Chapter 18

Term

Life

Many choose to live a sensual life, since they believe pleasure is the supreme good.

Three kinds of life are most excellent: the sensual, the political, and the contemplative.

Those who choose to live a sensual life, that is, a life of pleasure, seem to be brutish.

The life of happy men is pleasurable in itself.

Life includes many changes and fortunes of every kind. It very often happens that a man falls into many calamities in his old age, just as it is reccounted of Priam.

The life of a virtuous man would be miserable and not pleasurable if the activities this life assumes were not pleasurable.

The life of the happy man is pleasurable in itself and not in need of some outside additional pleasure.

The life of a solitary man is a difficult one.

The life of the just man and of the blessed man are most blessed, and for these men live a more desirable life.

Life is by nature a pleasurable thing and a desirable good. This is most true of the life of good men, who delight in perceiving the good they do.

Life is a kind of activity.

A life of blessed contemplation is better than a merely human life, this is why human (homo) is said to be of the earth (humus).

The blessed life is in men insofar as they have some share in intellectual activity.

Term 2

Living

Living and perceiving are determined in animals by their capacity for sensing. In men they are determined by their sensing and understanding. Capacity, however, is limited to activity.

Living is, according to the position of Pythagoras, is naturally good since it is a determinate thing.

All desire to live.

One should elect to live according to one's own rather than another's. Rather, for a man to live according to what is proper to a man is to live by what is best in him. His intellect, this is best for a man.

Term 3

Virtue

Virtue is better than honour and more reasonably held to be the supreme good.

Virtue remains in a man when he sleeps and does nothing, and when he undergoes many evil things and misfortunes.

We choose virtue for its own sake and for the sake of other virtues.

Any given thing reaches its perfection according to its own proper virtue.

We call some virtues intellectual, and others moral.

If a thing accords with virtue it will be pleasurable and not sad, or at least only a little sad.

It is a virtue to be sorrowful and take pleasure in the right things and in the right way.

Moral virtue comes from observing mores, from which it takes its name, and seldom strays from it.

Moral virtues are not in us by nature, nor are they beyond our nature, but we are innately suited to receive them, and to perfect them by habit.

All virtue grows and deteriorates from the same principles.

Virtues deteriorate because of activities that tend toward excess or defect and which stray from the mean. He gives an example relating to fortitude and health.

A moral virtue concerns pleasures and pains.

Virtues, according to Plato, are some emotionless and calm states.

Virtue works what is best regarding pleasures and sadness.

One must choose and act firmly toward virtue, not reservedly but entirerly, because it is by frequently doing just and temperate things that one arrives at virtue.

Some men wish to become good by philosophizing by reason about virtue, these men are like those who hear the advice of a physician and do not heed any part of what he prescribes.

He asks asks what virtue is.

We are praised according to our virtues, blamed according to our vices.

We are not moved by the virtues, rather we are disposed toward proper perfection.

The virtues are not powers, for and we are not said to be good because of some ability to undergo suffering; we are neither praised nor blamed for this.

The virtues, which are the judgment of our goodness, are not in us by nature.

The virutes are habits.

He asks what kind of habit virtue might be in respect to species.

The man who has virtue is perfected by it and his work brings him good, examples follow.

A man's virtue is a habit by which he becomes a good man and what makes his act good.

Virtue is more certain and better than every craft.

Virtue aims at the mean, this is moral virtue.

Moral virtue concerns passions and activities. When excess or defect proves vicious, it is blameworthy, but the mean is worthy of praise.

Virtue is a kind of mean.

Virtue is a habit of choice, lying in the mean relative to us, determined by reason, such as a wise man would reckon.

It is a virtue to find the mean.

Virtue is a mean between two vices.

Moral virtue is concerned with passions and activities.

Virtue is not more voluntary than vice.

Virtues are means, which belongs to a proximate genus, they are habits, which belongs to a remote genus. They exist within us voluntarily and follow the dictate of right reason.

It belongs more to virtue to do good than to be the recipient of it.

The possession of and act of a virtue is not the same.

There is no worthy honour that is an adequate reward for perfect virtue.

