Article 3 — Whether God's will is fittingly divided by the will of approval and the will of sign

Third, it is asked whether God's will is fittingly divided by the will of approval and the will of sign. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 45, a. 4; ST I.19.11–12; In I Sent., d. 45, a. 4; distinctio inde a Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 1, d. 45, cc. 5–6 a Magistris accepta.)

Obj. 1: And it seems that it is not: for as the things done among creatures are signs of the divine will, so also are they signs of his knowledge and power. But knowledge and power are not distinguished by the power and the knowledge that are God's essence and its sign. Thus, neither should the will be distinguished in this way, by the will of approval that is the divine essence and by the will of sign.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, by God wanting something with the will of approval is shown that the act of the divine will bears upon a thing such it is pleasing to God. Therefore, that upon which the will of sign bears is either pleasing to God or it is not. If it is pleasing to God, then he wants it by the will of approval, and thus the will of sign ought not to be distinguished from the will of approval. However, if it is not pleasing to God, but is signified as being pleasing to him by the will of sign, then the sign of the divine will is false; and so such signs of the divine will should not be placed in the doctrine of truth.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every will is within the one willing. But whatever is in God is the divine essence. Therefore, if the will of sign is attributed to God, it will be the same as the divine essence, and thus it is not distinguished from the will of approval, for that will is said to be of approval which is the divine essence itself, as the Teacher says in the Sentences. (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 1, d. 45, ch. 5.)

Obj. 4: Furthermore, whatever God wants is good; but the sign of the will ought to correspond to the divine will; thus, the sign of the will should not be of what is evil. Therefore, since permission pertains to evil as does prohibition, it seems that they should not be held to be signs of the divine will.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, just as there is a good and a better, so also a bad and a worse; but a twofold will of sign is distinguished with regard to good and better, namely precept which is of the good, and counsel which is of the better good. Therefore, one ought to similarly posit two signs of the will with respect to the bad and the worse.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, God's will is inclined more toward the good than toward the bad. But the will's sign that regards evil, namely permission, can never be impeded. Therefore, precept and counsel, which are in respect to the good, should not admit of any impediment, which nevertheless appears to be false.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, of things that follow upon one another, one ought not to be distinguished against another; but the will of approval and God's operation follow upon each other: for he does nothing that he does not will by the will of approval, and he wills nothing among creatures by the will of approval that he does not do, according to the Psalm, all that the Lord wants, he accomplishes. (Ps. 113:11 according to Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 1, d. 45, ch. 5.) Thus, activity should not be placed under the will of sign, which is distinguished against the will of approval.

I answer that it must be said that there is a twofold way of speaking of divine things: one is according to proper speech, namely, when we attribute to God what belongs to him according to his own nature, even though it belongs to him more eminently than is conceived by our mind or brought forth in speech, for which reason none of our speech about God can be fully proper. Another way of speaking is according to figurative, metaphorical, or symbolic speech. For since God himself, with respect to his own being, exceeds the sharpness of our mind, we must speak of him by means of the things found among us; and so we attribute to God the names of sensible things, as when we name him "light" or "lion," (cf. Os. 13:8 et Mal. 4:2) or other things of this sort. The truth of such speech is grounded in the fact that no creature, as Dionysius says in the Heavenly Hierarchy, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, bk. 2, para. 3 (PG 3:141C).) is universally deprived of participation in goodness, and thus, one finds in every creature certain properties representing divine goodness in some respect; and so, names are transferred to God inasmuch as the thing signified by the name is a sign of divine goodness. Therefore, in divine things, any sign taken in place of the thing signified is the mode of metaphorical speech.

However, both of these modes of speech come together in the divine will. For the notion of will is found properly in God, as said above, (Above: a. 1.) and thus "will" is said properly of God, and this is the will of approval which is distinguished by antecedent and consequent, as was said. (Above: a. 2.) But since the will in us has some consequent passions of the soul, therefore, just as some names of the passions are said metaphorically of God, the same is the case for names of the will. But the name "anger" is said of God since an effect is found in him that usually belongs to those who are angry among us, namely, punishment. Hence, the punishment by which he punishes is called God's anger. (Cf. Alan of Lille, Regulae de sacra theologia, rule 21 (PL 210:631A).) And in a similar way of speaking, what are usually sings of the will among us are called wills of God; and it is called the will of sign since the sign itself which usually belongs to the will is itself called a will.

