Article 1 — Whether it pertains to God to have a will

The question is on God's will. And first, it is asked whether it pertains to God to have a will. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 45 a. 1; ST I.19.1; I.54.2; SCG I.72–73; IV.19; Compendium theologiae, ch. 32.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it does not, for it belongs to everything having a will to act with regard to the will's choice. But God does not act with regard to the will's choice, for as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 1 (PG 3:693B).) just as our sun, that is the visible one, enlightens all things through its own being and not by reasoning or choosing beforehand, so also does divine goodness. Therefore, it does not pertain to God to possess a will.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, necessary effects cannot come from a contingent cause; but the will is a contingent cause, since it stands in relation to any opposing side: therefore, it cannot be a cause of necessary things. However, God is a cause of all things, both of the necessary and of the contingent; therefore, he does not act by means of a will, and so the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, something that implies a reference to a cause does not belong to what does not have any cause. But God, being the first cause of all things, does not have any cause. Therefore, since the will implies a relation to a final cause, for the will itself is an end according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 3.5, 1111b26.) it seems that a will does not belong to God.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 3.1, 1109b31.) the voluntary merits praise or blame, however, the involuntary merits pardon and mercy. Therefore, the notion of what is voluntary does not belong to one to whom the notion of being praiseworthy does not belong. But the notion being praiseworthy does not belong to God, for as is said in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 1.18, 1101b22.) praise does not belong to what is best, but rather to those things that are ordered to the best; however, honor belongs to what is best. Therefore, it does not pertain to God that he have a will.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, opposites are such as to occur with regard to the same thing; (Cf. Aristotle, Topics 2.4, 111a14.) but to the voluntary two kinds of involuntary are opposed, as is said in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 3.1, 1109b35.) namely, what is involuntary through violence, and what is involuntary through ignorance. But what is involuntary through violence does not belong to God since coercion has no place in God, and neither does the involuntary through ignorance since he knows all things; therefore, neither does the voluntary belong to God.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, as said in the book On the Rules of the Faith, the voluntary is twofold, namely, that of affection with regard to interior acts and that of accomplishing with respect to what is exterior: however, the will of affection, as is said there, is operative towards merit, but the will of accomplishing is perfective of merit. (Alan of Lille, Regulae de sacra theologia, rule 79 (PL 210:661).) However, it does not belong to God to merit, and thus, neither to have a will in any way.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, God is an unmoved mover, for according to Boethius, he makes each thing to move while remaining immobile. (Cf. Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 3, verse 9 (PL 63:758A).) But the will is a moved mover, as said in On the Soul; (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.15, 433b16.) hence, the Philosopher also proves in Metaphysics, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 11.7, 1072a26.) that he moves as desired and understood, inasmuch as he is an unmoved mover. Thus, it does not pertain to God to possess a will.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, the will is a certain appetite, for it is contained under the appetitive part of the soul. But an appetite is an imperfection, for it is of what is not possessed according to Augustine. (De Trin. IX c. 12 (PL 42, 971) ut dicitur supra q. 22 a. 1, cf. tamen Enarr. in Ps. cxviii:20 (PL 37,1522).) Thus, since no imperfection is found in God, (Cf. Moyses Maim. Dux neutr. bk. 1, ch. 26; bk. 3, ch. 21.) it seem that it does not pertain to him to possess a will.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, it seems that nothing belongs to God which stands in relation to opposites, for such things are able to be generated and corrupted, from which God is far removed. But the will stands in relation to opposites since it is contained among rational powers which, according to the Philosopher, stand in relation to opposites. (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.2, 1046b4–6.) Thus, a will does not belong to God.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, Augustine says in the City of God 13, (It is actually Augustine, City of God, bk. 11, ch. 21 (PL 41:334).) that God is not differently affected by things when they exist or do not exist. But when things do not exist, God does not will them to be, for they would exist if he wanted them to exist; thus also when they do exist, God does not will them to be.

Obj. 11: Furthermore, it does not belong to God that he be perfected but rather that he should perfect. However, it belongs to the will to be perfected by the good just as the intellect is by the true. Thus, a will does not belong to God.

On the contrary (1) is what is said in the Psalm, anything whatsoever that he wills, the Lord does, (Ps. 113:11,3 according to Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 1, d. 45, ch. 5.) from which it seems that he possesses a will and that things are created by his will.

