Chapter 2

Term 1

The Vulgarian

The vulgarian is that man who spends lavishly, not as accords necessity, but as one who entertains actors at a marriage feast and rolls out a red carpet for comedians as they pass by.

Term 2

The Flatterer

The flatterer is he who seeks to please others to win some financial gain.

Term 3

The Happy Man

Those called happy are those among the living found in the conditions of happiness.

We call men happy.

Men who are happy do not lack things that are necessary, but can lack pleasures.

No one is unwillingly happy.

Term 4

The Buffoon

Bomolochi or buffoons are called those who immoderately take pleasure in laughter and play.

Buffoons are also called witty.

The buffoon is less vicious than the derider, since he neither spares himself nor others.

Term 5

The Good

The good is what all desire.

Term 6

Beasts

Beasts do not share in action, even if they do have senses.

Some animals are called prudent that seem to be able to care for themselves.

Beasts are neither continent nor incontinent, since they do not have universal judgment.

Beasts are neither temperate nor intemperate, unless metaphorically speaking, since they have neither reason nor choice.

Term 6

Brutishness

Brutish baseness, or unbounded desire, belongs to evil.

Some virtue is opposing brutishness is divine and heroic.

Brutishness is chiefly found in barbarians.

Brutishness is less evil than human incontinence, but is more frightening.

Cutting open pregnant women and devouring the children is a brutish pleasure.

Term 8

Barbarians

Some classes of barbarians are by nature irrational, living only by sense perception.

Term 9

To Wage War

No one chooses to wage war or to incite war-waging for its own sake. Indeed, a man would be considered murderous or violent if, when enemies run out, he went onto friends just to keep fighting.

Term 10

To Benefit

To bestow benefit is a laborious thing, but to receiving a benefit is no labour at all. And so those who bestow benefits love more than those who are benefited, since this greater toil makes them to love more.

Term 11

The Benefactor

Benefactors love those they benefited more than those benefited love their benefactors. This seems contrary to reason, I wonder the reason for this.

The benefactor loves the one he benefits more, since the one receiving the benefit, since the benefit is work of the one doing it, and in this way every man loves his own undertaking more than others would, just as happens with poets, who always take the most delight in their own poems.

The benefactor loves the one he benefits more than the other way round. He gives six ways of defending this position.

Term 12

Benefit

If someone receives some benefit from a friend who expects something in return, he should freely make some return as accords the greatnesss of what he receives.

Receivers of benefits will downplay their worth, but givers of them will extoll the worth of what they gave.

One must first give recompense for benefits received before making gifts to friends, just as one has a greater oblication to repay a loan than to give gifts to a friend.

Term 13

Goodwill

Goodwill can seem to be friendship, yet it is not. For it can be directed toward those unknown or unaware of it, but frienship cannot.

Goodwill is not affection, since affection requires some familiarity, but goodwill is unexpected, as happens when spectators observe athletes in competition.

Goodwill is the beginning of frienship.

Goodwill, if it lasts, can become friendship, but not a friendship of utility or pleasure.

Term 14

The Well-wishing

Well-wishers love superficially, since they do not take any active part with the other.

Those who will good things for others are called well-wishing if others do not return the same to them. And if it happens that they both happen to love that same thing, there will be well-wishing but with reciprocation.

Term 15

The Good

The good is what all desire.

The good of one man and of the city is the same, but that of the people and city is greater and more perfect and more divine.

We shall have sufficient knowledge about human good if we determine its subject matter.

The goods which the political order is directed do not come natuarlly, but rather are brought about by law.

The Platonists held that the good is self-sufficient and that the good is the cause of all being, formally speaking, but not effeciently, since, if they did, they would be on the mark.

The good in itself is said to be and universally good and prior to than that which stems from it or as an accident.

The good is synonymous with being.

There is no idea that encompasses all goods, as if it were one science.

A thing that is long-alsting is more like the good than something lasting only a day.

The good is said in two ways: in itself, and some preservative and prohibitive.

All things that are good in themselves do not convene in one notion of the good in itself, as is evident with honour, and in other things he lists.

A universal good is useless, since neither a weaver nor another artisan would be aided by it in his craft. If he were to consider this good as a separate good, he would not benefit any in his work.

The good which is object of this study is man's work and possesion through his actions, but good as a separate good is not in this way.

He asks what the good is, which is happiness, according to the opinion of Aristotle.

There is one end good which is happiness, and if there were to be many, one would then be directected toward the other, such that only one would be the final and greatest good.

The self-sufficient good is sufficient for a man not only if he led a solitary life, but sufficient even for his parents, children, and for a wife and friends, and for his fellow citizens.

The greater the good, the more desirable.

The human good turns out to be life in accord with the best and most perfect virtue.

Goods are of three types: some are external, such as good fortune, some internal, such as virtues and sciences, some concern bodies, such as health and a good appearance.

The goods of the soul are those that are most principally good.

Term 16

Good

No one is good who does not take joy in good works, the same should be said about a just man.

Some goods are necessary for happiness, such as the virtues, while others work as instruments for its attainment.

Great goods make a man more blessed, since they were made for to adorn and the use of them.

Term 17

The Good things of Fortune

The goods of fortune are those things that are good without qualification, but they are not always good for a particular man.

Men pursue the goods of fortune with the greatest desire and pray for them.

A man should not ask for good things without qualification, but the things which are good for him to have.

Being a citizen and being a good man are not the same thing.

Term 18

The Good Man

Good men are both good to each other without qualification, and useful and pleasurable, since the actions of good men are alike.

There seem to be three things that make men good: nature, habituation, and teaching.

For someone to be made good by teaching there must first be some disposition, that is, a habituation, amenable to virtue.

Temporal goods become vitious in excess. Likewise, therefore, does man become when he persues excess and evil pleasures.

According to the Pythagoreans, all men desire the apparent good .

A good man must be also a lover of himself (philautos) since by doing good things he will both profit himself and help others.

No one would choose to have every good thing for himself if it meant living a life completely alone.

That which is good by its nature is pleasurable in itself, and this is even true in relation to a good man.

Every good thing is more desirable with another good thing added to it than by itself.

Those who say that all things do not desire the good do not speak truthfully, since we hold what is seen by everyone to be true. And it is generally affirmed that all things desire the good.

To be good without prudence, and to have prudence without moral virtue is impossible.

The good can be said in three ways.

What is good in moral matters is said in two ways: of an activity and of a habit of character.