Chapter 4

Term 1

Debt

As a general rule, a debt should be payed before making a gift to a friend.

Term 2

Deception

When a man is deceived, thinking he is loved honestly, but he does not see any workings of honesty in the one supposedly loving him, he should blame himself.

Term 3

The Deceiver

The man who deceives by pretense of love is guilty of greater blame than one who counterfeits money.

Term 4

What is Pleasurable

Every man finds what he is fond of pleasurable.

What is just is pleasurable to a lover of just things, and so are things in accord with virtue to a lover of virtue.

Many experience pleasures that are opposed to each other since different people desire different things that do not accord with human nature.

What lovers of the good find pleasurable accords with their nature.

All animals seem to share what is pleasurable. Even what is good and useful are pleasurable.

As nature has it, different people find different things pleasurable, others more.

If anyone does not find anything pleasurable or anything more preferable to another, he is a far cry from a man.

Pleasurable things come along more in life than terrible things. Men are accustomed to these things in life and living by them is not dangerous.

What is pleasurable does not corrupt every kind of judgment, only those that deal with practical matters.

Some pleasurable things are desirable by nature, others however, are contrary to it, some occupy a middle position.

Some things are pleasurable by nature to everyone, some to kinds of animals, and kinds of men, some out of passion or habit or perverse nature.

Term 5

Pleasure

Pleasure has grown up from childhood with everyone.

Pleasure and pain are the rules of action.

Pleasure is more difficult to resist than anger, as Heraclitus says.

We should be on the greatest guard against pleasures and pleasurable things. We should behave toward them as the elders of the people toward Helen. By so shying away we shall sin less.

The only pleasure acts of the virtues afford is when they attain to their end.

Pleasures are divided into bodily pleasures and pleasures of the soul.

Pleasures which temperance regulates are servile and brutish.

Pleasures that regard touch make man brutish, since they do not belong to what makes us men.

Pleasures of the most liberal sort are apart from the stuff of temperance, such as those in gymnasia.

There is a an excess concerning pleasures called intempereance and it is worthy of fault.

Concerning pleasures in social interactions.

Some pleasures are necessary, such a food, for the preservation of the individual, and sex, for the preservation of the species. Some pleasures are desirable, such as victory, power, honour, and riches.

With regard to pleasures of anger, gain, riches and honours, we are not called incontinent, properly speaking.

A man belonging to desirable pleasures, is termed incontinent not without reservation, but rather as a bad physician or a bad actor would be.

Incidentally pleasurable things are curative pleasures.

Things that are pleasurable for one and painful for another are not admirable things. Since men are subject to many perversions and deteriorations, the things they take pleasure in are not pleasurable without qualification, but rather pleasurable to those so inclined to them.

Pleasurable and valuable things are those that seem so to the virtuous man, whose activity accords with virtue.

In bestial and psychological pleasures there is something of continence and incontinence alike, since a man can either overcome them or be overcome by them, such as if Phalaris were to keep a boy to devour and then were to set him free.

Some bodily pleasures are humane, while others are brutish, and some are psychological.

Some bodily pleasures are necessary for some end, that is, in the right amount, but this is not the case for excess and defect. The same is true for natural desires, occasions of sadness, and avoidances.

Pleasures, according to the opinion of others, are not good. He gives six reasons.

During sexual pleasure no one can reason about anything.

Pleasure is a sensible process of generation, according to Plato.

Pleasures that are without pain do not have an excess. These things are pleasurable by nature, and not incidentally.

Another way of thinking holds that no pleasure is the best.

Pleasure from sensual desires and pains still is lacking, but pleasure in perfect activiy rejoices in a nature not in need anything.

Pleasures where nature is lacking and pleasures when nature is normal and surfeited are not the same. Since a nature that is fulfilled without qualification takes pleasure in enjoyable things, but a surfeited nature takes pleasure in things opposite them, such as bitter and spicy things.

Pleasures do not always arise in doing actions, but in using things out of an already-formed habit.

Pleasure is not a generation of the senses, but is rather an activity of an unimpeded, already-connatural habit, according to the Philosopher.

If pleasures were evil, because they can be harmful and cause sickness, then medical cures too would be bad because they harm our finances.

Pleasure does not hinder prudence's own pleasure, but pleasures of other habits, though its pleasure it does cause one to investigate and learn more.

Nothing keeps some pleasure from being the best and most desirable thing, even if some pleasures are evil.

Everyone desires pleasure, both beasts and men alike, and therefore it is the best thing.

Bodily pleasures have inherited the name of the general term 'pleasure' because many men are inclined to them, and because they are shared and known by all.

That some pleasure is the best thing, is manifest. Since otherwise the happy man would not live pleasurably.

Some pleasures are very desirable, but not bodily pleasures, with which the intemperate man is concerned.

Bodily pleasures seem very desirable because they seem strong as treatments in expelling excess sadness, and it seems that when they act they do so without their opposite, which is sadness, and therefore they are greatly sought after.