Furthermore (2), happiness is found most of all in God. But happiness requires that there be a will, for according to Augustine one is happy who possesses whatever one wants, and wants nothing evil. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 13, ch. 5 (PL 42:1020); cf. ST I-II.5.8, obj. 3.) Thus, a will does belong to God.

Furthermore (3), there are more perfect conditions of the will wherever a more perfect will is found. But conditions of the will are found most perfectly within God, for since his will is his own essence, (cf. Petrus Lomb. Lib. Sent. I d. 45 c 1.) there is no distance in him between the will and the willing subject; there is also no distance in him between between his will and its act, for his act is also his essence; there is likewise no distance between his will and its end or object, for his will is his own goodness. Thus, the will is found to be most perfectly in God.

Furthermore (4), the will is the root of freedom; but freedom belongs most of all to God: for according to the Philosopher in the beginning of the Metaphysics, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.3, 982b25.) one is free who is one's own cause, which is most of all true about God. Thus, a will is found to be in God.

I answer that it must be said that the will is found most properly to be in God. In evidence of this, it must be known that knowledge and will are rooted in the spiritual substance with regard to its various relationships to things. For there is one relationship of the spiritual substance to things inasmuch as things are in some way with the spiritual substance, not with regard to their own being as the ancients held, (Cf. ST I.84.2) saying that we know earth by means of earth, by means of water, and so on with the rest; but rather with regard to its own account: for according to the Philosopher in On the Soul, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.8, 431b29.) the stone is not in the soul, but the form of the stone, or rather its notion.

But since the pure notion of a thing without any concretion can only be found in an immaterial substance, thus knowledge is not attributed to all things but only to immaterial things; and the level of knowledge is also with regard to the grade of immateriality, so that what are most immaterial are most knowable, the essences of which, since they are immaterial, are related to them as the means of knowing, just as God knows himself and all other things through his own essence. However, the will and any other appetite is grounded upon the relationship by which a spiritual substance is related to things as having a certain order to them inasmuch as they are existing in themselves. And since it belongs to any thing, whether material or immaterial, to have an order to another thing, it is for this reason that it belongs to each thing to have an appetite, whether it be natural, animal, rational, or intellectual; but it is found differently in diverse things. For since a thing has an order to another thing through something that it has in itself, it is ordered to another thing in different ways with regard to how it possesses something in itself in different ways.

Therefore, material things, in which whatever is within them is bound to matter and made concrete, do not have a free ordering to other things, but one following from the necessity of natural disposition. Hence, material things themselves are not their very own causes of this ordering, as if they should order themselves to what they are ordered, but rather they are ordered from another source, hence, they receive a natural disposition. Therefore, it belongs to them to have only a natural appetite. But something exists absolutely in immaterial and knowable substances that is not made to be concrete and bound to matter; and this is according to its level of immateriality; and thus, it is for this reason that they are ordered to things by a free ordering, of which they are the cause, as though ordering themselves to what they are ordered.

Therefore, it belongs to them to act or desire voluntarily and of their own accord. For if the bow that is in the mind of the artisan were a material form possessing a determinate being, (cf. supra q. 2, a. 7, obj. 4.) it would not incline except with regard to the determinate mode that it possessed. Hence, there would be left no freedom of the artisan to make or not to make the house, or to make it in one way or in another. But since the form of the house in the mind of the artisan is the absolute notion of house, not related in itself more towards being than non-being, and not related more one way than another with respect to the accidental dispositions of the house, there remains a free inclination for the artisan with respect to making or not making the house.

But since the forms of things are received into sensitive substances without matter, though not completely immaterially and without the conditions of matter inasmuch as they are received into a bodily organ; thus, the inclination within them is not wholly free, even though there is within them some imitation or likeness of freedom. For by appetite, they are inclined toward another thing from their very selves inasmuch as they desire something from apprehension; but to be or not to be inclined toward what they desire does not fall under their disposition. However, in the intellectual nature, where something is perfectly received immaterially, there is found the perfect notion of free inclination. It is this free inclination that constitutes the notion of will.

Therefore, a will is not attributed to material things, but rather a natural appetite; however, to the sensitive soul is attributed not a will but an animal appetite; yet a will is only attributed to the intelligent substance, and the more immaterial it is, the more does the notion of will belong to it. Hence, since God is at the limit of immateriality, the notion of will belongs to him in the highest way and most properly.

