Article 5 — Whether the divine will imposes necessity upon the things willed

Fifth, it is asked whether the divine will imposes necessity upon the things willed. (Parallel texts: ST I.19.8; SCG I.85; II.29-30; Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 16, a. 7, ad 15; Commentary on Aristotle's On Interpretation, bk. 1, lect. 14; Quodlibet, bk. 11, q. 3; bk. 12, q. 3, ad 1.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it does: for supposing a sufficient cause, it is necessary to suppose the effect, which Avicenna proves in his Metaphysics (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 1, ch. 7.) in this way: if by positing a cause the effect is not posited necessarily, then the effect is still open to both existence and non existence after the positing of the cause; but whatever is in potency to two things is not determined to one of them unless there is something determining it; thus, after the supposition of a cause one must still posit something that makes the effect to exist, and so that cause will not be sufficient. Therefore, if the cause is sufficient, then with it being assumed, one must necessarily assume the effect. However, the divine will is a sufficient cause; it is not a contingent but a necessary cause. Thus, the things willed by God are necessary.

Obj. 2: But one could say that a contingent effect sometimes follows from a necessary cause on account of the contingency of the middle cause, as when a contingent conclusion follows from a necessary major proposition because of the assumption of a contingent proposition.

On the contrary, whenever a contingent effect follows from a necessary cause because of the contingency of the secondary cause, this happens on account of the defect of the secondary cause, as the flowering of the tree is contingent and not necessary because of a defect of the sprouting power, which is a middle cause that is able to occur, even though the motion of the sun, which is the first cause, is a necessary cause. But the divine will can remove every defect and even every impediment of a secondary cause; thus, the contingency of a secondary cause does not prevent the effect being necessary on account of the necessity of the divine will.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, when an effect is contingent because of the contingency of the secondary cause but with the first cause being necessary, the non existence of the effect can exist together with the existence of the first cause; such as when the tree does not flower in spring even with the motion of the sun; but its non existence, which is willed by God, cannot stand together with the divine will: for these two things are incomprehensible, that God wills something to exist and that it not exist. Thus, the contingency of secondary causes does not prevent that things willed by God be necessary on account of the necessity of the divine will.

Obj. 4: But one could say that the non existence of a divine effect, even though it could not stand together with the divine will, yet since a secondary cause can fail, the effect itself is contingent.

On the contrary, the effect does not fail except with the secondary cause failing. But it cannot happen that the secondary cause fails with the existence of the divine will: for then the divine will and the non existence of what was willed by God would exist together, which appears to be false. Thus, the contingency of secondary causes does not prevent the effect of the divine will being necessary.

On the contrary, all good things happen by God willing them; thus, if the divine will imposes necessity upon things, all good things that are in the world would exist by necessity, and thus free choice and other contingent causes would be destroyed.

I answer that it must be said that the divine will does not impose necessity upon all things. The reason for this is assigned by some from the fact that whereas the will is the first cause of all things, it produces some effects by means of secondary causes, which are contingent and able to fail; and thus, the effect follows upon the contingency of the proximate cause, but not upon the necessity of the first cause. But this seems to agree with those who held that all things proceed from God by a necessity of nature: such that from one simple thing there immediately proceeded one thing having a certain multitude, and by means of that there proceeded a multitude. Similarly, they say that from one wholly immobile thing there proceeds something that is immobile according to substance, but mobile and variable according to position, by means of which generation and corruption happen in these lower things. One could not hold according to this way that a multitude, as well as corruptible and contingent things, are immediately caused by God, which is contrary to the doctrine of the faith, which holds that the multitude of even corruptible things is created immediately by God, namely, the first individual trees and irrational animals.

Thus, one must assign another primary reason for the contingency in things, which the reason given before would serve. For it is necessary that what suffers be assimilated to the agent, and if the agent is the most powerful, the likeness of the effect to the agent will be perfect; but if the agent is weak, the likeness will be imperfect, as when a son is likened to his father not only in the nature of the species, but also in many accidents, because of the strength of the forming power within the seed; but contrarily, the previously mentioned likenss is annihilated because of the weakness of the previously mentioned power, as said in the History of Animals. (Aristotle, History of Animals 4.3, 767a36; cf. Albert the Great, De animalibus, bk. 18, tract. 1, cc. 4–5.)

However, the divine will is the strongest agent, hence, its effect must be likened to it in every way, so that not only what God wants comes to pass, which is like being assimilated according to species, but that it come to pass in the way that God wants it, whether necessarily or contingently, quickly or slowly, which is like a kind of assimilation according to accidents. And the divine will fixes this mode within things from the order of its wisdom. However, inasmuch as he disposes some things to be done in one way or another, he adapts causes to them according to the manner in which he disposes them; which manner he could introduce into things even without those causes as intermediaries. And so we do not say that some of the divine effects are contingent just because of the contingency of secondary causes, but rather because of the disposition of the divine will which provides such an order in things.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that that argument follows for agent causes by a necessity of nature and with regard to immediate effects; but it does not follow for voluntary causes, for something follows from the will in the way that the will disposes and not in the way that the will has existence, as happens among natural causes, among which likeness is considered with respect to the same condition of the cause and the thing caused; whereas among voluntary causes the likeness is considered inasmuch as the agent's will is fulfilled in the effect, as mentioned in the article. Also, the argument does not follow among natural causes with respect to mediated effects.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that although God can remove every impediment of a secondary cause when he wants, yet he does not always want to remove them, and so contingency remains within the secondary cause, and in the effect as a consequence.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that although the non existence of an effect of the divine will could not exist together with the divine will, yet the ability for the effect to fall short does exist together with the divine will; for these things are not incompatible: "God wills this man to be saved," and "this man can be damned"; but these are incompattible: "God wants this man to be saved," and "this man is damned."

Reply Obj. 4: And one should respond similarly to the fourth with regard to the defect of the middle cause.