Chapter 13

Term 1

Operations /actions/Activities

Activities are done for the sake of ends.

The activities of the virtues are pleasurable in themselves.

Activities in accord with virtue are the dominant factors in happiness.

The activities of the virtues have more permanence than fields of knowledge.

Activities are the dominant factors of a life, and so one must consider actions done according to the right measure of prudence.

From like activities, like habits are made.

Speaking about activities of virtues is not an exact science with strict reasoning, but is rather outlined generally by explanation and example.

Activities and things related to them do not have anything fixed about them, nor do matters concerning health.

Some activities, adultery, for example, can in no way be made right.

Activities concern particulars.

Some activities may gain a man praise in one instance and at other times blame.

Activities concerning ends and those concerning means are done by choice and voluntarily.

Activities of virtues are voluntary and are within our power; just as virtue is in our power, so too is vice.

Not every activity of the soul admits of a mean, such as adultery, theft, and murder. For all of these and others like them are in themselves evil.

Activities and habits are not voluntary in the same way. We are in control of our activities from their beginning to their end and we know the particulars related to them, but the development of habit is unseen.

Some think an activity is a kind of process, but this is false.

No activity is perfect when it is impeded by something.

Our activities are like our habits. A man unable to understand that like habits come from like activities is nearly senseless.

Activities of virtue are good in themselves and done for the sake of the good.

The activity present at hand is more pleasant than one hoped for in the future, or recalled in past memories.

The activity of a happy man, which must be to live pleasantly, will be kept all the more pleasant by friends.

A good activity is more easily kept up by a man who has company than if he were alone.

An activity of virtue is not a quality of a thing.

The perfect activity of the senses consists in their right disposition to the most beautiful sensible thing. That is, toward what rightly falls under that sense.

The action of anything is best when an activity is best disposed toward its completion, that is, most fitting, when it corresponds to the ability of the one acting. Such an activity is most desirable and perfect in every sense.

Some activities are necessary and sought out for the sake of something else, and some sought after for their own sakes.

The most desirable for each thing activity is what is proper to it.

An activity is better and happier when it is the kind of activity that really belongs to a man, that is, that it accords with that best part of him. It will be lesser when it is an activity more proper to beasts, that is, to the more beastly nature of man.

An activity, contemplative and uninterrupted, this is called happiness.

Activity in accord with wisdom is the most pleasurable kind of virtuous action, this much is admitted by everyone.

Activities of practical virtues happen in political and military matters. Such actions do not seem to be wholly leisure in goodness.

Political activities are not leisurely, because in them a man aims at acquiring positions of power and honours, he treats happiness for himself and for citizens as something distinct from political life.

Activities of war and politics, among all actions of practical virtues, are distinguished by beauty and greatness. Despite this, they are not activities of leisure, since they are directed toward some other end, not desirable for their own sakes. It follows, then, that the conditions for happiness are not found in these things.

The sole activity of the contemplative intellect is perfect happiness, since it aims at no end outside itself and has its own proper delight and whatever other things are attributed to the happy man which have their perfection throughout the course of his life.

Activities in accord with moral virtues are human actions, becuase what what we do in accord with justice, courage, and other virtues, what we do in exchanges and passions and other matters, all of these are human things. It seems the same with prudence, and with the happiness of the state, which depends on prudence and other moral virtues: these are human things. What is concerned with the intellectual reason, however, is a thing apart and divine.

Term 2

Acts

Acts of the virtues are most long-lasting and constant.

Because of the most honourable acts they bring, men do not forget the virtues.

Virtues and crafts are made from good acts and destroyed by evil ones. Meng become good or bad harpists by playing the harp.

Term 3

To Act

A man who does not care to act justly does not care about becoming good.

Men are the principles of their own actions, they have their own power either to act or not to act.

Acting rightly or wrongly is within our power.

A man does what he deems best.

Acting wrongly is caused by ignorance.

Term 4

Acting

Men acting rightly, men who live virtuously, gain renown.

For a man to be acting virtuously he must know what he must do and choose it as an end, out of a firm and stable habit of character.

A man doing just or pure things is not necessarily called a just man or a pure man. For example, he may be acting out of fear of established laws, or unwittingly.

It seems irrational to say that a man doing unjust things does not wish to be unjust, or that a seducer does not wish to be incontinent.

Term 5

Function

The function of a man is either in accord with reason or at least not without it, that is, it as least participates in reason.

The function of man is the same in kind as that of a good man, that of a happiest the same in kind as the best harpist.

We state the function of man as some kind of life, a way of living.

A state function is achieved in accordance with prudence and moral virtue. For virtue rectifies the intention, and prudence directs its means toward it.

Term 6

Ends

We find that end products are better than the activities which produce them.

Term 7

In the Olympic Games

In the Olympic games, the best and most courageous are not the ones given crowns, they are given rather to victorious competitors.

Term 8

Oligarchy

Oligarchy is a vice of rulers who do not give according to merit, but undeservingly give to themselves what belongs to the city. They accord themselves many good things and give positions of authority always to the same friends so as to easily grow rich.

Term 9

Smell

We do not call people who enjoy the smell of roses or incense intemperate.

Men sometimes delight in the smell of food when they are hungry.

Term 10

The Eye

The virtue of the eye and what makes the eye good is its function.

Term 11

Opinion

Opinion seems to concern all things, both eternal things and impossible things, and even things in our power.

Opinions are divided between true and false.

An opinion is praised if it is true, and a choice is praised if it concerns what it ought and is made rightly.

It makes no difference for our inquiry if an opinion precedes a choice or follows it, because that is not its aim, only that opinion and choice are distinct things.

An opinion states something already fixed.

Opinion is said in two ways: universal, that is, of the major premise, and particular, that is, of the minor.

It makes no difference whether a thing is beyond a man's opinion as if it is beyond his knowledge.

A man may act incontinently even though his opinion holds that he is not.

An opinion is not contrary to reason because of reason itself, but rather incidentally, as much as it is mixed with sensual desire.

There are three opinions concerning pleasure.

The opinion of Aristotle seems to harmonise with the thought and deeds of others.

Prudence does not easily forget, since it is not only a rational thing, but also has innate governing principles.

In practical matters, the truth about a man's character is more gleaned by a man's life and actions, than his words. So one must take what a man has said into account with the man's life and actions.