Article 2 — Whether the divine will can be distinguished by antecedent and consequent

Second, it is asked whether the divine will can be distinguished by antecedent and consequent. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 46, a. 1; d. 47, aa. 1, 3; ST I.19.6, ad 1; Commentary on I Timothy ch. 2, lect. 1.)

Obj. 1: It seems not: for order presupposes distinction; but there is no distinction in the divine will since it wills all that the it will by one simple act of the will. Thus, there is no antecedent or consequent in the divine will that implies an order.

Obj. 2: But one might say that even though there is in the divine will no distinction on the part of the one willing, yet there is a distinction on the part of the things willed.

On the contrary, order cannot be held in the divine will on the part of what is willed except in two ways: either with respect to diverse things willed, or with respect to one only. If with respect to diverse things willed, it follows that the antecedent will is said with regard to prior creatures, but the consequent will with regard to secondary creatures, which is false. But if with respect to one willed thing, this can only be with regard to diverse circumstances considered in that willed thing. However, this cannot make a distinction or order in the will since the will is referred to the thing inasmuch as it exists in its own nature; but a thing in its own nature is implicated with all of its own conditions. Thus, in no way should one hold an antecedent and a consequent in the divine will.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the will is compared to creatures just like knowledge and power; but we do not distinguish by antecedent or consequent either the knowledge or the power of God with respect to the order of creatures; thus, neither should the will be distinguished in this way.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, what does not admit of change or impediment from another is not judged by another but only by itself; but the divine will cannot be changed or impeded by anyone; thus, it ought not to be judged by another but only by itself. But, according to Damascene, the antecedent will is said to be in God as being from him, but the consequent will is for our sake; (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 29 (PG 94:969A).) thus, the consequent will ought not to be distinguished against the antecedent.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, there does not seem to be an order in the affective part except in relation to the cognitive, for order pertains to reason. But knowledge possessing an order, which is reason, is not attributed to God, but rather simple knowledge, which is understanding. Thus, neither should one hold that there is an order of antecedence and consequence in his will.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, Boethius says in the book On the Consolation of Philosophy (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 5, verse 2 (PL 63:838A).) that God sees all things with one glance of his mind; thus, for the same reason, by one simple act of the will he spreads himself above all the things that he wills; and so one should not hold that there an antecedent and a consequent in his will.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, God knows things both in himself and in their own proper natures; and even though things exist in themselves posteriorly to how they exist in the Word, antecedent and consequent are still not held to be in God's knowledge; thus, neither should they be held to be in the will.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, just as divine being is measured by eternity, so also is the divine will. But the duration of the divine being is all together, not having prior or posterior, inasmuch as it is measured by eternity. (cf. Boetius De consol. V pr. 6 (PL 63, 858 A).) Thus, neither should one hold there to be an antecedent and a consequent in the divine will.

On the contrary (1) is that which Damascene says in book two that God wants all to be saved by an antecedent will, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 29 (Marietti, ch. 26)(PG 94:969A).) but not by a consequent will, as he says later on. Therefore, the distinction of antecedent and consequent does belong to the divine will.

Furthermore (2), an eternal, habitual will belongs to God inasmuch as he is God, and an actual will inasmuch as he is the Creator willing things to be in act. But this will is compared to the first as consequent to antecedent. Thus, an antecedent and a consequent are found to exist in the divine will.

I answer that it must be said that the divine will is fittingly distinguished into antecedent and consequent. The meaning of this distinction must be taken from the words of Damascene who introduced it; for he says in book two that the antecedent will is God's granting of something as being from himself, but the consequent will is a concession for our sake. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 29 (PG 94:969A).) In order to make this clear, it must be known that in any action one must consider something on the part of the agent and something on the part of the recipient; and just as the agent is more original and prior to what is made, so also whatever exists on the part of the agent is naturally prior to what exists on the part of what is made, as is clear in the work of nature, namely that it depends upon the formative power in the seed for a perfect animal to be produced; (Avicenna, Canon medicinae, bk. 3, fen. 20, tract. 1, ch. 3; Averroes, Metaphysics, bk. 7, comm. 31; cf. Aquinas, In II Sent., d. 18, q. 2, a. 3.) but with regard to the receiving matter, which is sometimes indisposed, it happens that at times a perfect animal is not produced, as in deformed offspring. Hence, we say that it pertains to the first intention of nature that a perfect animal be produced; but that an imperfect animal is produced comes from the second intention of nature which, since it cannot give the form of perfection to the matter, gives to it that of which it is capable.

