Article 4 — Whether God wills by necessity whatever he wills

Fourth, it is asked whether God wills by necessity whatever he wills. (Parallel texts: ST I.19.3; SCG I.80-83; III.97; On the Power of God, q. 1, a. 5; q. 10, a. 2, ad 6.)

Obj. 1: And it seems so, for everything eternal is necessary; but God wills whatever he will from eternity; thus, he wills by necessity whatever he wills.

Obj. 2: However, one might say that God's willing is necessary and eternal on the part of the one willing, on the part of the act itself of the will, which is the divine essence, and on the part of the reason for willing, which is divine goodness; but not with respect to the relation of the will to the thing willed.

On the contrary, God's willing implies some relation of the will to the thing willed; but the very fact that God wills something is eternal: therefore, the very relationship of the will to the thing willed is eternal and necessary.

Obj. 3: However, one might say that the relationship to the thing willed is eternal and necessary inasmuch the willed thing is in the exemplar notion, but not inasmuch as it is in itself or in its own proper nature.

On the contrary, the will is related to something inasmuch as it is willed. Therefore, if God's will were not related to what is willed from eternity, inasmuch as it exists in itself, but inasmuch as it is in the exemplar notion of willing, then something temporal, such as the fact that Peter be saved, would not be willed by God from eternity, namely, that it should be in its own proper nature; but it would only be willed by God from eternity to be in the eternal reasons, which is clearly false.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, once God wills or has willed something, he cannot not will or not to have willed whatever he wills or has willed. But never did God not will whatever he wills, inasmuch as he always willed from eternity whatever he wills; thus, God cannot not will whatever he wills; thus, he wills whatever he wills by necessity.

Obj. 5: However, one might say that this argument follows inasmuch as God's willing is considered with regard to the one himself who is willing or to the act or reason for willing, but not with respect to the relation by which it is referred to the willed thing.

On the contrary, to create is an act that always implies a relation to an effect, for it connotes a temporal effect; but this argument would be verified of creation if it were supposed that God had always created, for he cannot not create whatever he has created; therefore, it follows by necessity inasmuch as it has a reference to what is willed.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, to be and to will are the same thing for God; but it is necessary that God be all that he is, for in perpetual things, to exist and to be capable do not differ according to the Philosopher in the Physics; (Aristotle, Physics 3.4, 203b30. In the margin folii 20r codicis Vat. lat. 2071 we see written the note: «alia translatio, quod in perpetuis non differt esse a posse».) thus, it is necessary that God wills all that he wills.

Obj. 7: However, one might say that even though willing and being are the same in reality, yet they differ with regard to the mode of signification, for willing is signified by the mode of an action that passes to another.

On the contrary, God's existence also differs with regard to the mode of signification, even though it is the same as the essence in reality; for to exist signifies in the mode of an action. Thus, in this respect there is no difference between existing and willing.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, eternity is incompatible with succession; but the divine willing is measured by eternity; thus, there cannot be succession in it. However, there would be succession if it does not will what it had willed from eternity, or if it should will what it did not will. Thus, it is impossible that he wills what he did not will, or that he not will what he has willed. Thus, whatever he wills, he wills by necessity, and whatever he does not will, he does not will by necessity.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, it is impossible for whoever willed something not to have willed it, for what has been done cannot not be done. But in God to will and to have willed are the same, for his will's act is not new but eternal. Thus, God cannot not will what he wills, and so he wills what he wills by necessity.

Obj. 10: However, one might say that he wills by necessity with regard to the reason for willing, but not with regard to the willed thing itself.

On the contrary, the reason for willing is God himself, for he wills whatever he wills for himself; thus, if he wills himself by necessity, he wills all other things by necessity.

