thirst, and so on. Of spiritual punishments, the principal is weakness of reason, the result being that man encounters difficulty in acquiring knowledge of the truth, and easily falls into error; also that he is unable wholly to overcome his animal propensities, which sometimes obscure his mental vision.

Someone, however, might reply that these defects, whether of body or of soul, are not penalties but natural defects, and a necessary consequence of the conditions of matter. For the human body, being composed of contrary elements, must be corruptible; and the sensitive appetite must incline to things in which the senses delight, and which at times are contrary to reason. Again, the possible intellect is in potency to all things intelligible, and has none of them actually, but has by its very nature to acquire them through the senses, and therefore with difficulty acquires the knowledge of truth, and is easily led astray by the imagination. Nevertheless, if we look at the matter rightly, it will appear sufficiently probable that, divine providence having fitted each perfection to that which is to be perfected, God has united a higher to a lower nature in order that the former might dominate the latter, and should any obstacle to this dominion arise through a defect of nature, God would remove it by a special and supernatural act of kindness. Therefore, since the rational soul is of a higher nature than the body, we believe that it was united to the body under such conditions that there can be nothing in the body to oppose the soul whereby the body lives. And in like manner, if reason in man is united to his sensual appetite and his other sensitive powers, that reason is not hindered by the sensitive powers, but, on the contrary, dominates them.

Hence, according to the teaching of faith, we affirm that man was so fashioned from the beginning that as long as his reason was subject to God, not only would his lower powers serve him without hindrance, but there would be nothing in his body to lessen its subjection; since whatever was lacking in nature to bring this about God by his grace would supply. But no sooner did his reason turn away from God than his lower powers rebelled against his reason, and his body became subject to sufferings that counteract the life it receives from the soul.

Accordingly, although these defects seem natural to man absolutely if we consider his nature from its lower side, nevertheless, if we consider divine providence, and the dignity of the higher part of man’s nature, it can be proved with sufficient probability that these defects are penal, and consequently that the human race was originally infected with sin.

Having made these remarks, let us now turn our attention to the objections.

It is not unreasonable, as the first objection affirmed, to say that because one man sinned, all men have contracted sin through their origin, although each one is praised or blamed for his own actions. For we must not speak in the same way of things that regard the individual, as of things that regard the nature of the whole species, because, as Porphyry says, (Praedicab. ch. De specie.) by sharing the same species, many men are like one man. Accordingly, a sin belonging to one individual or person is not imputed to the fault of any other but the sinner, because they are different persons. But if there be a sin that pertains to the whole specific nature, it is not unreasonable that it be transmitted from one man to another, even as the specific nature is. Now sin is an evil of the rational nature, and evil is the privation of good, and, consequently, if we are to judge whether a certain sin pertains to the common nature or to a particular person, we must see what good it deprives one of.

Accordingly, actual sins which are committed by mankind in general deprive the sinner’s person of a good, such as grace and the right order among the parts of the soul. Consequently, they are personal sins, and when one man sins, another is not blamed. On the other hand, the first sin of the first man deprived the sinner not only of his own personal good—namely, grace and due order in the soul, but also of the good belonging to the common nature. For, as we said above, (Bk. 3, ch. 81.) human nature was so fashioned when it was first brought into being that the lower powers were perfectly subject to the soul, the reason to God, and the body to the soul—God supplying by grace that which nature lacked for the purpose. Now this boon, which some call original justice, was bestowed on the first man in such a way that he was to transmit it together with human nature to his posterity. But when the first man sinned, his reason rebelled against God, and the consequence was that his lower powers ceased to be perfectly subject to reason, and his body to his soul. And this was not only in the first man that sinned, but also in his posterity, who were to have inherited the aforesaid original justice. Hence the sin of the first man, from whom all others are descended according to the teaching of faith, was not only a personal sin, insofar as it deprived the first man himself of his own good, but also a sin of nature, inasmuch as the result of that sin was that both he and his posterity were deprived of a gift bestowed on the entire nature. Therefore, this defect, transmitted by our first parent to others, is culpable also in those others inasmuch as all men are reckoned as one man through sharing in one common nature. And this sin proves to be voluntary in reference to the will of our first parent, just as the hand’s deed may be sinful on account of the will of the first mover (namely, the reason), so that in reference to the sin of nature we look upon the members of the human race as being parts of the common nature, just as in the case of a personal sin there are various parts in one man.