Reply Obj. 1: Thus, to the first it must be said that Dionysius does not intend by those words to exclude will and choice from God but rather to manifest his universal influence upon things. For he does not share his goodness with things such that he chooses some that he makes to participate in his goodness and others that he wholly excludes from participation in his goodness, but rather he gives to all abundantly (Vulgate: dat omnibus affluenter.) as is said in James 1:5, even though he is said to choose inasmuch as he gives to some more than others from the order of his wisdom.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that God's will is not a contingent cause since what he wills, he wills unchangeably. Thus, things can be caused necessarily by reason of his immobility, and especially because no created thing, considered in itself, is necessary, but it is possible in itself and necessary on account of something else.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that the will pertains to something in two ways: in one way principally and in another secondarily. The will pertains principally to the end, which is the reason for willing everything else; but secondarily it pertains to what is ordered to the end, which we will for the sake of the end. However, the will does not have a relation toward what is willed secondarily as toward a cause, but it only has this relation toward what is willed principally, which is the end. However, it must be known that the will and what is willed are sometimes distinguished according to reality, and then what is willed is really compared to the will as a final cause.

But if the will and what is willed are only distinguished according to reason, then what is willed will not be a final cause of the will except with regard to the mode of signification. Thus, the divine will is compared to its own goodness as to an end, which is really the same as his will; but it is only distinguished with regard to the mode of signification. Hence, it follows that nothing is really the cause of the divine will, but only with regard to the mode of signification. And it is not a difficulty that something is signified in God as a cause, for in this way "deity" is signified in God as something being related to God in the mode of a formal cause. But the created things that God wills are related to the divine will not as ends, but as ordered to an end; and for this reason God wills creatures to exist so that his own goodness might be manifested within them and so that his goodness, which cannot be multiplied according to essence, should at least be shared with many by means of a participation in likeness.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that praise is not due to the will with regard to any one of its acts, if praise is taken strictly as the Philosopher takes it, but inasmuch as the will is related to what is for the sake of the end. For it is agreed that the will's act is found not only among works of virtue, which are praiseworthy, but also in the act of happiness, which concerns what is honorable; for it is evident that happiness has delight. Nevertheless, praise is also attributed to God since we are invited to praise God in many places in Scripture; but praise is taken more commonly than the Philosopher understands it. Or it can be said that even if praise is taken properly, it belongs to God inasmuch as he orders creatures toward himself as an end by means of his will.

The solution to the fifth is lacking.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that in God there is both the will of affection and the will of action, for he wants himself to will and he wants himself to do what he does; but it is not necessary that merit is found wherever either one of these is, but only in an imperfect nature tending toward perfection.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that when what is willed is other than the will, what is willed really moves the will; but when what is willed is really the same as the will, then it only moves with regard to the mode of signification. And with respect to this way of speaking, according to the Commentator in the Physics 8, (Averroes, Physics, bk. 8, comm. 40.) the saying of Plato is shown to be true, which said that the first mover moves himself, namely, inasmuch as he understands and wills himself. But it does not follow that since he wills creatures therefore he is moved by creatures, for he only wills creatures by reason of his own goodness, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that by the same nature something is moved toward the end that it has not yet obtained, and rests in the end that it has now obtained. Hence, it belongs to the same power to tend to the good while it is not yet possessed and to love and delight in it after it has been possessed; and both of these pertain to the appetitive power, even though it is named more from that act by which it tends to what it does not have, for which reason it is said that the appetite is of what is imperfect. But the will is related indifferently to both, hence, will belongs to God with regard to its proper notion, but not appetite.

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that it does not belong to God to be open to opposites with regard to what is in his essence, but he is open to opposites with regard to effects in creatures, which he is able or not able to do.

Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that even when God does not make things, he wants things to exist, but he does not want them to exist just then; hence, the objection follows from a false supposition.

Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that God cannot be perfected by something in reality; yet sometimes he is indicated as being perfected through the mode of signification, as when one says that God understands something: for just as what is willed is a perfection of the will, so also is the intelligible a perfection of the intellect. However, in God the intellect and the first intelligible are the same, as well as the will and the first thing willed.