But since the will can be considered both with respect to what it proposes to do and with respect to the motion it makes toward the deed, certain signs are attributed to the will in both ways. For inasmuch as it proposes concerning practical things that evil should be avoided, its sign is prohibition. (Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 1, d. 45, ch. 6.) However, with respect to the pursuit of good there is a twofold sign of the will: for with respect to the necessary good, without which the will cannot attain its end, the will's sign is precept; but with respect to the useful good, by which the end is acquired more easily and fittingly, the will's sign is counsel. But inasmuch as the will causes a motion toward the deed, a twofold sign is attributed to it: one is expressed, namely, the activity; for one shows oneself to expressly will what one does; but another sign is interpretative, namely, permission: for whoever does not prevent something that he can prevent is interpretatively said to consent in it; but the name "permission" implies this.

Reply Obj. 1: Thus, to the first it must be said that although God knows and has power over all things, yet he does not want all things. (Cf. Albert the Great, In I Sent., d. 45, a. 5; Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 45, a. 1, q. 2.) And thus, apart from the signs found in creatures, by which he is shown to be knowing, powerful, and willing, certain signs are imputed to the will so that it might be shown what God wills, and not only that he is willing. Or it can be said that the manner of the passion is not adjoined to knowledge and power as it is to the will, as it is found in us. And thus the will approaches more to the things said metaphorically about God than do power or knowledge: and thus we more properly call the signs of the will a will, speaking metaphorically, than we call the signs of knowledge and power a knowledge and a power.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that although God does not will everything that he commands or permits, yet he wills something regarding this: for he wills us to be bound to what he commands and that what he permits be in our power; and precept and permission signify this divine will. Or one can say that the will is said to be of a sign not insofar as it signifies that God wills something, but because what is accustomed to be a sign of the will among us is named "will." However, it is not necessary that what is usually the sign of some thing be false whenever what it signifies does not correspond to that which signifies it, but only when it is being used to signify it. Thus, although among us to command is a sign of willing that, yet it is not necessary that whenever either God or a man commands something that they must signify that they will it: hence, it does not follow that it is a false sign. And it is for this reason that there is not always a lie in actions whenever some action is performed by which something is accustomed to be signified, if it does not exist.

But if what one signifies in words is not present, there is necessarily a falsehood, for words are instituted to be signs; hence, if what is signified does not correspond to them, there is falsehood. But actions are not instituted for the sake of signifying, but rather that something be done by means of them; but it happens that something is signified by them. Therefore, there is not always falsehood in them if what is signified does not correspond, but only when they are applied by the agent to signify something.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that the will of sign is not in God but from God; for some of God's effects are like what among us are designated as a man's will.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that even though God's will does not relate to evil such that it be carried out, yet he does relate to it such that he impedes it by prohibiting it, or else he puts it in our power by permitting it.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that since whatever the will tends towards has an order to the end, which is the reason for willing, but all bad things lack an order to the end; all bad things hold one place both with respect to the end and with respect to the divine will. But the will is related differently to good things, which are ordered to the end, with regard to the different orders that they have to the end; and for this reason there are different signs for what is good and better, but not for what is bad or worse.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that the will of sign is not distinguished against the will of approval by being fulfilled or not fulfilled. Hence, even though the will of approval is always fulfilled, something can also belong to the will of sign as being fulfilled; hence, God sometimes wills by the will of approval what he commands or advises. However, the will of sign is distinguished from the will of approval because God is one thing and his effect is another, as has been said. It should be known that the will of sign is related in three ways to the will of approval: for a certain will of sign never agrees on the same thing as the will of approval, such as permission which allows evil to be done, for the will of approval never wills that evil be done; but another always agrees on the same thing, such as operation; but others sometimes agrees and sometimes do not, such as precept, prohibition, and counsel.

Reply Obj. 7: And by this the response to the seventh is made clear.