Bodily pleasures are not perceived as good for two reasons: either because of some disposition of the temperaments, or by a trait passed down through parents, as in the case with beasts or brutish men, and out of habituation, as is the case with evil men.

Bodily pleasures are virtuous only incidentally.

Men vehemently seek out bodily pleasures for five reasons.

Some men seek much after bodily pleasures that they might quench the thirst of their desire, a thirst which they themselves cultivate within them.

Excessive pleasure can drive away pain, so these pleasures are much desired. Many men are made intemperate and evil by this.

Pleasure is found more in rest than in movement.

Concerning pleasures, there is much uncertainty amongst the philosophers. Some of them say pleasure is the good, while some say it is evil, some are uncertain and find other explanations convincing. On one hand, some feel compelled by the evidence to say all pleasures are evil, while others feel it is better speak as if they were so, so that men would shy away from pleasures and be led toward the mean.

Pleasure is good in itself, as Eudoxus held, since all seem to desire it, rational things and irrational things alike, and everything seeks after what is good for it, therefore what all seek is good in itself for them.

Pleasure is desirable in itself, since it is opposed to pain, which everything flees. Everyone admits that pleasure is something we choose for its own sake, not for the sake of anything else. A sign of this is that no one is questioned as to why he seeks to take pleasure in something, as if pleasure itself were the end for which other things were chosen.

Pleasure added in addition to any good makes that good more desirable, as, for example, acting justly and to being temperate.

Since pleasure is made more desirable with prudence, pleasure is not good per se, since no admixture of anything makes something that is good per se more desirable, and this is Plato's argument against Eudoxus.

Pleasure and pain are opposed just as good and evil, and if both were evil, they would both be things to be avoided, and if neither were evil, neither would be things to be avoided. Some things do, however, seem to be fled by some as if they were evil, such as sadness, but sought after as a good by some as a good.

Pleasure is not a good according to the opinion of Plato and Pythagoras. Three proofs are given, all of which the Philosopher rejects.

The Platonists say that pleasure is a motion and generation, and therefore not the good, since neither of these things is perfect.

Pleasure is neither a motion, a generation, nor a replenishment, as Plato said.

A man can be brought to pleasure quickly or slowly, but he does not act according to pleasure quickly or slowly.

Pleasure is not a replenishment, but pleasure does certainly come after someone has taken replenishment, just as pain comes after one has gone under the knife for surgery.

That pleasure is replenishment seems to arise from things relating to food with pains and pleasures.

Neither pleasures of knowledge nor pleasures of the senses, through smell, hearing, or sight, have a prior pain.

Concerning those who say pleasures are wicked. They say this because they are treating some disgraceful pleasures which they had to call evil.

Unnatural pleasures are not pleasurable things without qualification, though they can be pleasurable for those who are ill disposed, just like treatment for the sick, sweet things to bitter things, and things that seem foggy to those with an eye disease.

Pleasures, if they are not unnatural, are desirable without qualification if they are also for good reasons, but for some bad reasons, they are not, since they are dangerous. Such as getting rich, but by betrayal, or by being healthy, but not by eating so much food as to choke and die.

Pleasures from good men and from good things differ, just as those which come from what is shameful. Evil men do not take pleasure in good things, since it is not a quality of a just thing to cause pleasure in something that is unjust, as how someone who is not musical cannot enjoy the pleasure specific to music.

That pleasure is not a good per se seems to be shown in the fact that a true friend differs from a flatterer, since a flatterer is to blame.

Concerning pleasure. What it is and what kind of thing it is according to Aristotle.

Pleasure is as something existing as a whole entirely on its own, (just as vision does not have any need of anything following which would complete its form) and thus, no further prolonged time would give it additional completion from what it has.

Those who say pleasure is a movement or a generation miss the mark, since a generation and a motion are only said of particular things, but not of wholes, since there is no process of generation in vision, neither in seeing a single point or in seeing the unity of a whole. Therefore there is no motion or pleasure in either.

Pleasure concerns all the senses, intellect, and contemplation.

Pleasure brings perfection to an action, just as beauty does to youth, though not in the same manner.

There will be pleasure in an activity of the senses and of the intellect, in as much as the sensible or intelligible thing and the one regarding or contemplating it are as they should be.

How is it that no one continually experiences pleasure? And he responds that no human thing can continually be in activity (and therefore be in a state of pleasure), since feeling pleasure follows an action.

A man sometimes takes more pleasure in new things, and when his mind is turned more intensely toward them through desires, he acts more zealously for them, like when he looks at something more intently.

It might be thought that all men desire pleasure. Pleasure makes living better, which is why all men seek after it.

Pleasure makes activities better, as well as living, which is what all men strive after.

Pleasure is not separate from an activity, without an activity, there can be no pleasure.