One should similarly consider God's work by which he acts upon creatures. For although he does not require matter in his work, and he created things from the beginning with no preexisting matter, now he works upon things which he had first created, managing them by their presupposed nature that he had given to them before. And even though he could remove every impediment from creatures that makes them incapable of perfection, nevertheless, in the order of his wisdom, he has disposed things with regard to their conditions so that he gives to each one according to its mode. Therefore, that toward which God has ordered the creature with regard to himself is said to be willed by him as by a first intention or by an antecedent will. But when a creature is impeded from this end because of its defect, God still fulfills in it the goodness of which it is capable; and this pertains, as it were, to his second intention and it is called a consequent will.

Thus, since God made all men for blessedness, he is said to will the salvation of all men by an antecedent will; but since some are turned against their own salvation, whom the order of his wisdom does not allow to come to salvation because of their defect, he fulfills in them what pertains to his goodness in another way, namely, condemning them by justice; so that whereas they do not attain to the first order of his will, they fall into the second; (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 4, prose 6 (PL 63:820A); cf. Aquinas, In I Sent., d. 47, q. 1, a. 3.) and while they do not carry out God's will, the will of God is fulfilled in them. However, the very defect of sin by which someone is rendered worthy of punishment in the present or else the future is not willed by God either by an antecedent or a consequent will, but it is only permitted by him.

But one should not understand from what was said before that God's intention can be frustrated, for he foreknew from eternity that the one who is not saved would not be saved; and neither did he order him to salvation according to the order of predestination, which is the order of absolute will; rather, to the extent that this order is from himself, he gave to him a nature ordered to beatitude.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that neither order nor distinction comes from the act of the will, but only from the things willed.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that the order of the divine will is not understood with regard to various things willed but with respect to one and the same willed thing on account of the various things found in it; for just as God wills that a man be saved with an antecedent will by reason of human nature, which he made for blessedness, yet he wishes him to be damned with a consequent will on account of the sins that are found in him. But even though the thing to which the will's act is borne exists together with all its conditions, it is not necessary that any one of those conditions found in the willed thing be the reason for moving the will. For example, wine does not move the appetite of the drinker by reason of the power that it has for inebriating, but by reason of its sweetness, even though both are found together in wine.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that the divine will is the immediate principle of creatures, ordering the divine attributes by means of understanding inasmuch as they are applied to work; for a power does not go forth to work except that it be regulated by knowledge and determined by the will to do something; and thus, the order of things is referred more to the divine will than to power or knowledge. Or it can be said that the notion of the will consists in the comparison of the one willing to the things themselves, as was said; (in solut. ad 2) but things are said to be known or possible for some agent inasmuch as they exist in him in an intelligible mode or else virtually. However, things do not have an order inasmuch as they are in God, but inasmuch as they are in themselves; and thus, the order of things is not attributed to knowledge or power, but only to the will.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that even though the divine will is neither impeded nor changed by any other, yet by the order of wisdom it is carried toward something according to the condition of that thing; and thus something is attributed to the divine will on account of us.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that that argument proceeds from the order of the will on the part of the act itself; however, in that way there is no order of antecedent and consequent.

Reply Obj. 6: One can argue similarly with regard to the sixth.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that although a thing has existence in its own nature after it exists in God, yet it is not known by God to be in his own nature posterior to being in itself, for inasmuch as God knows his own essence, he sees things both insofar as they exist in himself and insofar as they exist in their own nature.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that antecedent and consequent are not placed in the divine will so as to imply an order of succession, but rather to denote its different comparisons to the things willed.