Lecture 17

Of those who have treated of governments, some have never taken any part at all in public affairs, but have passed their lives in a private station; about most of them, what was worth telling has been already told. Others have been lawgivers, either in their own or in foreign cities, whose affairs they have administered; and of these some have only made laws, others have framed constitutions; for example, Lycurgus and Solon did both.

Of the Lacedaemonian constitution I have already spoken. As to Solon, he is thought by some to have been a good legislator, who put an end to the exclusiveness of the oligarchy, emancipated the people, established the ancient Athenian democracy, and harmonized the different elements of the state. According to their view, the council of Areopagus was an oligarchical element, the elected magistracy, aristocratical, and the courts of law, democratical. The truth seems to be that the council and the elected magistracy existed before the time of Solon, and were retained by him, but that he formed the courts of law out of an the citizens, thus creating the democracy.

This is why he is sometimes blamed; for in giving the supreme power to the law courts, which are elected by lot, he is thought to have destroyed the non-democratic element. When the law courts grew powerful, to please the people who were now playing the tyrant the old constitution was changed into the existing democracy. Ephialtes and Pericles curtailed the power of the Areopagus; Pericles also instituted the payment of the juries, and thus every demagogue in turn increased the power of the democracy until it became what we now see.

All this is true; it seems, however, to be the result of circumstances, and not to have been intended by Solon. For the people, having been instrumental in gaining the empire of the sea in the Persian War, began to get a notion of itself, and followed worthless demagogues, whom the better class opposed. Solon, himself, appears to have given the Athenians only that power of electing to offices and calling to account the magistrates which was absolutely necessary; for without it they would have been in a state of slavery and enmity to the government. All the magistrates he appointed from the notables and the men of wealth, that is to say, from the pentacosio-medimni, or from the class called zeugitae, or from a third class of so-called knights or cavalry. The fourth class were laborers who had no share in any magistracy.

Mere legislators were Zaleucus, who gave laws to the Epizephyrian Locrians, and Charondas, who legislated for his own city of Catana, and for the other Chalcidian cities in Italy and Sicily. Some people attempt to make out that Onomacritus was the first person who had any special skill in legislation, and that he, although a Locrian by birth, was trained in Crete, where he lived in the exercise of his prophetic art; that Thales was his companion, and that Lycurgus and Zaleucus were disciples of Thales, as Charondas was of Zaleucus. But their account is quite inconsistent with chronology.

There was also Philolaus, the Corinthian, who gave laws to the Thebans. This Philolaus was one of the family of the Bacchiadae, and a lover of Diocles, the Olympic victor, who left Corinth in horror of the incestuous passion which his mother Halcyone had conceived for him, and retired to Thebes, where the two friends together ended their days. The inhabitants still point out their tombs, which are in full view of one another, but one is visible from the Corinthian territory, the other not. Tradition says the two friends arranged them thus, Diocles out of horror at his misfortunes, so that the land of Corinth might not be visible from his tomb; Philolaus that it might. This is the reason why they settled at Thebes.

And so Philolaus legislated for the Thebans, and, besides some other enactments, gave them laws about the procreation of children, which they call the Laws of Adoption. These laws were peculiar to him, and were intended to preserve the number of the lots. In the legislation of Charondas there is nothing remarkable, except the suits against false witnesses. He is the first who instituted denunciation for perjury. His laws are more exact and more precisely expressed than even those of our modern legislators.(Characteristic of Phaleas is the equalization of property; of Plato, the community of women, children and property, the common meals and women, and the law about drinking, that the sober shall be masters of the feast; also the training of soldiers to acquire by practice equal skill with both hands, so that one should be as useful as the other.) Draco has left laws, but he adapted them to a constitution whcih already existed, and there is no peculiarity in them which is worth mentioning except the greatness and severity of the punishments. Pittacus, too, was only a lawgiver, and not the author of a constitution; he has a law which is peculiar to him, that, if a drunken man do something wrong, he shall be more heavily punished than if he were sober; he looked not to the excuse which might be offered for the drunkard, but only to expediency, for drunken more often than sober people commit acts of violence. Androdamas of Rhegium gave laws to the Chalcidians of Thrace. Some of them relate to homicide, and to heiresses; but there is nothing remarkable in them. And here let us conclude our inquiry into the various constitutions which either actually exist, or have been devised by theorists.

Eorum autem qui pronuntiaverunt de politia, etc. After the philosopher pursued diverse regimes, he here pursues the institutors of regimes and of laws. Concerning this he does three things.