Accordingly, it is true to say with the Apostle that by one man’s disobedience many were made sinners (Rom 5:19), as the second argument stated; (Ch. 50.) not that other men were actually in him, but virtually, as in their first origin. Nor are they said to have sinned in him by their own deed, but as sharing in his nature which was corrupted by sin.

The third objection argued thus. If sin is transmitted by our first parent to his posterity, seeing that the rational soul is the subject of sin, it follows that the rational soul is transmitted together with the semen. But this does not follow. This sin of nature, which we call original sin, is transmitted in the same way as the specific nature, and although the rational soul completes that nature, it is not transmitted with the semen: the body alone is thus transmitted, being naturally adapted to receive such a soul, as proved above. (Bk. 2, ch. 86.)

Although Christ was descended from our first parent according to the flesh, he did not contract the stain of original sin, as the fourth objection argued, because from our first parent he received only the matter of a human body, and the power which fashioned his body was not derived from our first parent, but from the Holy Spirit, as we have proved. (Ch. 46.) Consequently, he received human nature from Adam not as from its efficient cause, but as from its material principle.

We must also note that the reason why these defects are transmitted to us through our natural origin is that our nature is deprived of the assistance of grace, bestowed on it in our first parent, and destined to be transmitted to his posterity together with nature. Since this privation was the consequence of his deliberate sin, the defects resulting from it took the form of sin. Accordingly, these defects are both culpable in reference to their first principle, which was Adam’s sin, and natural, in reference to nature already destitute. Therefore, the Apostle says: We were by nature children of wrath (Eph 2:3). Thus the fifth objection is answered.

Thus it is clear that the vicious origin which is the cause of original sin is due to the lack of a principle—namely, the gratuitous gift bestowed on human nature in its creation. In a sense, this gift was natural, not because it resulted from the principles of nature, but because it was bestowed on man in such a way that it was to be transmitted by him together with his nature. But the sixth objection took ‘natural’ as signifying that which results from natural principles.

In the same sense, the seventh objection speaks of the defect of a natural principle as belonging to the specific nature; and it is true that whatever results from this defect occurs in the minority of cases. But the defect of original sin results from our being deprived of a principle that is additional to the principles of the species, as stated above.

We must also observe that the act of the generative power cannot be an actual sin, for this depends on the will of the individual, but the act of the generative power is not obedient to reason or the will, as the eighth objection argued. But original sin pertains to nature; thus there is nothing to prevent its being in the act of the generative power, seeing that such acts are said to be natural.

The ninth objection can easily be solved from what has been said. By sin man is not deprived of the natural good which belongs to his specific nature; but he could, by the sin of his first parent, be deprived of the gratuitous good bestowed on his nature, as already stated.

Again, from what we have been saying, we can easily reply to the tenth objection. Since being deprived and being in want are correlatives, it follows that children resemble their parents as regards original sin inasmuch as the gift bestowed on nature in the beginning would have been transmitted by parents to their posterity. Although this gift was not included in the species, nevertheless it was given by God gratuitously to the first man that he might transmit it to the entire species. In the same way the sin which caused man to lose that good is transmitted to the whole species.

We must also observe that although a man is cleansed from original sin by the sacraments of grace, so that it ceases to be imputed to him as a sin, this cleansing regards him personally, but nevertheless the nature is not entirely healed. But original sin is transmitted to posterity by an act of nature. Accordingly, even though there be no original sin in the one who generates, considered as an individual, and though there may be no sin in the act of generation, as the eleventh objection suggested, nevertheless, original sin, through infecting the nature, infects both the generator, who is nature’s principle of generation, and the act whereby he generates.

Again, we must note that the actual sin of the first man affected the whole nature, because on account of the gift bestowed on it this nature was still perfect; but when this nature was deprived of that gift through his sin, his act became simply natural. Hence by his act he could neither satisfy for the whole nature, nor restore the gift of nature: but he could only make satisfaction, to a certain extent, for himself. This suffices as a reply to the twelfth objection.

In like manner, the thirteenth objection is solved. When subsequent parents sin, nature is already deprived of the gift originally bestowed on it. Consequently, their sin does not cause a defect to be transmitted to their posterity, but only one that affects them personally.

Accordingly, it is neither unfitting nor unreasonable that men should have contracted original sin, as the Pelagian heresy which denied original sin declared.