Obj. 11: Furthermore, the reason for willing is the end; however, according to the Philosopher in the Physics, (Aristotle, Physics 2.15, 200a15.) and the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 7.8, 1151a16.) the end exists in practical science just as a principle exists in demonstrative science. But if in demonstrative sciences the principles are necessary, a necessary conclusion follows: (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.13, 74b13 sqq. ; cf. ST I.14.13, obj. 2.) thus, if someone wills an end among desirable things, one wills by necessity what is for the sake of the end; and so if the divine willing is necessary with regard to the reason for willing, it will be necessary in comparison to the things willed.

Obj. 12: Furthermore, whoever can either will or not will something is able to begin willing it; but God cannot begin to will something; thus, he cannot will or not will something, and so whatever he wills he wills by necessity.

Obj. 13: Furthermore, God's power and knowledge imply a relation to creatures, just like his will; but it is necessary that God be capable of whatever he is capable and that he knows whatever he knows. Therefore, it is necessary that he wills whatever he wills.

Obj. 14: Furthermore, that is necessary which always holds itself in the very same way; (cf. Arist. Metaph. V 6 (1015 a 33).) but the relation of the divine will to the things willed always holds itself in the very same way; and thus the divine willing is necessary even with regard to the relation toward the substance of the thing willed.

Obj. 15: Furthermore, if God wishes the Antichrist to exist, it follows by necessity that the Antichrist will exist, even though that the Antichrist will exist is not necessary: (This example is from William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 1, ch. 10; see Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, part 1, inq. 1, tract. 3, q. 2, ch. 3, n. 93, 1:150.) but this would not be unless there were a necessary relationship or reference of the divine will to the thing willed; thus, the divine willing itself is necessary inasmuch as it implies a reference of the will to the thing willed.

Obj. 16: Furthermore, the divine will's order to the reason for willing is the cause of the divine will's order to the thing willed; for the will is borne toward something willed because of the reason for willing; however, a contingent middle does not fall between either order. But, having posited a necessary cause, a necessary effect follows unless a contingent middle cause should interfere. Therefore, since the divine willing is necessary as ordered toward the reason for willing, it will also be necessary as ordered to the thing willed, and thus God wills whatever he wills by necessity.

On the contrary (1), God's will is more free than ours; but our will does not will by necessity what it wills; thus, neither does God's will.

Furthermore (2), necessity is opposed to a gratuitous will; but God wills the salvation of men with a gratuitous will; thus, he does not will by necessity.

Furthermore (3), since nothing outside of God can impose necessity upon God, if he were to will something by necessity, he would not will it except by the necessity of his own nature. Therefore, the same thing would follow from holding that God acts by his will and that he acts by the necessity of nature. But it follows for those holding that God acts by the necessity of nature that all things have been made by him from eternity. Thus, the same thing would follow for us who hold that he does all things by his will.

I answer that it must be said that it is undoubtedly true that the divine willing has necessity on the part of the one himself who is willing and the act itself, for God's action is his essence, which is eternal. Hence, this is not disputed in the question, but whether the willing itself has necessity in comparison to the thing willed, which comparison is understood when we say that God wills this or that thing; for this is sought when we ask whether God wills something by necessity.

Therefore, it should be known that there is a twofold willed thing for any will: one that is primary and another that is secondary. The primary willed thing is that to which the will is borne by its own nature, inasmuch as the will itself is a certain nature and has a natural order toward something; but this is what the will naturally wills: as for the example the human will, which naturally desires blessedness, and in respect to this willed thing the will has necessity, for it tends toward it by way of nature; for a man cannot will that he not be happy or that he be miserable. But there are secondary willed things that are ordered to this primary willed thing as to an end. And the will is related to these two willed thing differently, just as the intellect is to the principles, which it naturally knows, and to the conclusions, which it draws from them.