First, he determines their difference toward each other.

Second, he determines about those who instituted regimes, at de ea quidem igitur, [II.17.2] etc.

In the third, he determines about those who were legislators, at legislatores autem, [II.17.5] etc.

Therefore, he first lays out two differences in those who have developed regimes or laws: the first is according to their diversity of life. For some of them lived a private life, in no way sharing in political actions, because they were not governors of any city, such as Plato, Phaleas, and Hippodamus, about whom he has already spoken, if there was anything worthy to be said about them. Others, however, lived the political life, instituting laws for some cities, either their own, or foreign ones. The second difference is according to what they treated of. For some were fashioners of some laws, but without putting any regime in order. But some also instituted a regime, which is the order of the rules of the city, and set up certain laws, as did Lycurgus, who instituted the Lacedaemonian regime, and Solon, who instituted the Athenian regime.

Then, where he says de ea quidem igitur, etc., he pursues those who instituted regimes. And because he has already spoken above about the Lacedaemonian regime, which Lycurgus instituted, it remains to speak about the Athenian regime, which Solon instituted. And concerning this he does three things.

First, he shows what Solon instituted.

Second, how he was censured by some, at propter quod et quidam, [II.17.3] etc.

Third, he excuses him, at videtur autem hoc, [II.17.4] etc.

Therefore, he first says that some deem that Solon was a good legislator, because he dismantled the oligarchy, which was exceedingly intemperate and immoderate at Athens, and he freed the people who were oppressed in slavery by the immoderate rules of the wealthy, and he instituted a democracy in his fatherland, and mixed well the regime—that is, the rule of the city, giving some part to the people in it.

For it was in the Areopagus, that is, in the village of Mars, which was a solemn place at Athens, that he instituted the council of the city, which was oligarchic, because the councils of the city were drawn from the wealthy and the powerful. But when the governors were chosen, it was aristocratic.

The courts, however—that is, the power of judging—he established from the popular element, which was democratic, that is, popular. And so Solon does not seem to have dismantled what was before—that is, the oligarchic council, and the choice of the people, which was aristocratic. But as a new thing, he instituted a certain popular government when he made the courts—that is, the judges—from all the citizens.

Then, where he says propter quod et quidam, etc., he shows how Solon has been censured by some. For some accuse him of dismantling another regime that was before when he instituted the courts that afterward had power over all, although this office was yet [chosen] by lot, because someone from the people was chosen by lot for this office. And therefore, they say that through this, he dismantled the earlier regime, because when he strengthened this office in the city, instituting the courts from the people, they transferred the whole rule of the city to the people, who through tyranny oppressed the greater [citizens]; and so it arrived at the disordered democracy which was at Athens. For first, Ephialtes and Pericles, who were of the popular courts, destroyed the council that from antiquity was in the Areopagus, and continuously, each of the rulers of the people enlarged the power of the people: how long was it before the regime was brought to the democracy that then existed?

Then, where he says videtur autem, etc., he excuses Solon, and he says that the defect seems to have happened not from the intention of Solon, but from some accident. For when the king of the Medes invaded the Athenians, because they thought that they could neither uphold their borders, nor endure a siege of the city, when the women and children and the things they had were settled in other Greek cities, having been sent away from the city, they transferred the war from the land to the sea. And so the people were gathered at the time of the Medes for the sake of this navarchia—that is, the government of the navy—and they cunningly conceived to usurp the whole power for themselves: and it happened that in place of virtuous rulers, the people had crooked rulers who pursued the intention of the people. And that Solon did not intend this is evident, because Solon did not give power to the people, except what was greatly necessary—to choose governors and to correct their errors. Moreover, he says that this power of the people is necessary because without this, the people would be slaves, if without their will the governors were received, and they were not able to mend the evils that their governors did; and since they could not bear slavery, they would become the adversaries of the governors.

But he instituted all government first from the distinguished—that is, from the noble and the wealthy.

And secondarily, he instituted it from some fifty men who were as though the middle in the city, who he called medimnoi—as if moderators—and he called them “yokers,” [iugarios] because they were the heads of companies or arts, as if “yoking together” [coniugentes] the multitude; and

third, he instituted the governors from the knights, which was a third order.

The fourth order was of wage-earners, who were the basest part of the people, to whom no part of government belonged. And so it is evident that in government, a greater part was given to the greater than to the people. Hence, it was not his intention to institute a democracy, but it was a consequence beyond his intention.

