Chapter 51 — Arguments against original sin

There are, however, some points that would seem to be in contradiction with the truth.

One man’s sin is not imputed to others; therefore, it is said: The son suffers for the iniquity of the father (Vulgate: why should not the son suffer for the iniquity of the father?.) (Ezek 18:20) The reason for this is that we are neither praised nor blamed for that which is not in our power. Now those things are in our power that we do freely. Therefore, the sin of the first man is not imputed to all mankind.

Someone, however, might reply that through one man sinning, all men sinned in him, as the Apostle seems to say (Rom 5:19): and thus it is not a case of one man’s sin being imputed to another. Yet this reply seems not conclusive, because when Adam sinned, those who were born of him were not yet in existence; they only existed virtually as in their first origin. Now only one who is actually in existence can sin since to sin is to act. Therefore, we did not all sin in Adam.

And if it be said that we sinned in Adam, in the sense that he transmitted his sin to us together with our nature, this again is apparently impossible. An accident does not pass from one subject to another, and therefore it cannot be transmitted unless its subject be transmitted. Now the subject of sin is the rational soul, which is not transmitted to us from our first parent, but is created by God for each one separately, as we have proved. (Bk. 2, ch. 86.) Therefore, sin cannot be transmitted to us from Adam through our origin.

Again. If other men contract sin from their first parent because they trace their origin to him, it would seem that Christ must have been subject to original sin, seeing that he also traces his origin to him: and this is contrary to faith.

Moreover. That which a thing receives through its natural origin is natural to it. But that which is natural to a thing is not its fault: thus it is not a mole’s fault that it is blind. Therefore, sin could not be contracted from the first man by other men.

If someone reply that sin is transmitted from the first parent to his posterity through their origin, considered not as natural but as vitiated; this reply will not stand. A fault does not occur in nature’s work except through a fault in a natural principle: thus a defect in the seed of animals leads to the birth of monstrosities. Now we cannot assign any defect of a natural principle in human seed. Consequently, a vitiated origin cannot account for the transmission of original sin from our first parent to his posterity.

Again. Faults in the works of nature due to a defective principle do not occur always or even frequently, but in the minority of cases. Therefore, if sin is transmitted by the first parent to his posterity through a vitiated origin, it will be contracted, not by all, but by a few.

Further. If a vitiated generation occasions the transmission of a defect to the offspring, this defect must be of the same kind as the fault in the origin, because like effects have like causes. Now the origin or generation of man is an act of the generating power, which has no part in the reason; and consequently it cannot be the subject of a fault of a sinful kind, since virtue and vice can only be in acts that are to some extent subject to reason. Thus a man is not blamed if he is born a leper or blind on account of a vitiated generation. Therefore, it is quite impossible for a culpable fault to be transmitted from the first parent to his posterity, through a vitiated generation.

Again. Sin does not destroy the good of nature: hence natural good remains even in the demons, according to Dionysius. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4.) Now generation is an act of nature. Therefore, human generation could not be vitiated by the first man’s sin in such a way that his sin would be transmitted to his posterity.

Moreover. Man begets his like in species. Hence a son is not necessarily like his parents in things that are not connected with the nature of the species. Now sin has no connection with the specific nature, since it is not according to nature; in fact, it is a corruption of the natural order. Therefore, it does not follow that, because the first man sinned, other sinners should be born of him.

Again. Children take after their proximate rather than their remote progenitors. Now it may happen that the immediate progenitors are sinless, and commit no sin in the act of procreation. Therefore, all men are not born sinners on account of the sin of their first parent.

Besides, if sin was transmitted by the first man to his posterity, since good is more effective in its action than evil, as we have proved, (Bk. 3, ch. 12.) much more were Adam’s repentance and righteousness transmitted by him to others.

Moreover. If the sin of the first man is transmitted to his posterity by generation, for the same reason the sins of other parents are transmitted to their children. Thus the burden of sin would be greater in the later descendants than in the first. And this would be the case all the more if sin were transmitted from parent to child, whereas repentance cannot be transmitted.