Chapter 19

The Chapters of the Book of Ethics

The Headings of the Chapters of Book 1

Every art and every science.

Let us ask on resuming our inquiry.

Let us return to the subject from which we have digressed.

Let us return again to the consideration.

But perhaps to say that happiness.

In our study we must carefully examine not only the conclusion.

Much less is the man happy if has wayward children.

Many changes take place.

Many events differing in importance happen by fortune.

Having settled these maters, we must investigate happiness.

If, however, happiness is an activity in accord with virtue.

First Lines of the Chapters of Book Two

Virtue is of two kinds.

The present study.

Someone will ask rightly.

After this we must determine the definition of virtue.

But it will become still clearer.

Not only must we speak universally.

There are three dispositions.

Since virtue is concerned with passions and activities.

Sometimes it is difficult to judge what is to be exchanged for what.

What is done through ignorance is not done voluntarily.

Since the involuntary comes about.

After the treatise on the voluntary and the involuntary.

What then is its genus and its specific difference.

We invite counsellors in matters of importance.

Willing is concerned with the end.

Willing regards the end.

Not only are vices of the soul voluntary.

There is, therefore, a mean dealing with fear.

Other kinds of fortitude are enumerated according to five types.

Concerning daring and fears.

Following this, we must discuss temperance.

Any use of taste is small or even non-existent.

Whatever is useful for health.

Let us next discuss liberality.

The wasteful man sins in these matters too.

It seems logical to pass now.

Magnanimity is concerned with great things.

It will seem, therefore, that magnanimity.

The magnanimous man does not run risks foolishly.

There appears to be a virtue that deals with this.

Meekness is a kind of moderation concerned with anger.

Some men in association with others and in interchange of words.

The mean opposed to boasting treats of almost the same subject.

Recreation should have a place in our life.

Shame is not properly spoken of as a virtue.

We must give our attention to justice and injustice.

The unjust seems even to be law-breaking.

We are now investigating that justice that is a part of the general virtue.

One species of particular justice.

There remains another kind of directive justice.

Some philosophers seem to think that, generally speaking, justice is reciprocation.

From these discussions it is clear that a just action.

However dominative justice.

One kind of justice is political.

As there are just acts and unjust acts.

Someone may raise a doubt.

There are still two questions we wish to discuss.

Next, we will treat equity and the equitable thing.

Whether or not it is possible to do injustice to oneself.

But, since we previously said.

There are things by which the soul expresses the truth.

Let us now investigate prudence in this way.

Since science is an evaluation of universals.

Wisdom in the most certain arts.

Therefore, to know what is to one’s advantage is a certain kind of knowledge.

Now we must consider.

Now it is synesis.

Someone may raise a doubt.

We must again turn our attention.

Now, making a new start, we must indicate.

It surely seems that continence.

First, then, we must try to find out.

Whether anyone is totally incontinent.

Some kinds of pleasures.

That incontinence is less disgraceful.

But we must take up their differences.

Dealing with what is related to touch and taste.

It seems that one fond of amusement is intemperate.

But the intemperate man, as was pointed out.

Whether a man is continent who abides by any principle whatsoever.

Sometimes a man is disposed to enjoy bodily pleasures less than he ought.

Concerning pleasure and pain.

But this does not then prove that it is not a good thing.

Concerning physical pleasures.

After these things follows a discussion on friendship.

On this subject, not a few things are uncertain.

But these differ from one another.

But the friendship for pleasure has a likeness to this friendship.

But friendship is divided into these species.

It is not possible to be a friend of many people by perfect friendship.

There is another kind of friendship.

Because of a desire for honor, most people seem to.

It seems, as we noted at the outset.

There are three kinds of polity.

Each form of government.

All friendship involves common participation.

There are three kinds of friendship.

Disagreements happen also in friendships between unequals.

In all friendships of dissimilar persons.

On the other hand, these questions are raised.

A question comes up.

Kindly acts done for friends.

These seem to belong to many.

Goodwill even resembles something friendly.

Likewise, concord seems to belong to friendship.

Benefactors and those they have benefited.

Likewise, the question arises whether a person should love himself.

Some doubt arises about a happy man.

Looking more profoundly into the matter.

Whether a man ought to make as many friends as possible.

Whether friends are more necessary in good fortune or bad.

It is true, just as between lovers.

After these matters, we ought perhaps next to discuss pleasure.

Exodus, therefore, held pleasure to be good in itself.

However, it does not follow that, if pleasure is not a quality.

To those who bring forward disgraceful pleasures.

The nature and quality will become clearer.

Every sense is in relation to its object.

But seeking pleasure.

Since, therefore, there is a pleasure proper.

After the discussion of the various kinds of virtue.

If, then, happiness regards virtue.

Such a life will be better.

Perfect happiness is a form of contemplative activity.

He will also have need of external prosperity.

Whether we have sufficiently discussed these matters and about virtues.

If, therefore, as it has been said.

Then we must inquire, after this, from whom and how the science of lawmaking.