Pleasure increases an action, and more for those who investigate particulars and who more readily do their research, working along with pleasure, such those who delight in geometry.

When we experience pleasure from one thing, we do not attend to others, as how lovers of flutes do not listen to the speech of those addressing them. The more pleasurable thing will crowd the other out, and if we are not enjoying in something, we can easily do something else, like an audience in a theatre watching bad acting who can eat beans at the same time.

There is a pleasure proper to an action that confirms it, lengthens and prolongs it. Foreign pleasures, however, hinder it, and in this it is evident that they differ much from this.

Foreign pleasures produce nearly the same thing as proper pains do, since they both corrupt a proper action, nevertheless, they do so differently.

Pleasures, just as activities, differ in virtue and plurality.

Pleasures belong most properly to activities than to concupiscence. From arose the confusion of pleasure and action as the same thing.

Pleasure is neither the mind nor the senses, but it is an activity of the mind and the senses, which is why some have difficulty separating them.

Pleasures are of different kinds, and differ just as activities do.

Pleasures of the mind and of the senses differ from one another with regard to their purity, just as activities do. Similarly, sensible pleasures differ from one another just as those of the mind from one another, since spiritual things are purer than natural things.

Just as there is a proper pleasure for each animal, and action, the pleasures of each one and different animals will differ, as, for example, the pleasure of the horse, or the dog, or the ass.

Those things which are said to pleasurable and called 'pleasures' without qualification are those which seem so to the virtuous man, the things in which he delights, since the virtuous man is the measure of all human things.

He asks about the pleasures of the virtuous, and how many they might be, and about the very nature of man's pleasure, and he responds saying that human pleasures are those enjoyed by a perfect and happy man.

It is not necessary to concede that pleasures taken in games, which the powerful seek out, are the best, merely because they seek after them. Just as we do not in this way conclude what is most valuable what children consider to be precious.

Term 6

The Weak Man

The weak man is likened to those who become drunk with little wine.

The weak are those who, despite having deliberated much, do not stand by their good reasoning, and are therefore worse for it.

The weak incontinent man is likened to a city that wished for laws but took no measures to maintain them.

Term 7

Desire

A desire is worthless and pointless if it is an endless process.

Every desire directed toward an end follows the immagination of the one desiring, which is involuntary.

The desire of an end is not voluntary, but must be innate.

Term 8

Shrewdness

Shrewdness (dinotica) is the force that spurs one toward fulfilling a desire.

Term 9

The Shrewd man

The shrewd man can be rather incontinent, but is not one who does not take note of detail in his actions and is not entirely aware, like a drunk or a sleeping man, and is not plainly evil, but is partly evil.

Term 10

Divine

It is rare for men to be divine or brutish.

Term 11

God

We call both the gods and godlike men blessed and happy.

God delights in one simple pleasure.

We suppose all the gods to be blessed and happy.

It is ridiculous to attribute the moral virtues to the gods.

All praises and actions of moral virtues are small and unworthy compared to the gods.

The whole life of the gods is entirely contemplation, entirely blesssed. Men take a share in this insofar as their lives resemble this activity. For the other animals, however, there is no happiness.

The gods have care over the matters of men, and so most delight in the man who is most alike and similar to them. This is the contemplative man, who acts well and rightly in accord with moral virtue.

Term 12

Difference

Concerning the difference between use and activity, and habit and possession.

Between an act and a deed.

Between counsel and deliberation.

Between speculative and practical matters, since the speculative deals with first principles, from which demonstrations are given.

Term 13

The Educated Man

The educated man will seek the amount of certainty in each field of study as its nature allows.

Term 14

Riches

Riches are not the good we seek, they are merely useful and sought for the sake of something else.

Term 15

The Diligent Man

It happens that someone is not diligent when he has the habit of living carelessly.

Term 17

The Half of Life

For half of their life (in sleep), nothing separates the happy from the miserable.

Term 17

The Contentious

Men are called contentious and quarrelsome who oppose anything others say or do.

The contentious or quarrelsome man or quarrelsome annoy everyone.

Term 18

Worthiness

All men differ in what they consider worthiness. For some it is freedom, some riches, some a noble status.

Term 19

Measure

When sone whole is divided by a measure (dicha), each can then say which part is his own.

Term 20

Democracy

Democracy seems to be found among groups where there is no rule and with those whose ruler is weak.

In demoncracies friendship can proliferate inasmuch as men may share things in common.

Term 21

The Home

The home is an older and is more necessary thing than the state.

Term 22

Powers

There are three acting powers: the senses, the intellect, and the appetites.

Term 23

Demonstrations

Demonstrations are made in practical matters by reasoning about an end.

Term 24

Guessing

Everyone seems to guess that moral virtue is some habit in accord with prudence.

The same is not suited for men and gods, or for building a temple or a tomb. *this seems out of place

There is something divine in the appetitive part of all, which tends to desire the same in likeness.