Chapter 16

Term 1

Speusippus

Speusippus seems to follow more after than Pythagoreans than Plato in his view of mathematical principles.

Term 2

Science

All sciences seek after some good, but while endeavoring to supply what they lack in the particular, they leave out the universal good. Such an approach, however, to set aside all other tools of knowing and not to use their knowledge, is not rational.

Science is a certain knowledge and concerns necessary things that are eternal.

Science is a demonstrative habit which is produced by demonstration and whatever other causes are put forth in the Analytics.

Rectitude does not pertain to science.

It is evident that nothing is stronger than knowledge.

Science can be said in two ways, in habit and in act.

He divides sciences three ways: between act and habit, between the universal and the particular, and between a restrained habit and an unrestrained one.

Term 3

The Wise Man

The wise man, as Socrates says, is not drawn away by the passions.

Term 4

Sleep

During sleep there is no apparent difference between good men and evil men. Hence the saying that happy men are no better off than miserable men for half of their lives.

Sleep is rest in the soul's activity, which is what determines one's goodness or wickedness.

Term 5

The Proud Man

The proud man and the one feigning courage appear reckless because of how they act in the face of dangers. But they do not stand up to them long, since many of these men are in fact cowards.

Term 6

Health

Health comes to men in a greater or lesser degree, since all men do not share in one proportion of health.

Term 7

Sophists

Sophists wish to argue indubitable positions so that they seem wise.

Some sophists profess to teach political science, but do not practice it. Men who engage in civil matters have a greater part in this, they seem to have some power to act in politics, and more experience than merely thinking about it.

If sophists were politicans then they would rightly be engaged in civil matters and turn their friends, or children, or whomever else into other politicians. In that case, they could do no better for their cities or themselves than to leave behind other statesmen for engaging in political matters after them.

Sophists seem far off from not just acting, but even from knowing about political science, they do not know either its nature, or what things it considers.

Sophists called political science the same thing as rhetoric.

Sophists do not follow through with what they promise and so are rightly taken to task.

Term 8

Speeches

If conjectures correspond to practical matters, they correspond to our actions, and we should heed them. If they do not, they are to be received lightly much as triffles sounding in the air.

Speeches in this field of knowledge are not enough to bring about its end, that is, to make men good. Since, if they were enough, men who taught them would be deserving of great compensation.

Speeches exhorting morals can encourage a liberal youth to the good, and can furnish a man who loves the good with virtue. Nevertheless, many men have the kind of nature that would not be deterred by shame but the fear and punishment would have a better effect. If they seek pleasures instead of goods, these cannot be changed to the good.

Speech and teaching are not, in themselves, enough to make men good, because men who are living according to their own passions cannot be convinced. And so, the soul must have some training in taking joy in good things and a habit of hating what is evil, just as soil does not grow seed well unless it is cultivated well.

Term 9

Statements

Statements should follow the nature of their subject matter.

A statements argument about actions lacks certitude and does not fall under art.

General statements are more generally applicable, but statements on particular matters are more certain.

Statementss about passions and acts are less credible than acts themselves.

True statements are most useful not just for knowing but for living, since when they are reflected in the actions of the one speaking they are convincing, and urge those who understand them to live in accordingly

The statements of Eudoxus were believed more for his virtuous counduct than for their own sake.

Term 10

Indication

The feeling of pleasure or sorrow following an action is an indication of a habit present.

Term 11

Knowing

Knowing about the virtues has little to nothing to do with possessing them.

Term 12

Six

Six is a mean in terms of an object, since it exceeds and is exceeded by the same amount. This mean follows a mathematical proportion.

Term 13

Excess

Excess and defect corrupt, but the mean makes a thing whole.

Term 14

Excess

Excess and defect are not the mean. If this were so, there could be an excess of excess or defect of a defect.

Term 15

The Elderly

How the elders felt toward Helen.

The elderly and the morose do not tend to be friendly, since there are few things they find pleasurable. No one can continually live with a gloomy person or a displeasurable person, since our nature flees what is sad and seeks after what is pleasurable.