Therefore, the divine will has as the principle willed thing what it naturally wills, and which exists as the end of his will, namely, his very own goodness for the sake of which he wills anything else other than himself; for he makes things for the sake of his own goodness, as Augustine says; (Pseudo-Augustine, De diligendo Deo, ch. 2 (PL 40:850); cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 1, ch. 4.) such that his goodness, which cannot be multiplied essentially, can at least be shared with many things by a certain participation of likeness. Hence, whatever he wills regarding creatures are like his secondary willed things, which he wills for the sake of his own goodness; so that the divine goodness is for his will the reason for willing all things, just as his essence is for him the reason for knowing all things. Thus, with respect to the primary willed thing, which is his goodness, the divine will has necessity, not of coercion but of natural order, which is not opposed to freedom according to Augustine in the City of God; (Augustine, City of God, bk 5, ch. 10 (PL41:152).) for God cannot will that he not be good, and consequently that he not be intelligent or powerful, or any of the things that that the notion of his goodness includes.

But he is under necessity with respect to no other willed thing. For since the end itself is the reason for willing what is for the sake of the end, what is for the sake of the end is compared to that end just as it is compared to the will. Hence, if what is for the sake of the end is, as it were, proportioned to that end, such that it perfectly contains the end and the end cannot be possessed without it, then just as the end is desired by necessity, so also is what is for the sake of the end desired by necessity, and especially by the will that cannot pass beyond the rule of wisdom. For it seems for the very same reason to desire the continuation of life and the taking up of nutriment, by which life is conserved and without which it cannot be conserved.

But just as no divine effect is equal to the power of the cause, so also nothing that is ordered to God as an end is equal to that end; for no creature is perfectly assimilated to God, for this pertains only to the uncreated Word. Hence, it happens that no matter how nobly a pure creature is ordered to God and assimilated to him in some way, it is possible that some other creature be ordered to him and represent divine goodness in an equally noble way.

Thus, it is clear that there is no necessity in the divine will coming from the love that it has for its own goodness, namely that it should will this or that thing regarding the creature; and neither is there within it any necessity with respect to the whole of creation, inasmuch as the divine goodness is perfect in itself, even if no creature existed, for he does not need our goods as it says in Psalm 15:2. For the divine goodness is not such an end as could be made from what is for the sake of the end, but is rather that by which are made and perfected the things that are ordered to it. Hence, Avicenna also says that the action of God alone is purely free, (Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 6, ch. 5.) for nothing is added to him from what he wills or does regarding creatures. Thus, it is clear from what has been said that God wills by necessity whatever he wills to exist in himself, but he does not will by necessity whatever he wills regarding creatures.

Reply Obj. 1: Thus, to the first it must be said that something is said to be necessary in two ways: in one way absolutely, in another by supposition. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.6, 1015a20; cf. Physics 2.15, 199b34 sqq.; Aquinas, In I Sent., d. 6, a. 1.) Something is said to be necessary absolutely because of the necessary relationship between the terms that are placed in a proposition, such as that man is an animal, or that every whole is greater than its part, or other things of this sort. But that is necessary by supposition which is not necessary by itself but only with something having been posited, such as that Socrates ran: for in himself Socrates is not more associated with this than with its opposite; but making the supposition that he ran, it is impossible that he not have run. Thus, I say that for God to will something within creatures, such as that Peter be saved, is not absolutely necessary, inasmuch as the divine will does not have a necessary ordering to this, as is clear from what was said; but having made the supposition that God wants or wanted this, it is impossible that he not want or not have wanted since his will is immutable. Hence, this kind of necessity is called the "necessity of immutability" by theologians. (Cf. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 6, a. 1, q. 1; In II Sent., d. 25, part 11, a. 1, q. 2.) But that it is not necessary absolutely that God will some thing comes from the thing willed, which falls short of the perfect proportion to the end, as was said. And in this respect the response first given is confirmed; and one should distinguish in the same way regarding the eternal as regarding the necessary.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that the implied relationship is necessary and eternal by supposition, but not absolutely; and not only insofar as it terminates in something willed inasmuch as it exists in the reason for willing, but also inasmuch as it exists temporally in its own nature.

Reply Obj. 3: Thus, we concede the third.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that for God to will something or to have willed after he wills and has willed is necessary by supposition, but not absolutely, just as that Socrates ran after he has run; and it is similarly the case regarding creation and any act of the divine will that terminates in something exterior.