Then, where he says legislatores autem, etc., he determines about the instituters of laws.

And first, he shows who they were, and upon whom they imposed the laws.

Second, what laws they carried out, at legislator autem fuit, [II.17.7] etc.

Concerning the first he does two things.

First, he deals with some legislators in Italy—which was once called Magna Graecia.

Second, about some legislators of Greece, at fuit autem et Philolaus, [II.17.6] etc.

Therefore, he first says that there was a certain legislator by the name of Zaleucus who set up the laws for the Western Locrians—which is a city in Calabria that is to the west of Greece. There was also a legislator, Charondas of Catania, who delivered laws to his own citizens and also to the other Chalcidian cities around Italy and Sicily. Moreoever, he shows where they became learned [eruditi] in legislation; and he says that some wish to gather that in those lands, the first one diligently instructed in legislation was someone by the name of Onomacritus, who, although he was a citizen of Locri, received exercise in legislation at Crete, and afterward, was put in charge of the people himself, ruling them artfully: and they say that his companion was a certain Thales, whose pupils, they say, were Lycurgus of Lacedaemon and Zaleucus of Locri. Moreover, they say that the pupil of Zaleucus was Charondas the Catanian. But those who say this do not consider well the time of these men, which does not fit with this narrative.

Then, where he says fuit autem et Philolaus, etc., he tells about the legislators of Greece. And he says that a certain Philolaus, a citizen of the Corinthians, passed the laws of the Thebans. And he indicates the cause why he went over from Corinth to Thebes. And he says that, since he was of the family of the Bacchiads—that is, of those who trace their origin to Bacchus—he was made a friend of one Diocles, who had had a victory in the Olympics. Therefore, after Diocles left the city—perhaps cast out from them because of some wrong—Philolaus, holding in his memory the love of Diocles's mother, who was called Alcyone, who perhaps had nursed him, he went with him to Thebes, where both of them ended life, and until now, they still show their tombs, which faced each other, and from one, the other could be seen. But they were so organized, toward the region of the Corinthians, that one could be seen from there, but not the other. And they tell that their tombs were so organized so that Diocles would not be seen from Corinth, as though they wished to avoid this because of what he had suffered from them: but Philolaus was able to be seen, who had suffered nothing from them. Such things were the cause of their dwelling among the Thebans, and the laws that they passed for them.

Then, where he says legislator autem, etc., he shows what each legislator himself instituted. And he says that Philolaus passed laws for the Thebans about some other things, but specifically about the procreation of children: namely, that they should not continue in the work of generation after they had a determinate number of sons. And these laws of Philolaus the Thebans called settled laws. Moreover, only he constituted this about the procreation of children: that the number of allotments should be preserved—that is, that one part of the possessions of one man must not be divided among several; but that as many children be generated as would always preserve the same number of citizens. However, Charondas was not the only one to establish anything, except the punishment of false testimonies, which he was the first to consider: he is more pleasing because he diligently explicated what was necessary in the laws which other legislators, before all other legislators, than because he individually established anything. But Philolaus instituted something himself: he eliminated the unevenness of possessions. Now Plato instituted four things of his own in his Laws. One of them is that women and children and possessions should be common. The second is that there should be feasts among the women, just as in other cities there were feasts among the men. The third is that he instituted a law against drunkenness, so that only the sober would be able to be governors of symposia—that is, of feasts. Fourth, he established in military affairs that the men, through exercise and study, would become ambidextrous—so that both hands would become useful for fighting. After this, he says that certain laws of Draco have been found, which laws he imposed upon a preexisting regime; but in his laws was found nothing of his own that is worthy of memory, except that a harsher penalty was given when the harm that followed from a fault was greater. There was also one Pittacus, a legislator who did not institute a regime. The law proper to him was that drunks, if they were prosecuted, would be punished more than the sober, because more drunks committed wrongs than did the sober: hence he looked more toward utility, to contain the wrongs of drunks, than toward the pardon that one must have toward drunks, who are not competent for themselves. There was also a legislator, Androdamas, a citizen of Reggio, who instituted some laws about the penalties for homicide, and hereditary successions, but yet nothing can be spoken of as if it were his own. And lastly, he concludes in a epilogue that in this manner, we have considered the things that must be considered about the best regimes: of the Lacedaemonians, the Cretans, and the Carthaginians, and about the regimes put in order by certain others. And so the second book is ended.