Without virtue it is difficult to fare in good fortunes, since men become vicious and look down on others.

The virtue that concerns honours seems to be undefined, its extremes unclear.

The virtue relating to conversation and conviviality does not have its own name, but it seems to be like friendship.

The virtues of the soul are moral virtues and intellectual virtues.

Virtue is the best habit of character which perfects a work's object.

Moral virtue is a habit of correct choice.

There are five intellectual virtues: craft, science, prudence, wisdom, and knowledge.

Whether intellectual virtues are useful for man.

The moral virtues make man good.

Intellectual virtues are desirable in themselves.

Moral virtue make the right choice.

Neither a virtuous activity nor happiness are qualities of something.

A man can virtues to a greater or a lesser degree. Men can be just or courageous to a greater degree and so act justly and temperate to a greater or lesser degree.

Virtue and the virtuous man are the measure of all human things.

Moral virtue has need of external goods for its activity, since liberal men have need of wealth to do liberal deeds, and too for the just man to repay a debt. Willing it alone is not enough, since even unjust men pretend to wish to act justly.

Virtue is long-lasting.

Virtue and the good man seem to be a standard for everyone.

He asks which is more important to moral virtue, choice or external action.

Term 4

The Virtuous Man

In the virtuous man, all things are in harmony with reason.

The virtuous man is in harmony with himself and seeks out good things or things that seem good for him and does them. It is characteristic of the good man to be about doing good, and that for its own sake.

The virtuous man is not regretful.

The virtuous man acts as a friend to himself.

The virtuous man most exemplifies philautos, that is a man who loves himself, since he affords himself what is best and yields to the highest principle in him, that is, the intellectual part (which all others obey). It is like a city with the best hold on itself.

The virtuous man is a lover of himself, not such that he is reproached for living according to passion, but rather according to reason, and that he always seeks after what is good in itself and what seems to contribute to it.

The virtuous man is praised and is received by everyone, his actions bring good for all. He is a man most able to love himself (philautos).

The virtuous man and just man obey the commands of the intellectual part.

The virtuous and just man directs all objects of his choice to these three considerations: what is noble, what is usefule, and what is pleasurable. The evil man errs in these.

The virtuous man is the rule and standard of good things.

The virtuous man does many things for the sake of his freinds and homeland. He will sacrifice riches and honours and all the good things men go to great lengths for. By doing this he gains good things for himself, the acts of virtues.

The virtuous man is more wont to prefer the short-lived pleasures of doing virtuous acts, than long-lastsing pleasures of small things, even virtuous things. He prefer more one good action, such as dying for a friend, than many little things, as if he spared his life.

The virtuous man suggests virtuous actions to a friend and makes prompts to do just acts.

The virtuous man seems to afford himself what is most praiseworthy in all good things, so he must be a lover of himself (philautos).

The virtuous or good man is at the same time pleasurable and useful, but such a one does not become the friend of someone who is his superior, unless that man surpasses him in virtue. Such men are rare.

It is a difficult thing to be virtuous.

Term 5

The Husband

The rule of a husband of his wife seems to be an aristocracy, since he rules over what falls under his authority and he leaves to her the things that are fitting for her.

The man who wishes to have charge over every matter and does not leave anything to the discretion of his wife turns his rule into oligarchy.

The tasks of the husband and the wife combined provide for each other's needs.

A husband and wife are joined together principally on account of children, when they are sterile they more readily separate.

Sometimes wives rules as heiresses, but they do not rule because of virtue, but because they have riches and power, as is the case in oligarchies.

Term 6

Use

The use of a thing causes it to grow strong, so too in the virtues of the soul.

Term 7

Shame

Shame does not come at every age, but it comes in youth. Youths have need of being ashamed, since they commit many mistakes in a spurt of the passions, but they are indeed restrained by shame, and so we praise youths when they show shame. No one, however, praises an old man who is shameful.

Shame does not belong to the virtuous man since he would only feel shameful because of evil deeds, which he does not do.

A virtuous man could feel shame in a hypothetical situation: if he were to do shameful things, he would rightly and praiseworthily feel shame, but the virtues are praised for themselves, not for a hypostheical.