The elderly and the morose make fewer friends inasmuch the more ill-tempered they are and the less they delight in conversation, for these seem to be friendly and what make friendship. So it is that the young, who do take much joy in these make friends quickly, but not the elderly or the morose.

We must show the elderly honour by rising and by bowing.

Term 16

Perceiving

Perceiving and understanding are pleasurable, since whoever sees or hears or understands, perceives and realises that he is doing it. Now whoever perceives, perceives that he is perceiving and that he is living and that he is, and to be and to live are the most pleasurable things, since living is a good for its own sake.

Term 17

Sensible Things

Sensible things are not easy to determine, since judgment of them is based in a perception.

Term 18

For Healthy People

Healthy things are good for healthy people without qualification, but for those in delicate health, other things are better suited.

Term 19

The Good Man

The good man does not willingly do evil things.

Term 20

Scientific Knowledge

Scientific knowledge seems to regard contrary bodies of knowledge.

Term 21

Solon

Solon said that to know if a man is happy one must consider the end of his life.

Solon said that the man who has a moderate amount of external goods must do what he can virtuously within his means.

Term 22

Wisdom

Wisdom is the most certain kind of knowledge.

Wisdom treats of universal things, not about some particular matter, just as Homer said in the Margites.

Wisdom is the head of the sciences and therefore concerns the most honourable things.

Wisdom does not regard useful things since, if it did, there would be many kinds of wisdom.

Wisdom does not explore the means by which a man may be happy.

Wisdoms is a part of virtue on the whole, and acting according to it makes a man happy.

Wisdom is more honourable than prudence, as he demonstrates through reason and by giving an example.

Term 23

A Philosopher

No one is a philosopher by nature.

A philosopher is a contemplative, save for the necessities of life, which everyone needs, and he is content with having little of these. He is most self-sufficent and he is about contemplation, though he would benefit from having others to share in philosophy with him.

Everything said about a happy and contemplative man belongs to the philosopher, so he will be most beloved by God and his happiness will be in accord with his activity.

Term 24

Contemplating

Contemplation can sometimes be harmful to one's health.

For a man of contemplation, no external goods are needed. These things are rather an obstacle to contemplation. But insofar as this contemplative is a man and lives among others, he will have need of such externals to live a human life.

Term 25

Contemplation

Human contemplation, which most leads to happiness and shares most in the divine, is unlike all other things because of its excellence.

The more one engages in contemplation, the greater share he has in happiness. Those with more contemplation are happier too, not because happiness merely accompanies it, but because of the contemplation itself.

Term 26

The Senses

We do not acquire our use of the senses by seeing and hearing many times over, but rather, the other way round, we use them because we have them.

It is of no matter whether we say the sense acts or that the body in which it resides (say, an animal) , acts.

Sense is not a thing that has power over action.

Term 27

What is Scientific

Concerning what is scientific and what is estimative.

Term 28

Suspicion

Suspicion and opinion are not virtues.

Term 29

Synesis

Synesis concerns those things about which someone may have doubts or seek counsel, and for this reason it relates to the same matters as prudence.

Synesis merely forms judgments.

Term 30

The Elderly

The elderly, experts, and the prudent, have a clear vision of things from their expereince, they more easily perceive the principles of action which others do not see.

Term 31

Knowing

Knowing does not make one more able to act.

Term 32

Socrates

Socrates identified all virtues with prudence, in this he missed the mark; but in saying that they cannot exist without prudence, he struck on.

Term 33

A Syllogism

In the syllogism comparing the continent and incontinant man, there must be four premises.

Term 34

Satyrus

Satyrus, who is nicknamed 'philopator,' that is, 'father-lover,' exceeded so much in the love of his father that he seemed to behave foolishly.

Term 35

Excesses

Excesses of naturally desirable pleasures are evil and should be avoided.

Those men with excesses of vice or foolishness, are not plainly malicious, but rather they are brutish or psychologically ill.

Term 36

Without Qualification

When we say 'without qualification,' we mean what a thing is in itself per se, and when we say 'to a certain extent,' we mean what a thing is coincidentally per accidens.

Term 37

Kinds of Habits

Three kinds of habits are to be avoided: vice, incontinence, and brutishness.