Reply Obj. 5: Thus, we concede the fifth.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that although the divine being itself is necessary in itself, yet creatures do not go forth from God by necessity, but by free choice; and thus whatever implies a comparison of God to the going forth of creatures into existence, such as to will, to create, and similar things, are not necessary absolutely, such as the things said of God with respect to himself, like to be good, to be living, to be wise, and other such things.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that to exist does not denote the act that is an activity passing into something external that is produced temporally, but rather something like first act; however, to will denotes an act inasmuch as it is an activity; and thus, something is attributed to divine existence from a different mode of signification that is not attributed to divine willing.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that a succession is not implied if we say that God is able to will and not to will something, unless it is understood in such a way that supposing he wills something, it is held that afterwards he does not will it; but this is excluded if we posit that God wills something to exist necessarily by supposition.

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that for God to have willed what he has willed is necessary by supposition but not absolutely; and similarly that God wills what he wills.

Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that although God wills that he himself exist by necessity, it does not follow that he wills other things by necessity; for something is not said to be necessary from the condition of the end, except when it is such that the end cannot be had without it, as is clear in the Metaphysics: (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.6, 1015a22.) but this does not happen in what was proposed.

Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that if in syllogisms a principle is necessary, a necessary conclusion does not follow unless the relation of the principles to the conclusion is also necessary. And thus, insofar as an end is necessary, unless what is for the sake of the end has a necessary relationship to it so that the end cannot exist without it, there will not be any necessity from the end in what is for the sake of the end; for example, even if the principles are able to be true, yet with the conclusion being false because of the lack of a necessary relationship, the necessity of the conclusion does not follow from the necessity of the principles.

Reply Obj. 12: To the twelfth it must be said that whoever is able to will or not to will, if he is able to will after he did not will and not to will after he has willed, he is able to begin to will; for if he wills, he can stop willing and begin again to will; but if he does not will, he can immediately begin to will. But God cannot will and not will in this way because of the immutability of the divine will; but he is able to will and not to will inasmuch as his will is not bound with respect to itself that it will and not will; hence, it follows that for God to will something is necessary by supposition, but not absolutely.

Reply Obj. 13: To the thirteenth it must be said that even though knowledge and power imply a reference to creatures, yet they pertain to the very perfection of the divine essence, in which nothing can exist except what is necessary through itself. For in this respect something is said to be knowing inasmuch as the thing known is in the knower; but something is said to be capable of doing something inasmuch as it is in complete act with respect to what is to be done. However, whatever is in God is necessarily in him; and whatever God is in act he is necessarily in act. But, when God is said to will something, this does not signify that something is in God, but it only implies God's very order toward the constitution of the thing in its own nature; and so the condition of absolute necessity fails in this respect, as was said before.

Reply Obj. 14: To the fourteenth it must be said that that relation always exists in the same way on account of the immutability of the divine will; thus the argument does not follow except regarding the necessity which is by supposition.

Reply Obj. 15: To the fifth it must be said that the will has a twofold relation to what is willed: it has the first relation to it inasmuch as it is something willed, but it has the second inasmuch as it is to produced in act by the will; and this relationship presupposes the first. For we first understand that the will wants something; then from the fact that it wants something, we understand that it would really produce it if the will were effective. Thus, the first relation of the divine will to the thing willed is not absolutely necessary, on account of the disproportion of the thing willed to the end, which is the reason for willing it, as was said; hence, it is not absolutely necessary that God will it. But the second relation is necessary on account of the efficacy of the divine will; and for this reason it follows necessarily that if God wills something by the will of approval, it comes to be.

Reply Obj. 16: To the sixteenth it must be said that even though no contingent middle cause falls between the two orders that the objection touches upon, nevertheless, because of the lack of proportion, the necessity of the first order does not introduce necessity into the second order, as is clear from what was said.

However, what was objected to the contrary regarding the will's freedom has now been solved by the fact that the necessity of natural order does not exclude freedom, but only the necessity of force. But we concede the rest.