The ashamed man is praised as a mean, the man who exceeds the mean is kataplex or bashful, but the man too much lacking is shameless, one who is not ashamed about anything.

Shame is more like a passion than a habit.

Shame is a kind of fear of disgrace.

Shame brings about some bodily change, those who are ashamed blush, while those who are afraid of death grow pale.

Term 8

Everyone

Everyone's actions are said to correspond most to what the intellect does, since everyone is most identified with his understanding.

Term 9

The Will /wishing

It is the wish of the lawmaker to make citizens good through habit.

Wishing may concern things which may be impossible, such as immortality.

Wishing may concern things which could never be accomplished by the one wishing them, such as wishing that one feigning athleticism would win a competition.
NEW ENTRY Wishing is for an end, such as when we wish for health, which is an end.

For some, wishing seems to be for a good in itself, for others, only the apparent good.

If wishing belonged to the good per se, then it would follow that evil were good. If it only belonged to the apparent good, then opposites would be the object of one power.

Wishing can be for shameful things and good things.

Term 10

An Object of the Will

The object of our willing is the good without qualification, which is distinct from any difference of the good.

Term 11

What is Voluntary

Praises and blaming are voluntary things.

To determine what is voluntary and what is involuntary is necessary for those making a study of virtue.

A thing is voluntary when its acting principle is in the thing acting, and he does it freely.

A thing is voluntary when it acting principle knows the particulars and circumstances of the activity.

A voluntary thing is more than merely choice, since children and other animals share voluntary things, but not choice.

A voluntary thing is when something works according to its powers knowingly, not being ignorant of what it is or for what it is done.

Not everything we do knowingly is voluntary, since we naturally do and undergo many things knowingly. None of these things is voluntary or involuntary, such as growing old or dying.

We perfrom some voluntary actions by choice, others without.

No one coaxes a man do involuntary things which are not in his power to do, such as to become hot or ache or be hungry or something similar.

Term 12

Things Done under Compulsion

Everything done under compulsion is done with sadness.

A compulsory action is one in which neither the one acting or the one acted upon contributes anything to it.

Term 13

The Truthful Man

The truthful man occupies a mean between speaking what is true and fleeing lies, he is worthy of praise.

A man is truthful in his speaking and his way of life if he makes a habit of saying what is true, such a man is also temperate and moderate.

Term 14

The Truth-teller

Concerning men who tell the truth and deceitful men, they act similarly in their words and activities, and concerning pretenses.

Term 15

Cheaply-Made

The clothing of the Spartans was cheaply-made, they wished to show their restraint by this, and this makes them seem boastful.

Term 16

The Cumin-Splitter

'Cumin-spitter,' and all such names are given to men who are too reticent to give to anyone.

Term 17

Pardon

Pardon is afforded those who do something shamefully out of fear of dangers beyond human endurance.

Term 18

Truth

Truth is a mean concerning what is true. The man in excess is a boaster, the man lacking is a self-deprecator.

Truth is the work of each of the parts of the intellect.

Telling the truth is not enough, but it is also necessary to explain the cause of an error. This is what leads to conviction.

Term 19

True and False

What is true and false belong to the speculative part of the mind.

Term 20

The Universal

What is universal comes from particulars which one must experience through the senses.

Term 21

Blameworthily

To be blameworthy in pleasures that are naturally desirable or in intermediate ones, is not just desiring or being affected by them, but it is rather loving them in excess, such as if one were to rebel like Niobe.

Term 22

Concerning the Snake

Concerning the snake which bit Theodoctus.

Term 23

The Last

What is last in resolution is the first in the order of generation.

Term 24

The Manly

The manly shy away from, that is, they avoid making friends sharing in their sadness. And if this sadness is not so great that it overcomes his friends, he does not at all allow them to bear the pain with him, since they are not given to mourning, and take no pleasure in someone mourning with them. But womanly men enjoy when people are grieved for them, these such men should not be imitated, but the manly ones should.

Term 25

Sight

It is most pleasing to the sense of sight to have a friend in one's view. For lovers, seeing is most pleasurable, lovers favour this sense more than the others.